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Abstract
In 1993, international food aid reached a record high level, but by 1997 food aid had
fallen to its lowest level in more than two decades. Though the post-1993 decline of
food aid has been the dominant trend in food aid, there has also been a significant
growth in food aid during the period in question. This thesis aims to understand the
paradoxical, but parallel, growth and decline of food aid since 1993 from a neo-
Gramscian perspective. The neo-Gramscian approach to international relations is a
historically sensitive, non-deterministic Marxist perspective, normatively committed
to transformation towards a more just world order. This perspective assists us in
understanding the relative freedom enjoyed by the hegemon from the structural and
institutional constraints faced by other states. The neo-Gramscian approach is unique
in indicating the role of middle powers and international organisations in perpetuating
and legitimising the hegemonic order, whereby middle powers strongly support
international organisations. The decline of food aid occurred because agricultural
surplus availability has remained the most important factor determining food aid
levels, with food aid consequently declining as cereal prices increased after 1993.
Furthermore, the food aid regime has proved too weak to enforce a severing of the
link between food aid and agricultural surplus for most states, particularly the largest
food aid donor and hegemon, the United States. The growth of food aid has been the
result of the support given to relevant international organisations and agreements by
middle powers, despite middle powers initially having been manipulated into
participating in the food aid regime by the hegemonic United States. The possible
implications of the trends identified in this study for the future of food aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa, also enjoy consideration.
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Opsomming
In 1993 het internasional voedselhulp 'n rekord hoogtepunt bereik, maar teen 1997
het voedselhulp geval tot die laagste vlak in meer as twee dekades. Alhoewel die post-
1993 afname van voedselhulp die uitstaande tendens in voedselhulp was tydens die
betrokke periode, het voedselhulp ook gegroei gedurende hierdie tydperk. Hierdie
tesis beoog om die teenstrydige, maar parallelle, groei en afname van voedselhulp
sedert 1993 te verstaan vanuit 'n neo-Gramsciaanse perspektief. Die neo-
Gramsciaanse benadering tot internasionale betrekkinge is 'n histories sensitiewe, nie-
deterministiese Marxistiese perspektief, normatief verbind tot transformasie na 'n
meer regverdige wêreldorde. Hierdie perspektief help ons om die hegemoon se
relatiewe vryheid van die strukturele en institusionele beperkinge en struikelblokke
wat deur ander state in die gesig gestaar word, te verstaan. Die neo-Gramsciaanse
benadering is uniek in die klem wat dit plaas op die rol van middelslag-moondhede en
internasionale organisasies in die stabilisering en legitimering van die hegemoniese
orde. Die afname in voedselhulp het plaasgevind omdat die beskikbaarheid van
landbousurplus nog steeds die belangrikste bepalende faktor van voedselhulpvlakke
is, met 'n gevolglike afname in voedselhulp toe graanpryse gestyg het na 1993. Wat
meer is, die voedselhulpregime was te swak om 'n verbreking van die verband tussen
voedselhulp en landbousurplus af te dwing met betrekking tot die meeste
donateurstate, maar veral ten opsigte van die hegemoon en grootste donateur van
voedselhulp, die Verenigde State. Die groei van voedselhulp is te danke aan die
ondersteuning van die betrokke internasionale organisasies en ooreenkomste deur
middelslag-moondhede, alhoewel die hegemoniese Verenigde State middelslag-
moondhede aanvanklik moes manipuleer tot deelname aan die voedselhulpregime.
Die moontlike implikasies van die tendense geïdentifiseer in hierdie studie vir die
toekoms van voedselhulp na Sub-Sahara Afrika, geniet ook oorweging.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1. Problem statement
In 1993, international food aid reached its highest level since the 1960s. By 1997,
international food aid had fallen to is lowest level in twenty years 1 (see figure 5.1).
The trend in aggregate international food aid is very much a tale of two paradoxical
trends. On the one hand, food aid remains a form of agricultural surplus disposal,
which implies a relative disappearance of food aid when agricultural prices rise (as
happened over the period 1993-97). However, the strict links between food aid and
agricultural surplus have gradually weakened so that, on the other hand, much food
aid has been disconnected from its surplus disposal logic, as indicated by the
development of a food aid regime that is underpinned by states acting less in their
direct self-interest than ever before (with regard to food aid).
Food aid is a supply-driven form of aid, and not, as we would like to believe, demand-
driven, especially in terms of aggregate world levels (chapter 3). When agricultural
surpluses decrease and prices rise, the incentives to donate food aid quickly fade.
With respect to food aid donations, "the passions and the interests (i.e.,
humanitarianism and economic advantage) seem to spring into political action almost
simultaneously when food surpluses prevail. When these food surpluses disappear,
and the world trade in food becomes market-oriented, then the passions subside and
inward-looking interests of the export nations reappear" (Talbot, 1993:164). It is
however too much of a generalisation to regard all food aid donors as equally self-
interested (i.e. dumpers of surplus), but, unfortunately, the more altruistic donors
account for less than half of the world's food aid, the more altruistic often being net-
food importers themselves. The world's largest donor of food aid is the USA, but as
we shall see, the US is also the most recalcitrant and self-interested donor of all.
I In 1993, the aggregate level of world cereal food aid was 15,2 million tonnes, but by 1997 it had
fallen to 5,9m tonnes (USAID, 1998).
2 When I speak of agricultural surplus, I am largely referring to cereal surpluses, as cereals account for
about 90% of all food aid in terms of tonnage.
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2Despite food aid still generally being a form of agricultural surplus disposal, the
record highs reached by cereal prices in 1996 (which indicate a relative absence of
surplus) did not result in a total extinction of food aid. Many states continued to
faithfully donate food aid, despite high international agricultural prices and often
being food importers themselves. This divergence from the more typical surplus
disposal logic of food aid requires a look at the role performed by middle powers in
the world system. The altruism (or more cynically viewed, the lesser direct self-
interest) displayed by these states is consistent with the middle power role, which is
dealt with in chapters 2 and 3. The development of a food aid regime (chapter 4) has
also contributed to the weakening of links between agricultural surplus and food aid
for some states, even though the food aid regime has not done much to solve world
hunger, as the statistics mentioned below testify. The weakening of the links between
agricultural surplus and food aid is what is generally viewed as the
"developmentalisation" of food aid (see Hopkins, 1992; Uvin, 1992).
The reason for lower global levels of food aid lies with donors, and not with recipient
demand. The next paragraph will indicate that any decline of food aid is not explained
by an abating demand. Demand might strongly influence the distribution of available
food aid, but demand is not an important factor in determining overall international
food aid levels. This should be borne in mind so as to prevent the reader from
overestimating the developmentalisation of food aid. Remember that food aid levels
did decline by around 70% over the period 1993-97. Furthermore, this study does not
consider the negative effects of food aid on recipient states, particularly the
disincentive effects on local agricultural productiorr', as food aid is something that is
not likely to disappear. Food aid seems likely to fluctuate in proportion to surplus
availability (even though the developmentalisation of food aid has undermined this
link to some extent), and when the need arises, this surplus will be dumped as food
aid. Therefore it is perhaps better to secure as high and consistent a level of food aid
as possible". However, the world seems a long way from having high and consistent
levels of annual food aid.
3 See, for example, Maxwell (1991) and Schultz (1993).
4 In 1994, the world's most prominent food aid analyst, Sir Hans Singer, suggested that the minimum
level offood aid be raised to 15m tonnes after the Uruguay Round (Raffer, 1997: 1904) to counteract
the counter-cycIicality of food aid with agricultural prices.
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3The aim of this study is to understand international food aid since 1993. The
understanding which I refer to basically involves drawing out the two paradoxical
trends mentioned before, the parallel growth and decline of food aid, as it were. What
originally caught my attention about food aid was its sharp decline after 1993. The
reason for the decline seemed to lie with the surplus disposing character of food aid.
But, this turned out to be too simplistic an answer, as not all states were dumpers of
food aid to a similar extent. Some did not even have surpluses to dispose of.
Furthermore, food aid did not just disappear when cereal prices reached record highs
in 1996. Some food aid seemed to have been disconnected from agricultural surplus.
This "disconnection" can be attributed to the development of the food aid regime and
the contribution of less self-interested middle powers. Thus, any understanding of
food aid could not go without an understanding of both the growth and decline of
food aid since 1993, the decline obviously being the dominant trend since 1993. Both
trends have historical roots prior to 1993, but 1993 has been chosen as the cut-off
point as it was during this year that food aid reached its heighest point in three
decades and also the year that the decline started.
The importance of investigating food aid since 1993 lies in the importance of food aid
as a scarce public good per se, against a background of severely declining levels since
1993. Approximately 828 million people are currently undernourished worldwide
(FAO, 1998b). Since the early 1990s, the number of undernourished people
worldwide has increased both in relative and absolute terms. A study by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that food aid levels will have to
increase to 27million tonnes by the year 20055 to merely maintain current levels of
consumption. Let me bring the importance of food aid closer to home.
5 Total cereal food aid amounted to only 6,5m tonnes in 1997.
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41.2. Prospects for food procurement in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding food aid)
The need for food assistance is particularly pressing in Sub-Saharan Africa", the only
region where undernourishment has increased since 1969 (FAO, 1996a:15).
Currently, 210m people live in Sub-Saharan Africa (39% of the region's population is
presently undernourished). If current trends persist, two thirds of the Sub-Saharan
African population will be undernourished by the year 2007, according to the USDA
(USAID, 1999b; FAO, 1998b). There are three conventional ways in which the people
within a state can procure the food they need to survive. They can produce it
themselves, they can import it, or it can be donated to them by an outside agency. A
brief consideration of the (dismal) prospects of the former two food-procuring
strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa, will indicate the need for sustained food aid to the
region.
In the 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa was virtually self-sufficient in basic food staples
(Watkins, 1996:246), meeting 95% of its staple food needs through domestic
production (Stryker and Baird, 1992:416). By the year 2000, Africa is predicted to be
able to fulfil in only 68% of its staple food requirements through domestic production
(Stryker and Baird, 1992:416). While consumption of traditional staples have
declined, non-traditional staples, such as wheat, have compensated for the declining
availability of traditional staples, even though only about 40% of the wheat consumed
in Sub-Saharan Africa is produced locally (Morris and Byerlee, 1993 :737). What is
more, cereal imports on the whole have increased by more than 100% since 1973
(Lawrence, 1986: 1).
Numerous (infra-) structural factors (have) hamper(ed) agricultural production in Sub-
Saharan Africa'. However, there seems to be some consensus that the most damaging
factor in the decay of agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa has been the
policies pursued by African governments (Lawrence, 1986:7; Asefa, 1994:24; Stryker
6 The focus will be on the Sub-Saharan region as a whole. This obviously ignores the great variances
that exist between the different regions and states in Sub-Saharan Africa with regard to their abilities to
produce, import or receive food. It also does not take cognisance of the pockets of poverty and hunger
that exist within states that should be able to feed its populace on paper. My concern is with the level of
per capita food availability for Sub-Saharan Africa, the region being the unit of analysis.
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5and Baird, 1992:423; Sahn, Dorosh and Younger, 1996:735). Government policies in
Sub-Saharan Africa often reflect an urban bias slanted against the rural population
(Cheru and Gill, 1997:152; Gibbon, 1996:765; Herbst, 1990:951; Medhora, 1994:301;
Riddell, 1992:61), despite the estimation that 80% of the poor in Africa live in rural
areas (Killick, 1995 :309).
Agriculture featured prominently in the structural adjustment programmes that have
been undertaken by (forced upon) many Sub-Saharan Africa economies. Structural
adjustment programmes sought to get the African state out of (agricultural)
economics, let market forces become a stronger determinant of production, and
liberalise internal and external agricultural trades. Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa
agricultural production has not improved greatly in recent years. Therefore, the
prospects for greater food self-sufficiency and increased earnings through agricultural
exports look bleak.
What follows are only some of the criticisms that have been levelled against (the
failed) structural adjustment of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, many of which hint
at the relative inability of Sub-Saharan economies to compete in world markets, even
with regard to the most basic of products. The focus on (agricultural) export-led
growth ignores that African agricultural exports are often of the environmentally
rapacious "extraction type" (Riddell, 1992:63). Promoting economic growth through
the export of basic commodities is regarded as a rather limited strategy, as states with
similar exports will soon flood the international market (if production increases) with
low value-added produce driving prices down (a fallacy of composition), while
expensive and higher value-added imports continue to be imported by Sub-Saharan
Africa states" (Cheru and Gill, 1997: 146; Glover, 1991: 180). Furthermore, the prices
of primary commodities have been on the long-term decline, thereby weakening the
position of Sub-Saharan Africa's many mono cultural economies even further (Jamal,
1994:21). The nature of domestic politics in Sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in export
crops being the last sector to be liberalised (Gibbon, 1996:760). The neoliberal
7 See, e.g. Ugwuanyi and Obinne (1998:48); Sahn, Dorosh and Younger (1996:722).
8 On the structural adjustment of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Bradshaw and Huang (1991);
Gibbon (1996); Riddell (1992); Sahn, Dorosh and Younger (1996).
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6assumptions of price incentives and associated agricultural production increases have
not always held true in practice, as it has underestimated the importance of (infra-)
structural deficiencies and their impact on production. Virtually non-existent roads in
rural areas, increased fuel costs due to structural adjustment programmes, low levels
of technology and the required literacy to employ higher technology, the absence of
electricity in many places, inadequate irrigation with the concomitant dependence on
the weather have all proven to be stumbling-blocks outside the purview of adjustment
programmes (Gibbon, 1996:755; Riddell, 1992:65; White, 1996:797). A further
obstacle to neoliberal economic adjustments lie in the low agricultural supply
elasticity found in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are lower than anywhere else in the
world (White, 1996:797)10.
Before we proceed, it is important to note an important effect of structural adjustment
on African governments, with potentially severe consequences for food security in the
region. The patrimonial state in Sub-Saharan Africa has, almost by definition, been
associated with corrupt and inefficient government. Importantly however, the
patrimonial state has also guaranteed the peace in many of the potentially volatile
regions of tropical Africa. Structural adjustment programmes attack the very core of
what can rightly be described as inefficient and bloated governments (Bradshaw and
Huang, 1991:325; Gibbon, 1996:751; Herbst, 1990:954; Medhora, 1994:301; Riddell,
1992:65; Shaw and Inegbedion, 1994:394). By reducing the redistributive influence of
the state, structural adjustment programmes are taking away the very incentive which
used to guarantee the acquiescence of community strongmen and their subjects. This
has led to increased civil conflict and with Africa's resultant descent into a Hobbesian
state of nature, agricultural production can be expected to suffer accordingly
(Hoogvelt, 1997: 175).
The section above sketched a rather dim picture of Sub-Saharan Africa's ability to
raise its food output. Now, we briefly consider Sub-Saharan Africa's ability to import
food, and by implication, the general health of the region's economy, as the capacity
9 On the glut of tropical products in world markets (which make up two-thirds of Third World
agricultural exports), see note 14, chapter 3.
10 Internationally, the agricultural supply elasticity is on average 0,9, whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa it
is between 0,1 and 0,3 (White, 1996:797).
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7to import food is dependent upon having enough foreign exchange to pay for such
imports. In other words, will the economic position of Sub-Saharan Africa improve in
order for the region to be able to afford more food imports?
The African economic nightmare is a tragic, but indisputable fact. The causes of the
African economic crisis can be grouped into three categories (Glover, 1991:176):
Firstly, external shocks and a hostile international economic environment. Secondly,
the weakness of domestic economies. Thirdly, bad domestic policies. The dispute is
not about these three categories as such, as they are generally accepted, but rather
about the explanatory weight that should be appropriated to each. The explanatory
weight given to each category of problems also determines the course of action in
fixing the problem. Theorists of the left have apportioned relatively more of the blame
for the African economic crisis to the antagonistic structure of the global economy.
Neoliberal assessments and solutions, as have been adopted by the most economically
powerful states in the world and their proxies (the IMF and the World Bank), see the
problem as too much inefficient state intervention along with bad domestic policies.
They see salvation as coming through a freer market and less state intervention in the
economy. The neoliberal solution proffered to the African economies in crisis should
be understood within its global context, driven by the liberalising power of capital.
Since the early 1970s, the world economy has undergone important structural
changes, with dire consequences for much of the Third World, but especially for Sub-
Saharan Africa. Fordist production has internationalised, thereby integrating only a
handful of semi-peripheral states (mostly from Southeast Asia) into the core of the
world economy (Hoogvelt, 1997:45). Trade has become liberalised, with most Third
World economies still exporting commodities of lower added value than those
imported by them from core states. The debt crisis and the globalisationlliberalisation
of international financial markets have resulted in the flight of capital, new loans and
investment from the periphery to the core where investments are safer (Hoogvelt,
1997:77,83). Offering an attractive destination for footloose capital (through high
interest rates, social repression, etc.) is one of the few economic strategies left to
states whereby they can exert some form of control over their economies.
Internationally, national economic and political behaviour has come to be
circumscribed much more by secretive international financial institutions, such as the
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8IMF and the World Bank, in which Northern states hold the lion share of voting
power, than through the closest thing to a world government, the United Nations. The
rise of the "transnational liberal economic order" (Gill, 1990:88) has been
accompanied and facilitated by the growth of a transnational elite, and a parallel
transnational "proletariat" (Hoogvelt, 1997:58). This transnational elite and its
interests have become increasingly disconnected from their national economies. A last
important feature of the world economy since the 1970s is the relative decline of US
hegemony which it had enjoyed since after World War II. This relative decline of the
US to a "minimally hegemonic" position (Cafruny, 1990: 106), has been characterised
by the hegemon being less intent on managing the system and more on the
exploitation and domination of other states.
Hoogvelt (1997:89) argues that most of the Third World (basically the whole of Sub-
Saharan Africa) has become "structurally irrelevant", a fate even worse than being
"structurally exploited". Attempts at integrating Sub-Saharan Africa into the world
economy have failed. Hoogvelt (1997: 176) reaches the pessimistic conclusion that
"Africa is simply too far behind to make a living in the global market. Because of its
structural irrelevance to the global economy, any enforced return to global markets as
agent of economic disciplin~ __can therefore not even be excused on the grounds that
the adverse effects of adjustment will be 'temporary"'. Attempts by development
agencies to help the people of Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Third World to
achieve "self-reliance" has become void of its previously rebellious connotations.
Today "self-reliance" rather refers to a "do-it yourself welfare programme" for those
permanently excluded from the world economy (Cox, 1981: 155, note 42).
The dismal prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa for either improving its agricultural
production or its overall economic position have been noted. International food aid
seems to be something Sub-Saharan Africa will be becoming more dependent on in
the near future and thereby serves as justification for the focus of this study. The
implications of the findings of this study for future food aid will be considered in the
concluding chapter.
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91.3. Method, ontology and organisation
This study is aware of the communication distorting effects of power relations,
interests, history and values on data, concepts and theories in the social sciences.
Habermas 's "ideal speech situation" Il, whereby argumentation which has been rid of
communication distorting power relations remains the ideal which is aspired to.
According to Habermas, this ideal is supposed and anticipated in all discourse.
However, in reality, discourse is not devoid of distortions and Habermas's "ideal
speech position" remains purely fictional. Consequently, theory always contains a
normative element. Also, Vasquez (1995:227) asserts that "[al]ll data are theory-
laden". At best then, one can be aware of one's biases and foundational assumptions,
substantiate claims with appropriate evidence and be open to criticism from other
scholars on all aspects. But, to theorise/analyse non-normatively in the social sciences
is impossible. Re-opening the debate on the fundamentals of the major theoretical
approaches in International Relations is also not possible in a study such as this, and is
seldom done, thereby leading to a certain degree of incommensurability between
theoretical (paradigmatic) positions. Claiming to be objective is also an ideological
position. This will become clearer in the discussion of Cox's (1981:128-130) notion
of "problem-solving theory,,12 (see chapter 2). Such a static view (unintentionally?)
favours the status quo, serving to obscure and maintain the power relations whereby
certain inequalities and injustices are sustained.
Tracing the development of the food aid regime, for example, obviously requires
some form of historical analysis. A historical qualitative approach is careful not to
sacrifice the desire to present an elegant explanation with an oversimplification. The
qualitative historical approach allows for the inclusion of significant (historical)
particularities that might otherwise have fallen outside the purview of a more
quantitative explanation. In this study a certain theoretical approach (the neo-
Gramscian approach) is used inductively, describing and exploring the reasons for the
changes which have occurred in food aid since 1993.
Il For a brief discussion of Habermas's "ideal speech situation", see McCarthy (1978:304-310).
12 For similar ideas, see Habermas on the technocratisation of public life, in Held (1980:263-267).
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Most of this study is approached from a neo-Gramscian perspective. The selective
application of Antonio Gramsci ' s ideas to International Relations, originated by
Robert Cox, offers us a historically sensitive, transformative'f theoretical basis. Neo-
Gramscian scholars recognise the relative fixity of social structure, but then still leave
room for a historically specific social constuctivist role for agency, and a reciprocal
view of the relationship between agency and social structure, which allows for the
theorising of structural transformation. In chapter 2, the virtues of the neo-Gramscian
approach are indicated, in comparison to the problems with liberalism and realism,
with regard to how these approaches would address the research problem. Note that
the choice in favour of the neo-Gramscian approach was made because of the superior
understanding it offers of food aid since 1993. In other words, the potential for
addressing the research problem was the main criterion in choosing a theoretical
perspective. This does not infer that the neo-Gramscian approach is generally
superior, since some theoretical approaches approaches have a greater capacity for
addressing certain issues than do others (e.g. realism explains arms-races better than
liberalism, but liberalism explains economic interaction better than realism). More
generally, the merits of the neo-Gramscian approach to international relations lie in its
foundational historicism and its strong normative commitment to change toward a
more just world order, as shared by the authorl4. However, in my commitment to the
scholarly scrutiny of this thesis, I wish to draw attention to the fact that part of the
reason for the choice of a neo-Gramscian perspective is paradigmatic (in the Kuhnian
sense), as I, the author, cannot be totally disentangled from this study, even though
every attempt is made to attain objectivity.
This thesis seeks to contribute to the study of food aid in the following ways: Food aid
(in contrast to financial aid 15, for example) is seldom dealt with in International
Relations literature'", nor related to the broader global political economy. Never has
food aid been considered by someone employing a neo-Gramscian perspective. The
neo-Gramscian approach is extremely useful in helping us to better "understand" food
13 See Nel (l999b:62-63) on the difference between "trans formative" and "conservative" theories, the
difference being basically similar to Cox's distinction between "critical" and "problem-solving"
theories.
14 See note 37, chapter 2.
15 See section 3.2, as well as figure 3.2, for more on the relationship between food aid and foreign aid
in general.
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aid since 1993, allowing us to make inferences about, for example, the food aid
regime and middle powers that would not have been possible if mainstream
approaches to International Relations were being used. Middle powership is
occasionally mentioned in passing in food aid literature, but to my knowledge no
lengthy discussion of the links between middle powers and food aid has ever been
made. What is more, the neo-Gramscian perspective enables us to challenge the fairly
benign view held of international organisations in the food aid regime (especially the
WFP), as international organisations are shown to be the stabilisers and legitimising
agents of international inequality and injustice.
Existing literature on food aid has guided me to a problem-solving grasp of food aid
and its intimate dependence on the availability of agricultural surplus. Additionally,
the neo-Gramscian approach has been invaluable insofar as it has helped me to
understand why some states are less self-interested donors of food aid than others, as
well as the international politico-economic context within which the food aid regime
functions. The neo-Gramscian approach is also useful in pointing to the power and
interests that underlie and shape seeming normality, neutrality and common sense.
Food aid and relevant agricultural statistics were obtained from the documents and
websites of official national and international agencies (such as the USAID, USDA,
WFP, FAO, IGC, etc.). Data on food aid were also obtained from secondary sources,
such as articles and books on food aid. The discussion of the prospects for food
availability in Sub-Saharan Africa selectively drew on the vast literature on Africa's
economic problems, structural adjustment and agricultural crisis.
States (and international governmental organisations) are central to this study. Food
aid donations are seen as originating from states. Virtually all the food aid distributed
through the world, once used to be the property of governments and their agencies, or,
in the absence of government stockpiles, were paid for by states. It is mostly
governments that contribute to the primary international governmental organisation
concerned with food aid, the World Food Programme (WFP). Furthermore, though
16 The notable exceptions are Hopkins (1992, 1993b, 1993c) and Uvin (1992).
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36% of total food aid was channelled through NGOs in 199i7 (WFP, 1998), much of
this food aid was given to NGOs by states. Over the period 1987-1991, more than
90% of "NGO" food aid was bilateral food aid merely channelled through NGOs
(Shaw and Clay, 1993:34). NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the
distribution of food aid on a sub-international level (that is, once it has reached the
ports of the recipient country), but this takes place irrespective of global food aid
levels and falls beyond the scope of this study. NGOs are therefore important in the
distribution of food aid, but have little influence on the overall quantity of
international food aid.
Except for the United States, states are seen as unitary actors in this study. In the case
of the US, the tremendous influence it has on international food aid levels necessitates
a more refined analysis, which takes into account the divergent tendencies of the
various US food aid lines. States are viewed as being transnationalised (see chapter 2),
whereby
"states now by and large play the role of agencies of the global economy with the task of adjusting
national economic policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of global economic
liberalism. The structure of power is sustained from outside the state through a global policy
consensus and the influence of global finance over state policy, and from inside the state from
those social forces that benefit from globalisation (the segment of society that is integrated into the
world economy)" (Cox, 1999: 12).
In this study, the most important groups of states are the hegemon (USA), traditional
middle powers and food aid recipient states. Only food aid donating states are seen as
important in shaping the food aid regime. Food aid recipients are acquiescent, but do
not play much of a shaping role. This corresponds with the view of food aid as
generally supply driven, and not donor driven. The constraining and enabling
character of the wider world economy, within which these states have to function, are
sketched from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Middle powers and the hegemon fit into
the study as the following way:
Middle powers aim to moderate tensions that might threaten the prevailing world
order. Aid is a typical way of mitigating stress in the international system. However,
middle power altruism is not just the result of the position of these states in the global
political economy, but also of dominant national values and constraints on the foreign
17 The figure was 26% in 1998 (WFP, 1999)
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policy elite of middle powers. Further, middle powers are strong supporters of
international organisation, which constitutes a passing up of direct self-interest. The
altruism of middle powers should be seen in relative terms, and not as something
"pure". As such, middle power altruism can be reframed as a greater negation of
direct and short-term self-interest'f than one would find with the hegemon.
Middle power altruism and their inclination to moderate tensions that might threaten
the prevailing world order, stand somewhat in contrast to the posture assumed by the
hegemon and premier food aid donor, the US, toward food aid matters. As mentioned,
the US is the most refractory of all major donors. Surplus-disposal concerns figure
much more prominently in US food aid policy than in that of any other donor state. It
will be argued that the hegemon has drawn middle powers into the food aid regime to
share the food aid burden (an unenviable task when agricultural prices rise), an
arrangement that is especially beneficial to the agriculturally competitive US. This has
allowed the US to reduce its role in providing food aid, and in a wider sense, also to
ensure some international stability, widen the hegemonic base and universalise
arrangements that it benefits from. The US, however, remains central to the food aid
regime in two important respects, firstly, as the largest donor of food aid, and
secondly, as the hegemon that underpins the current world order. Though the two
dimensions of America's international role cannot be understood in isolation, the
research question directs the study into focusing more strongly on the former
dimension of US involvement in food aid. In fact, a whole chapter is devoted to US
food aid policy (chapter 5). The reason for such a strong focus on US food aid policy
is that, remembering the period under investigation, the decline of US food aid
accounted for two-thirds of the total decline over the period (1993-96). Between 1993
and 1996, US cereal food aid decreased by almost 70%, whereas European cereal
food aid declined by only around 40%. Furthermore, in 1995, the US reduced its
commitment to the legally binding Food Aid Convention by 50%. In sum, American
food aid donating habits deviate from the ostensibly greater humanitarian concern of
other major donors. To think that in the 1960s world food aid was virtually
synonymous with US food aid!
18 In food aid terms this refers to the relative severing of the link between, and dependence on, the
availability of agricultural surplus.
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Many food aid lines exist under the rubric of "US food aid". The sizes of donations
given through these lines do not oscillate similarly. The two most important food aid
lines in US food aid are Title I and Title II of the Public Law 480 (PL480) of 1954.
During the period 1955-92, Title I food aid accounted for 70% of total US food aid,
but by 1998, Title I had declined to only 20% of the US total which was already much
reduced. Title I is very strongly motivated by surplus disposal needs, with market
development in recipient states also being a function of Title I. Title I food aid is
administered by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) which more
than hints at the interests that underlie this form of aid. The US Agency for
International Development (USAID) administers the other major US food aid line,
Title II, which is driven more by altruistic and developmental concerns than Title I,
and has actually increased somewhat in recent years. By disaggregating US food aid
into its most important lines (two other programmes, Title III and Food for Progress,
will also be touched upon), an even more nuanced understanding of (the decline of)
food aid can be attained.
US hegemony, is dealt with from a neo-Gramscian perspective (chapter 2). Thus
understood, the US enjoys more freedom and benefits from structural conditions in
the global political economy than any other state. Given the view of the agent-
structure problem held by neo-Gramscian theorists, the US is also the state most able
to influence the system within which other states/actors function, particularly noted in
the development of the food aid regime (chapter 4). American hegemony further
enables it to escape censure and pressure from other states to a great extent. Of all
states at the present juncture in history, no state is more able and successful in
pursuing its national interests, as articulated in various state-sectoral dyads, than is the
USI9. The relative freedom and success of US foreign policy are the reasons for the
theoretical underpinning of the chapter on US food aid being more rational choice
based, which is an agent-centred perspective, and not very cognisant of structural
impediments to unit behaviour.
19 See chapter 2, and also Buzan (1995:204); Hollis and Smith (1990:7-9).
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A neo-Gramscian perspective is particularly useful in better understanding the role of
international organisations in the hegemonic order (chapter 4) and ties in well with the
typically strong support middle powers give to the process of international
organisation. This perspective emphasises the role of international organisations in
legitimising and supporting the hegemonic order (Cox, 1981: 136; 1983: 172), often
performing a mere stopgap function, without ever addressing or altering the more
fundamental causes of global inequality, injustice and other problems. International
organisations are situated within a broader regime, institutional ising at least one
aspect of a particular regime. Regime development is theorised along two dimensions,
one normative and the other behavioural. In chapter 4, the development of the food
aid regime is explicated along the two aforementioned dimensions. Thereafter, the
roles fulfilled by the most important international organisations in the food aid
regime, In particular the World Food Programme (WFP), toward sustaining the
hegemonic order, and benefiting those at the core of this hegemony, will be
expounded. Whatever counter-hegemonic tendencies are displayed by the WFP, will
be indicated.
As the title of this study indicates, there has been both a growth and decline of food
aid in recent years. This study seeks to draw out these paradoxical elements which
characterise food aid. The organisation of this study, given both the growth and
decline of food aid is as follows: The growth of food aid is indicated mainly in the
latter half of chapter 3 (sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.) where (middle power) food aid less
driven by agricultural surplus is considered. This builds on the theoretical treatment of
the middle power concept in chapter 2. Chapter 4 traces the development of the food
aid regime, which has ensured some consistency in food aid levels. Chapter 4 also
notes how the food aid regime, but more particularly the international organisations in
the regime, support and legitimate the hegemonic order, thus preventing fundamental
solutions to world hunger from being enacted (see also the theoretical foundation laid
for international regimes and international organisations in chapter 2). Title II of US
food aid (in chapter 5) is another example of the developmentalisation of food aid,
albeit that Title II falls under the broader rubric of "US food aid", which has declined
greatly in recent times. The decline of food aid is first indicated in the first half of
chapter 3, where the general surplus disposing logic of food aid will be shown. The
reason for the decline of food aid since 1993 is then located largely with the United
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States, the world's largest and most self-interested donor (chapter 5). The reasons why
the US is able to realise its direct and short-term self-interest like no other state can, is
theorised in chapter 2 (section 2.2.3).
The concluding chapter will provide an overview of the main arguments and findings
of this study, as well as point out some of its shortcomings and possible directions for
future research on food aid. Finally, chapter 6 will consider the implications of this
study for the future food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, the importance of which has
already been inferred. But, it is to the theoretical underpinning of much of this study
that we now turn.
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Chapter 2 - Some central concepts: A neo-Gramscian perspective
2.1. Introduction
Neo-Gramscian scholars can be classified as Marxist, due to the centrality of
production, and the antagonistic social relations engendered by the production
process, in their analyses'. The neo-Gramscian strand of Marxist thought deviates
from deterministic Marxism", into what Drainville (1994) has called "open Marxism".
Neo-Gramscian theorists recognise the relative permanence of social structure, but
then still leave room for a historically specific social constructivist role for agency,
and a reciprocating view of the relationship between agency and social structure,
which allows for the theorising of structural transformation. Social structure is viewed
historically as the result of a specific configuration of the varying interaction between
ideas, material capabilities and institutions at various connected levels. "Institutions
reflect the power relations prevailing at the point of origin", even though they can
become the focus points in a struggle between opposing social forces (Cox, 1981: 135-
137). Institutions generally proffer the opportunity to anchor and perpetuate a
hegemonic order. Accordingly, the need for force recedes and the inequities sustained
by prevailing power relations are obscured. The legitimacy of the hegemonic order is
achieved through the co-option of rival groups and the acceptance of ostensibly
universal and benevolent norms, ideas and theories that secure the continued material
pre-eminence of the most powerful social groupes), though a dialectical approach does
not exclude the possibility of the seed of its own destruction being carried by
hegemony. In a hegemonic structure, "the power basis of the structure tends to recede
into the background of consciousness (Cox, 1981:137). Cox (1981:141) sees
nationally based production and the social forces engendered by it as the ultimate
source of hegemony, but only arising at certain historical junctures.
There is no such thing as a non-normative theory or position in Social Science, even
though it is an ideal that is aspired to. What I find particularly attractive about the
1 For liberal (economic) theorists, production and economic interaction also enjoy theoretical primacy,
but their general view of the consequences of production are more sanguine than that of neo-
Gramscians theorists, and all Marxists, for that matter.
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neo-Gramscian perspective is its emancipatory potential (George, 1989:274; Sinclair,
1996:14) as well as its ethical commitment to a more just world order (Gill, 1991;
Mittelman, 1998:68,73), unlike that found in much critical social theory', The ethical
and emancipatory promise of the neo-Gramscian perspective is enabled by Cox's
(1981: 128-130) distinction between "problem-solving theory" and "critical theory" ,
which even Waltz (1986:338), appreciates.
Problem-solving theory seeks to solve to immediate problems, fine-tuning prevailing
social and power relationships and institutions in which these relationships are
manifested, without critically reflecting on the fundamentals of these relationships
and institutions. Problem-solving theory is ahistorical in its isolation and law-like
solution of a problem. This reflects the conservative bias inherent to problem-solving
theory, obscuring the inequalities and injustices behind claims of being value-free and
scientific (Cox, 1981:128-130; 1994:101).
Critical theory acknowledges the inescapability of an ideological bias to any
theoretical position, and as such does not reject problem-solving theory, but merely
requires it to be aware of its implicit normative posture when claiming to be "value-
free". Critical theory seeks to escape from contributing to, and legitimising the
prevailing unequal social and power relations by reflecting on the origins and
development of the current order. Unlike problem-solving theory, it tries not to
address problems in the isolation of various academic (sub)fields, but rather aims to
provide a more holistic understanding. Critical theory, although lacking the precision
of problem-solving theory, claims to provide a more realistic portrayal of the world,
as it understands the world as being in constant interconnected, historically bounded
flux, such dynamism being the reality of social and political order(s). "Critical theory
allows for a normative choice in favour of social and political order different from the
prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are
2 Deterministic Marxism goes under various names, for example, (mechanical) structural Marxism,
scientific Marxism and dogmatic Marxism (see, e.g. Gill, 1991:52-58; Drainville, 1994:107-108).
3 For the sake of clarity Critical Theory (in upper case) refers to the strand of thought associated with
Jurgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School; critical social theory refers to the broad field varyingly
opposed to modernity, such as the Frankfurt School, post-modern, post-structural, feminist,
environmentalist, neo-Gramscian, etc. approaches; and critical theory (lower case) refers to Cox's and
the neo-Gramscian use of the term.
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feasible transformations of the existing world ... reject[ing] impossible alternatives just
as it rejects the permanency of the existing order" (Cox, 1981 :128-130).
Before discussing the weaknesses of the neo-Gramscian approach, let us justify the
application of this approach to the research problem by considering how the two
major theoretical approaches in International Relations, realism and liberalism, would
probably have gone about understanding the decline of food aid since 1993. The
inadequacies of these other approaches will be indicated, only with regard to the
problem at hand. An extended discussion and comparison of the realist, liberal and
neo-Gramscian approaches will not be offered. Hollis and Smith (1990:60), under the
influence of Thomas Kuhn, state that "it is virtually impossible to think of a way in
which [theoretical approaches in International Relations] could be tested against one
another". Gilpin (1987:41) is also doubtful as to the possibility of rapprochement
between the various perspectives and progressive engagement across paradigmatic
lines. Some theoretical approaches explain certain phenomena in international
relations better than do others, despite paradigmatic incomparability. Our concern is
with the adequacy of their understanding of food aid since 1993.
In the first chapter the two strands of understanding food aid since 1993 were noted,
namely the decline and growth thereof. In this study the decline of food aid is linked
to the drying up of agricultural surplus to dump as food aid, as indicated by high
international cereal prices. However, account must also be taken of the
"developmentalisation" (growth) of food aid, whereby some donors persist in their
donation of food aid, despite not having agricultural surplus to dump. In the following
section, the way in which such a two-fold argument could be approached from either
a realist or a liberal perspective will be stated, along with the weaknesses of these
approaches to the problem at hand.
From a realist perspective", the importance of national security in an inherently
conflictual world, where external dependence in key economic areas (such as food
production) should be avoided, would explain and justify the surplus disposing
4 There are many strands of realism, as with most other perspectives. The strand I have chosen as
representative of the realist school, is based on the work of Kenneth Waltz (1979), which has also been
referred to as structural realism and neo-realism.
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character of food aid. Only once states have satisfied their internal nutritional needs
should they be concerned with hunger beyond its borders, if at all. The self-interested
and fundamentally conflictual character of interstate relations precludes morality from
playing a behaviour-inducing role. Morality is useful only insofar it serves to justify
self-interested state behaviour, for example, proclaiming the beneficence of food aid
when there is agricultural surplus to be disposed of. Reduced food aid donations,
when international agricultural prices rise and thus indicating less surplus (as
happened after 1993), come as no surprise since states seek to satisfy national
demands for food before any other uses for agricultural produce are considered.
How would one explain net-food importing states donating food aid from a realist
perspective? The development of international regimes has been one way in which
some predictability has been brought to counteract the uncertainty of an anarchic
world. Regimes require powerful states, preferably the hegemon, to ensure the
stability of a regime, and compliance with its rules. Only under the leadership of a
powerful state will the threat of retaliation loom large enough to ensure the obedience
of lesser states. Regimes usually favour the hegemon disproportionately (Gill and
Law, 1988:39), implying a greater cost for other states. Regimes do confer some
normative credibility to regime rules, even if such normative credibility only serves to
obscure underlying power relations. The inability to resist the (tacit) threat by
powerful states explains why even net-food importing states donate food aid.
What are some of the weaknesses of a realist analysis? Firstly, the view of the state as
a unitary, although parsimonious and powerful, is too simplistic for the problem at
hand. It does not enable one to theorise divergent interests and goals pursued by
different segments of the same state, for example, between the departments of
agriculture and foreign affairs on food aid issues.
Secondly, norms' do playa behaviour influencing role, and do not always just serve
to justify self-interested behaviour. Admittedly, it is hard to causally connect values
5 I follow Nel's (1998: 106) example, whereby he sees norms as "moral beliefs that have become so
institutionalised in a specific setting that they can be expected to be a significant contextual
constraining or motivating factor". This defmition captures two connotations of the concept "norm",
namely the moral as well as the patterned behavioural elements. Further, the defmition recognises that
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and behaviour, but normative considerations have an influence on how states behave
against other states. Thérien and Noël (1994:552) argue that foreign aid donations are
driven by "the same level of state responsibility at the international level as ... at the
domestic level" (as manifested in state welfare institutions and policies). Evidence of
the influence of domestic values can be found by comparing the aid contributions of
liberal welfare states (e.g. the USA, Canada and Australia) to that of social
democratic welfare states (e.g. Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands) (Thérien and
Noël, 1994:545-6).
Thirdly, the realist view of power/hegemony places too much emphasis on (latent)
relational power. As a consequence, realist theorists have trouble explaining why
states willingly contribute to a regime, such as the food aid regime, in the seeming
absence of duress and immediate self-interest. In the case of the food aid regime,
pressure from the hegemon on other states to share the food aid burden was stronger
during the creation years than it has recently been. What is more, in the case of the
food aid regime, the participation of the hegemon in the regime has receded'', Why
then are states eager to donate food aid, despite the lack of agricultural surplus and
visible pressure from major powers? The answer ventured in this study lies in the
supportive role performed by middle powers in the hegemonic order (in the neo-
Gramscian sense), and their concern with managing conflict in the international
system, the donation of food aid being one particular method whereby tensions in the
international system are assuaged.
Lastly, the realist explanation of why states provide aid as a means of advancing the
power and authority of the donor state (Thérien and Noël, 1994: 531) is inadequate.
The voluntary channelling of aid through multilateral channels dissipates the
influence states can exert through aid, contradicting realist claims that aid is
necessarily a way of augmenting state power.
norms are to the benefit of some ("motivating") and to the disadvantage of others ("constraining"). See
also section 4.2.3.
6 The USA used to donate more than 95% of total world food aid in the mid-1960s (Hopkins,
1992:234), compared to the 51% oftotal cereal food aid it donated in 1998 (WFP, 1998).
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Liberalism is a wide-ranging term, with many potential applications, associations and
meanings. The way the liberal approach in the field of (International) Political
Economy is understood in this study is as economic liberalism 7. Political liberalism
favours individual equality and liberty, although the emphasis varies (Gilpin,
1987:27l
Economic liberalism holds a benign VIew of the free market, which regulates
economic interactions between juridically equal individuals who behave rationally in
order to maximise material gain. The freer the market (from state intervention), the
greater the increase in allocative efficiency, and the subsequent increase in total
human welfare, with the caveat that certain public goods be provided (and market
imperfections corrected to some extent) by a minimal state. Liberals disagree over the
extent to which the state should interfere in the economy. At present,
welfarelKeynesian liberalism is in retreat, and those ideas favouring a "night-
watchman state" at most, are in ascendance (Cox, 1987:286-288), noticeably in the
discourses of powerful international institutions (e.g. the World Bank, IMF, WTO,
etc.) and states (e.g. USA, UK, etc.).
The primacy of economics over politics in the liberal perspective has been implied, in
contrast to the realist approach where economic considerations are subservient to
political/military/strategic concerns. For liberals, man is predominantly an economic
animal. Consequently, material wellbeing is more important for liberals than for
realists, who are more concerned with survival in an antagonistic and anarchic world,
even if it means losing out on absolute gains in wealth". For economic liberals,
relations between individuals, persons or firms are informed by an economic
rationality which seeks the most efficient allocation of the factors of production,
whereby to procure the greatest gain in overall material welfare. The dictates of
economic rationality and market efficiency often involve importing certain products
form outside the borders of a state, even strategic materials such as military
7 Economic liberalism, as described here, corresponds to what Cox 1987 (286-89; 347-53) has called
hyper/ibera/ism, also known today as neo-liberalism.
8 The theoretical tendency of liberal theorists to separate politics and the economy allows for the
distinction between economic and political liberalism.
9 For realists, relative gains vis-a-vis other states are what is important, not absolute gains that are
relative losses to other states.
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equipment, oil and food. But, unlike realists, liberals do not fear the resultant
interdependence. Instead, they view it as the source of stability and a guarantee
against military conflict between states. Increasing interdependence has led to the
institutionalisation of much of international life. International institutionalisation
provides actors with a more predictable and enabling environment in which to
(economically) interact. A good example of the pacifying effects of economic
interdependence is the European Union (EU), which developed out of the European
Council of Coal and Steel Community, created in the early 1950s. Today, military
conflict between the member states of the EU seems preposterous, but would not have
seemed far-fetched fifty years ago, if one remembers the conflict-ridden history of
Europe.
From a liberal perspective, the nature of food aid as a form of agricultural surplus
disposal would not be denied. In fact, economic liberals would see the solution not as
more food aid, but less food aid. Agricultural surplus (and therefore most food aid) is
the result of inefficient government intervention in agricultural economic sectors,
through market distorting devices such as tariffs, export and production subsidies and
other support measures for farmers. The complete liberalisation of agricultural
production and trade will result in demand for food being met by supply through the
market interface.
Answering why some states provide food aid, despite having no agricultural surplus
to dispose of, one could argue that that (food) aid aims to correct the shortcomings of
the market, which even liberals would admit is not perfect in reality. Aid is the
international extension of the way in which states deal with market imperfections on a
national level, political liberals would argue. The more redistributive the state (that is,
correcting the inequality generated by the market interaction), the more likely it will
be to donate aid. In effect, food aid is an international public good (and is often
propagated as such), with the result that net-food importing states might feel an
obligation not to free-ride on the contributions of other donors.
What are the weaknesses of the liberal understanding of the decline of food aid?
Firstly, the (theoretical) separation of politics and economics is artificial, leading to an
inadequate understanding of why, for example, states intervene in the economy.
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Liberals might point to unemployment levels, and then to Keynesian strategies to
stimulate demand, as a possible solution. This might make sense, but it ignores the
political pressure that probably resulted in governments implementing Keynesian
reforms. Economic policies do not just change because the market dictates it. The
political participation of those affected by the market must also carry some
explanatory weight. As for food aid, there are strong political reasons why states
generate an agricultural surplus (an economic good), as well as for why some states
are more willing donors of food aid than others.
Secondly, as Gilpin (1987:27) notices, the separation of the economic and political
spheres is an ideological position. There is no natural reason why these two spheres
should be separated'". The policy prescriptions that result from such a view favours
mobile capital, to the detriment of more geographically bounded labour, especially in
the current transnational liberal economic order (Gill, 1990:88; Gill and Law,
1988:50). One could also doubt the seemingly innate logic of the market which
liberals assume, informing our economic decisions independent of influences outside
the economic sphere. The sway currently held by hyperliberal ideas has not developed
naturally. Rather, these ideas have been promoted by powerful interested parties,
whose interests they also serve (Gill and Law, 1988:51), although ascribing this
process a too great a coherence and intentionality would also be mistaken (Drainville,
1994: 116). However, the preponderance of hyperliberal ideas have attained virtual
causal influence (Biersteker, 1995: 180), so as to appear common-sensical11•
Hyperliberal ideas are "ideas backed with power" (Biersteker, 1995: 186), courtesy of
their utility for hegemonic interests.
Thirdly, liberals have an inadequate view of power in the international system, due to
their neglect of the political side of material life. Power is generally viewed as
relational, involving "a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over which
there is an observable conflict of .. .interests, seen as express policy preferences,
revealed by political participation" (Lukes, 1974: 15). Consequently, the
10 For an argument in favour of the "separation of the spheres", see Gagiano and Du Toit (1996).
II In Gramscian terms, hyperliberal ideas have moved from being a contested "collective image"
toward the realm of "intersubjective meanings" (Cox, 1981: 136). See below for a more lengthy
discussion of these two concepts.
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constraining/enabling influence of normative/ideational and structural forces on actor
behaviour is undertheorised. This results in the liberal view of institutions and market
interactions being rather ignorant of the power relations that shape institutionalisation
and economic interaction.
Finally, despite being a wonderful analytical tool, the market (as interface between
supply and demand) has been as much of a problem in the satisfying of human needs
as it has been the solution. The liberal concern with aggregate increases in human
welfare ignores the inequality in bargaining power, as well as the inequality of
transaction outcomes. The assumption is that if the demand exists, the market
mechanism will result in supply meeting demand. A distinction must however be
made with regard to demand. When liberals speak of "demand", they are in fact
referring to "effective demand". Effective demand involves the ability to pay for what
is supplied, regardless of the surfeit of supply, provided that there is not a shortage of
supply. The widespread existence of hunger and malnourishment in the world
suggests a great demand for food. Yet, this demand remains unmet, often due to
political reasons one must admit, but also because many of these people do not have
the money to meet the price asked, even when excess supply exists (as is often the
case with agriculture).
The neo-Gramscian approach is of a different order than (neo )realism and economic
liberalism. (Waltzian) realism'f and economic liberalism are both static and
ahistorical, unable to account for and theorise global structural transformation. The
lack of a transformative vision renders these two approaches as inadequate as the
theoretical inspiration behind a project of fundamental global change. Instead,
economic liberalism and realism are consigned to effect the incremental change
characteristic of problem-solving theory'r'. Although problem-solving theories
generally contain elements of critical theory, and vice versa, the neo-Gramscian
approach lies toward the "critical" end ofthe spectrum.
12 For Cox's depiction of (structural) realism as a problem-solving theory, see Cox (1981 :130-135;
1996:49-59).
13 The practical utility of realism and economic liberalism has not been lost on policy-makers. The
prominence (and self-fulfilling character) of realism during the Cold War and economic liberalism in
the current transnational liberal economic order, as both guide to action and analytical device, has not
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The principal, though somewhat implicit, concern of this study is with world hunger,
and the persistence of the problem amidst tremendous riches. The consideration of
changing food aid levels seems admittedly like a typical problem-solving concern. In
this regard, Cox (1981: 129) states that
"as a matter of practice, critical theory, like problem-solving theory, takes as its starting point
some aspect or particular sphere of human activity. But whereas the problem-solving approach
leads to further sub-division and limitation of the issue to be dealt with, the critical approach leads
towards the construction ofa larger picture of the whole of which the initially contemplated part is
just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and
whole are involved"
The solution to world hunger is not seen as more food aid (even though it might come
to play an increasingly important role). More fundamental change is (was) required (it
might be too late) for much of the South to dig itself out of the depths it is currently
in. Food aid is a useful means of obfuscating this need for fundamental change, by
smoothing over some of the harshness of global nutritional inequality.
Fundamental change, with respect to drastically reducing world hunger, would entail
less antagonistic conditions for Third World agricultural production (as well as for
general economic recovery). Yet, in recent decades much of Third World agriculture
(especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) was decimated by subsidised agricultural exports
from the wealthy North, from behind their highly protected domestic agricultural
sectors. Northern agricultural subsidies and protectionism are extremely important in
explaining the trouble much of Southern agriculture is in today. Of course, the foolish
economic policies of many governments in the South should not be discounted. What
prevents these states from the South that are being plagued by hunger to not perform
better in the current more open agricultural trade system? Firstly, the damage done to
agricultural production capacities in the Third World cannot be mended overnight and
might very well be permanent. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the dominance of
the North in agricultural trade has been firmly established (especially with regard to
temperate products, such as cereals). Northern states, and especially the US, have
captured an increasing share of international agricultural markets, with the market for
been accidental. These two theories have served to legitimate and obscure inequality, injustice and
lopsided power relations in the world.
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many products (e.g. maize) having become quite oligopolistic'". Meanwhile, many
Third World countries have become net-food importers, where once they were net
exporters of food. Thirdly, in instances where Third World states are able to compete
in international agricultural markets, it is often in markets for flowers, tobacco and
other speciality products for finicky Northern tastes. The implication is that such
agricultural exports do little to increase global food supplies, take up land that could
have been planted with food crops, and often benefit mainly wealthy landowners, with
little financial or nutritional benefit for other citizens of the state from whence these
products are exported'".
Cox's notion of critical theory is not unproblematic, even though its potentialities are
superior to those offered by problem-solving theories, such as realism and economic
liberalism. Neo-Gramscian theorists are incisive critics of how global inequality is
maintained (as well as the concomitant inability to overcome inequality), identifying
many aspects of international life that contribute towards maintaining these
inequalities. Neo-Gramscian writers find support for the hegemonic order in the
ideational sphere (the dominance of hyperliberal ideas), in socio-cultural life (the
global spread of American/Western consumerist culture), in political arrangements
(polyarchical democracy), in the economic realm (the liberalisation of the world
economy), and so forth. While I do think that neo-Gramscian writers are quite
accurate in their depiction of how the aspects above maintain (growing) global
inequality, they are rather coy in their theorisation of alternatives and what a preferred
world should look like. For instance, with regard to the ideal political arrangement, is
Fukuyama (1992:xi) not perhaps correct in stating that "the ideal of liberal democracy
could not be improved on"? Robinson (1996b) would disagree. Yet, he tries, rather
unconvincingly, to get away without identifying a specific alternative form of political
organisation on the national level. Robinson (1996b:624) argues that "the polyarchical
definition [of democracy] competes with concepts of popular democracy. Although,
in distinction to polyarchy, there is no fully elaborated theory of popular democracy"
(my emphasis). Neo-Gramscians hardly get beyond the commendable, but
14 See note 24, chapter 5.
15 Many of the issues dealt with in this paragraph, will be treated at greater length in chapters 5 and 6.
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pragmatically rather vacuous notion that a preferred world order should be more just
and equitable. Things are just not that black or white.
A possible way out of escaping the absence of an alternative vision is to accept
critical theory as useful for exactly what its name suggests, being critical, but also to
accept its lack of guidance on practical issues. The distinction between problem-
solving theory and critical theory is useful on an abstract level, as it assists us in
identifying how ideas become ideological (backed by interested power) and
appropriated as justification for behaviour. However, if critical theory (and its ethical
commitment) were to remain merely critical, and not propose practical ways in which
to effect change, what is its use? It is impossible not to consider current structures of
order, and how to deal with them. No matter how subversive one's critical theory, it
will sooner or later have to consider existing arrangements, and therefore become
problem-solving. One could argue that critical theory should remain detached from
everyday concerns, so as to carve out a position to be assumed by the organic
intellectuals of the new historic bloc. But, it is impossible to assume a position if one
does not know what that position is. Critical theory is therefore of limited use as a
guide to practice, but is very useful as an analytical instrument. However, the
distinction between the two types of theory remains easier to maintain in relative
abstraction.
Attendant to the neo-Gramscian inability to provide viable alternatives to the
oppressive organising principles of the current world order, is the tendency to depict
these dimensions of transnational control as more coherent, unified and deliberate
than is necessarily the case. For example, neo-Gramscian theorists are charged with
overestimating the coherence of hyperliberalism, the degree to which the world
economy is a deliberately planned and organised process, and the extent to which
international structures of authority act on behalf of capital (Drainville, 1994:110-
114). One should rest assured, there is no capitalist "conspiracy" in the world, the
scale is simply too vast. However, examples of elite collusion do exist (Gill, 1990;
Taylor, 1999), but one would be mistaken to argue that they "manage" the world
economy. The fact of the matter is that the structural features of the world economy
do much of the "managing" itself, independent of intentional human intervention.
Capital mobility, liberalised trade and the internationalisation of production are all
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faits accomplis, and benefit (transnational) capital greatly. Where the structural
features of the world economy do not shepherd national policy-makers into decisions
amenable to the interests of capital, the hegemony of neoliberal economic thinking
leaves states hardly able to think of alternative economic strategies, in any case'".
Drainville (1994: 111) argues that neo-Gramscian theorists present "[t]he neoliberal
concept of control. .. as the political project of transnational money capital"
Drainville's (1994: 116) conclusion is that neo-Gramscian theorists "underestimate the
partial, hesitant and fragmentary nature of neo-liberalism ... Neo-liberalism is not a
constituted project implemented in the world economy". Drainville is probably right
in his depiction of neoliberalism as having developed somewhat accidentally and
haphazardly (and thus less deliberately) than he accuses the neo-Gramscians of
claiming. Be that as it may, hyperliberal ideas remain the dominant strain of economic
thought, whether its dominance is self-fulfillingly assured by the structural
characteristics of the world economy, through the exertion of power from the core
states in the world economy, or through its virtual causal influence'".
The neo-Gramscian approach offers a rich understanding of how global order is
maintained and (vaguely) suggests possible avenues for fundamental change, through
a selective application of some of Antonio Gramsci's ideas to international relations.
In the rest of the chapter, Gramscian inspired concepts that are deemed central to this
study are elaborated. Criticisms levelled against the neo-Gramscian approach are
addressed where they pertain to the concepts under discussion. Although Gramsci is
the original source on which much of the conceptualisations below are based, he did
not write much about international relations, per se. Neo-Gramscian writers have
16 The South African ANC government's neo-liberal economic strategy (GEAR) seems to be a case in
point.
17 Cox (1987:261) identifies the Chilean coup of 1973, as one example of "how recalcitrant Third
World governments are ultimately removed by violence if they do not conform to minimum standards
of correct world economy behaviour". The war waged against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua
(following the revolution of 1979) by the US government through their proxies, the contras, is yet
another such example. In the case of Nicaragua, civil war lasted for almost a decade, ravaged the
country, and led to the election of a right-wing president, Violetta Barrios de Chamorro, in 1990,
whereby "correct world economy behaviour" was nailed down.
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selectively adapted Gramsci's ideas and applied them to problems of world order
(Cox, 1983:162)18.
In the rest of this chapter, four aspects considered to be central to understanding the
decline of food aid since 1993 are investigated from a neo-Gramscian perspective. We
will examine the role of middle powers in the global political economy; the function
of international regimes and organisations; the hegemonic order and the relative
position of the US within it, and a neo-Gramscian approach to the agent-structure
problem.
The importance of understanding the role performed by middle powers in the
hegemonic order becomes clearer when one recognises the reasons why middle
powers give food aid, and how these reasons differ from those of the United States,
the largest food aid donor. Food aid, on the whole, is motivated by the need for
agricultural surplus disposal, with altruism largely relegated to a rhetorical
justification of such self-interest (specifically in the case of the US). For middle
powers, the mix between non-surplus disposal reasons and surplus disposal reasons
for donating food aid is weighted more in favour of the former. Food aid, for middle
powers, is more of an assuaging instrument in the global cauldron of unlimited wants
and needs, than it is for the US, fulfilling a role that they have, in part, been
manipulated into by the hegemon.
In the section on regimes, I elaborate on the development of regimes along normative
and behavioural dimensions, and its connections to hegemonic power/influence.
International organisations are understood as the initial embodiment of at least an
aspect of a broader regime, legitimising and obscuring the inequalities sustained by
global hegemony. The importance of this section lies in the need to understand why
18 Germain and Kenny (1998:4,13) doubt whether the neo-Gramscian approach to international
relations comprises a "viable interpretation" of Gramsci's ideas, whether Gramsci's central concepts can
be "internationalised" and decontextualised, given that Gramsci's writings hardly extend beyond the
state level and was written in Fascist Italy of the 1920s and 1930s. Neo-Gramscians have never claimed
to be strict interpreters of Gramsci. Their primary aim is not to accurately portray Gramsci, but to better
understand world order and its various dimensions. The imputed "bastardisation" of classic texts is an
inescapable practice in Social Science. Think of how Marxist writing has deviated (and developed)
from what Marx originally wrote. More provocatively perhaps, consider the quip that "Western
philosophy is mere footnotes to Plato".
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the food aid regime, and more specifically the WFP, have not prevented the decline of
food aid, or at least have made greater strides toward overcoming world hunger
The importance of the US as food aid donor, and the need to account for American
intransigence and self-interested behaviour on issues of food aid, justifies a look at the
broader position of the US in the world order, and its relationship to that
hegemonic/world order. Although aspects of a reconfigured hegemonic order are
demonstrated, the US remains the state most central to hegemony, and as such enjoys
relatively much freedom from regime and structural constraints. The US is also the
state most able to shape the normative and institutional framework in order for it to
agree with its interests, as it has done in its manipulation of the food aid regime.
Very closely related, and central to understanding the manoeuvrability of the US in
the global political economy, is the neo-Gramscian treatment of the agent-structure
problem. This section sketches the background against which relative US freedom of
action should be understood, as well as the relatively less room for pursuing self-
interested goals enjoyed by middle powers. The incapacity of the Third World to
secure a food aid regime more amenable to their interests is implied by the portrayal
of the neo-Gramscian "solution" to the agent-structure problem. Structure will be
viewed as both a constraining and enabling factor, varying according to where states
find themselves in international hierarchies. It is to this study's understanding of
middle powers and the roles they play in the hegemonic order that we now tum.
2.2. Neo-Gramscian conceptual tools
2.2.1. Middle powers
Categorising states as middle powers is a problematic exercise. Wood (1990:72-78)
has come up with a fluid but "manageable" group amounting to around 20% of the
states in the world. Cox also favours a fluid categorisation, and even discusses the
state with the second largest economy in the world, Japan, in middle power terms.
Cox (1996:242) argues that "the middle-power role is not a fixed universal, but has to
be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international
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system". We follow Cox's lead and identify middle powers according to the roles
they play in the world economy, rather than according to some arbitrary quantitative
demarcation. To negate some of the fuzziness of the term "middle power", it is
proposed that we distinguish between traditional middle powers and emerging middle
powers'", Though some overlap exists between the distinguishing characteristics of
these two groups, two fairly clear camps can be discerned.
Traditional middle powers, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Canada and Australia enjoy some of the highest per capita incomes in the world and
are stable social democracies. Virtually all the citizens of traditional middle powers
are deeply integrated into the world economy, with their states falling clearly in the
North (core). For this type of middle power, geographical location is nowadays not a
significant factor in accounting for its international role and influence. Although some
counter-hegemonic sentiment does exist in traditional middle powers, it does not
involve a total subversion of the world economic order, as these states typically prefer
the status quo, by which they are best served.
On the other hand, the national per capita incomes of emerging middle powers (e.g.
Brazil, South Africa, India, etc.) hover around the middle income bracket, with many
of these states exhibiting tremendously unequal distributions of wealth. Such
inequality indicates, firstly, that large sectors of emerging middle power societies
have not been integrated into the world economy, and secondly, the semi-peripheral
status of these states. Given the relatively greater integration of these states into the
world economy, compared to other states in their physical proximity, many emerging
middle powers have been identified by the North as proxies for the expansion of
liberal capitalism. These states have democratised recently, and as yet do not have
stable democracies. The relative international influence enjoyed by these states is
attributable more to their regional pre-eminence, than in the case of traditional middle
powers. It is the regional identification and connections of these states that have often
fostered a strong counter-hegemonic tradition (e.g. Pan-Africanism in Africa and the
dependencia writings of some Latin American scholars), though such subversive
19 This study considers only the role played by traditional middle power in the food aid regime, as the
contributions of emerging middle powers, as donors, are negligible. Thus, the terms "traditional middle
power" and "middle power" are used interchangeably.
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fervour has been tempered by economic dependence and transnational elite alliances
with the North. Our concern however lies with traditional middle powers, as they are
the ones that give significant amounts of (food) aid.
While the middle power role involves many behavioural niches, middle powers
generally seek to manage or pre-empt international conflict, by smoothing over
differences between states to ensure "a more orderly world system" (Cox, 1996:243),
multilateralisation being a particularly useful way of ensuring such stability. The
general goal of ensuring a more stable world order results in middle powers
performing various, more specific actions, such as peace-keeping, mediation and
conflict resolution, heading "independent" commissions of investigation, donating aid
to Third World states, and so forth. The great propensity of middle powers for giving
aid to the Third World states is the niche of their behaviour that concerns us here
(Cooper, 1994:3; Pratt, 1990:14). Traditional middle powers, such as Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia, are large donors of aid (in
terms of their per capita GDPs) to Third World states, as has been mentioned. In
1994, out of all states, Norway donated the highest percentage of its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) as Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Third World,
followed by Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. France ranked highest of the
major powers, higher than Canada, with the latter beating Germany and the United
Kingdom (UK). Australia ranked fifteenth, ahead of Japan and the US, but lower than
Germany and the UK (UNCTAD, 1996:25).
Middle power proclivity for giving aid can be explained by various factors on various
levels, such as foreign aid being the internationalisation of the socially entrenched
welfare and humanist values expressed through their states and foreign policies
(Lumsdaine, 1993:121; Therien and Noël, 1994:534); economic and political (and
military) interests (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998:294); and attempts to provide
leadership and demonstrate independence on specific issues (niches) (Cooper, 1995;
Pratt, 1990: 15). The problem with these explanations is that they are easily
contradicted, as the same state sometimes gives aid for altruistic reasons, and
sometimes for self-interested reasons. A neo-Gramscian explanation allows us to
locate more general, non-exclusive reasons for middle powers being such generous
donors of aid at three junctures, namely the structural position of middle powers in the
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global political economy, the constrained influence of middle power foreign policy
elites, and the manifestation of dominant societal values in and through the foreign
policy of middle power state-societal complexes.
The structural position of middle powers dictates that they support the hegemonic
order, but, in turn its behaviour is also shaped by the hegemonic order. Middle powers
are too weak to unilaterally shape global organisational arrangements and, at best,
seek to minimise risk to themselves and to manage conflict, and to support the process
of international organisation with an eye on long-term predictability and stability.
Generous aid donation is one way of realising the above-mentioned aims. One way
through which some stability has been achieved is the linking of the middle power
role "to the development of international organisation. International organisation is a
process, not finality .... The middle power's interest is to support this process, whether
in the context of a hegemonic order or (even more vitally) in the absence of
hegemony" (Cox, 1996:243). Practical concerns are important to consider when
explaining middle power support for multilateral institutions, whereby informational,
bureaucratic and implementation costs for middle powers are reduced, thus preventing
duplication and unnecessary expense. As a matter of fact, the small size of middle
power aid (in absolute terms) and the inability to achieve an "economy of scale",
steers middle powers into using the economies of scale provided by international
organisations. Such pragmatism contributes to the stabilising and legitimising role
most international organisations play in the hegemonic order. Pragmatic
considerations also do not explain why middle powers are often stronger supporters of
an international organisation than the hegemon, despite the latter often having played
a vital role in the creation of the international organisation. Furthermore, international
organisations offer middle powers a forum through which to exert their influence,
given their lack of (structural) power on a global scale (Pratt, 1990: 15). Cox
(1996:243) argues that
"[t]he rules and practices and ideologies of a hegemonic order conform to the interests of the
dominant power while having the appearance of a universal natural order of things which
gives at least a certain measure of satisfaction and security to lesser powers.... The
[hegemonic] order does not usually need to be enforced by direct violence or threat of
violence on the part of the founding power. Middle powers may playa supporting role in such
a hegemonic order".
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While Cox does not idealise the state (in the Hegelian sense), prevalent domestic
social values do find some expression in the state and its foreign policy, and
specifically foreign policy altruism in the form of aid. Van der Westhuizen
(1998:438) concurs that middle power approaches to the global order, and its role
within it, is partly influenced by "the nature or complexity of the dominant values,
social forces and institutions embedded in their state-societal complexes". Lumsdaine
(1993) argues that domestic views on and concerns for justice, equality and poverty
are transferred to the international sphere. Traditional middle powers are typically
social-democracies, in which a strong relationship between domestic social spending
(which indicate national concerns with justice, equality and poverty within the state)
and aid levels have been found, even though not all middle powers give aid to the
same degree (Lumsdaine, 1993: 121). Altruism, therefore is one of the motivating
factors in middle power aid, more so than for liberal-democratic states such as the
US, where the social-democratic tradition is much weaker. The question may be
asked whether traditional middle power concern with global justice and equality is so
great that these societies identify more with the counter-hegemonic project than the
hegemonic? Even supposing that middle power societies regard themselves as
counter-hegemonic, a mollification of these national counter-hegemonic sentiments
occur through the status quo-friendly interjection of foreign policy elites between
dominant national values and the eventual articulation of middle power foreign
policy.
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:57) trace the gradual development of normative support
for the international policies imposed by the hegemon, identifying the particularly
important part played by middle power foreign policy elites. Such normative support
legitimises hegemonic interest maximisation and ensures the continuity of whatever
behaviour has been induced by the hegemon. These two authors provide an incisive
description of the way in which states other than the US (read: middle powers) come
to accept, and gradually view as legitimate the way in which the US originally
prodded them to share the food aid burden in the late 1960s. Ikenberry and Kupchan
(1990:57) describe this process as one of "positive inducement", whereby
"the hegemon initially uses economic and military power to induce elites in smaller states to
change their policies, but the process eventually leads to legitimisation. At the outset of
interaction hegemonic power is exercised ... through coercion and inducements. The hegemon
uses traditional power resources to induce compliance with its principles of order and
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leadership. Elites in secondary nations, with fewer resources at their disposal, adjust their
policies accordingly. It is only later that the normative order, into which the secondary nations
have been forced or induced to participate, comes to be embraced as rightful.. .The conformity
of secondary nations begins only hesitantly. Elites in those nations may have very different
views concerning the organisation of international relations. It is only after a time that beliefs
in the normative virtues of the system emerge ...Two factors provide the impetus for
legitimisation in the positive inducement model. First, entering into a subsidiary relationship
with a hegemon requires compliant behaviour and, consequently, a diminution of de facto
political sovereignty. Participation in the system thus threatens to undermine a [secondary
state's] domestic legitimacy. The problem can be mitigated if the public of the secondary state
sees the hegemon as legitimate. In other words, elites may embrace and espouse the norms
articulated by the hegemon in order to enhance their own domestic legitimacy. Second, elites
in secondary states may face a degree of cognitive dissonance because the policies they
implement may not correspond with their beliefs. This dissonance can be reduced if the norms
that guide policy came to correspond more closely to practice."
Middle powers play an important role in maintaining the legitimacy of the hegemonic
order, contributing to the "buying off' of potential threats to the system. An important
instrument, through which middle powers acquire international influence, but at the
same time stabilise the current world order, is international organisation.
2.2.2. International regimes and international organisations
The generally accepted definition of regimes is Stephen Krasner's (1983a:2), whereby
regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge". From this definition, it is
useful to disaggregate the foundations of regimes into normative and behavioral
components. The normative foundations of regimes encapsulate the values, norms,
principles, ideas, ideologies and theories that enable mutual understanding and co-
ordination among a diversity of actors. The behavioural foundations of regimes refer
to the (patterned) action of actors in an issue-area of the global political economy'".
Although the normative leg of a regime precedes the development of a behavioural
leg (Keohane, 1989:4), persistent patterned behaviour does assume a "normative
significance" of its own (Krasner, 1983a:9, 18). Behaviour and the normative order
that accompany a regime affect each other. In practice, it is considerably harder to
20 The types of regimes envisioned here are "material" regimes. Material regimes concern economic
goods and how the trade, distribution costs and production of these goods are arranged internationally.
This differs deliberately from security regimes (e.g. NATO), as "high politics" works according to a
logic that resemble a realist worldview, whereas with "low politics", norms and absolute gains are
more important.
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distinguish the effects of norms on behaviour, and vice versa. The normative implies
(a) preferred course(s) of action, whereas established behaviour (e.g. stopping, or not
stopping, at a red traffic light) acquires normative weight. A change in the
behavioural aspect of regimes (rules and procedures) is merely a change within the
regime, whereas an alteration in the normative bedrock amounts to a change of the
regime itself (Krasner, 1983 :3-4). As will be discussed later, the normative basis of
regimes is to be found in the hegemonic order, with the implication that a change in
the nature of hegemony will result in a change of the regime. Strange (1983:345)
asserts that "[a]ll those international arrangements dignified by the label regime are
only too easily upset when either the balance of bargaining power or perception of
national interest (or both together) change among states who negotiate them". Strange
might overestimate the propensity for change in international power relations, but she
is correct in identifying the self-interest behind international regimes.
Cox (1981: 136) identifies two Braudelian levels of shared understanding, which allow
for the construction of the normative foundations of regimes, namely intersubjective
meanings and collective images", Intersubjective meanings are those ideas which
seem universal and timeless for all people at a particular time, even though these ideas
do change over the ages. An example of an intersubjective meaning is the
organisation of all people under some juridically defined state. Intersubjective
meanings are objective in the sense that, firstly, these understandings hardly change
over the span of a human life, and secondly, these ideas are very seldom the foci of
normative clashes. One could identify the universalisation of the Western notion of
the state (or even of democracy) as a normative project, but the length of such a
project, coupled with the fact that in the long run we will all be dead, places the
contestation of such a long-term venture beyond the pale of deliberate subversion.
Cox (1981: 136) identifies more contested and mutable ideas as collective images.
"Collective images.. .are differing views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing
power relations, the meanings of justice and public good, and so forth. Whereas
intersubjective meanings are broadly common throughout a particular historical structure and
constitute the common ground of social discourse (including conflict), collective images may
be several and opposed. The clash of rival collective images provide evidence of the potential
21 Braudel would identify intersubjective meanings as the ideational component of the longue durée,
wheras collective images correspond more loosely to the conjunctural perspective of time and change.
See Helleiner (1997) for an application of Braudel's ideas to economic globalisation.
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for alternative paths of development and raises questions as to the possible material and
institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure"
In a hegemonic order, the clashing of "rival collective images" occurs less often than
in a non-hegemonic order. In other words, much of the subjective, socially
constructed norms and understandings come to be viewed as universal and objective
(that is, more like intersubjective meanings), with their contestability increasing as
hegemony weakens. In a hegemonic order, the power bases (of which dominant
understandings form part) that underpin a regime fade into the "background of
consciousness" (Cox, 1983: 168). The seemingly universal notions about an invisible
hand that governs the economy and the superiority of Western culture (Gale,
1998:272) have expedient material consequences for the hegemon, most directly for
its economic elite. The preponderance of ideas associated with hyperliberal economic
hegemony, almost by definition prevents the articulation of alternative arrangements,
framing action in terms that favour the hegemon (Cox, 1996:518). We have sketched
the normative underpinning of regimes. Let us now turn our attention to the
behavioral foundations of regimes.
Notwithstanding that international regimes do not exist as ideals or essences prior to
their emergence (Young, 1983 :95), some normative correspondence between actors is
necessary to accommodate their interaction around a certain international issue-area,
patterned behaviour and the development of an international regime out of it. Young
(1983:98-101) identifies three ways in which international behaviour can be
patterned, preceding the development of a regime. Social institutions, such as
regimes, can arise either spontaneously, through negotiation, or through imposition. In
spontaneous orders, "subjects' expectations converge to a remarkable degree in the
absence of conscious design or even explicit awareness" (Young, 1983 :98).
Negotiated orders involve greater intentionality to establish co-operation and
explicitness on the terms of the agreement. Imposed orders can take two forms.
"Overt hegemony" occurs when a dominant state explicitly forces weaker members to
conform to the behaviour proscribed. "De facto imposition" refers to a manipulation
of incentives for subordinate states to establish an order advantageous to the
hegemon. Young (1983: 102) does mention that the three ways in which regimes
develop are not mutually exclusive, nor need the mix of growth factors necessarily
stay the same, which allows for a dynamic view of regime development.
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Young (1983: 101) is adamant that imposed orders be understood in terms of power.
Young (1983:105,108) is also aware that underlying power relations are important in
the development of spontaneous and negotiated orders, with the benefits derived from
co-operation falling disproportionately toward the hegemon. Continuous exertion of
power by the hegemon is regarded as unfeasible in sustaining a regime (Young,
1983: 101). What is required is the development of a greater normative and cognitive
consonance of subordinate powers with the professed higher principles attached to the
regime by the hegemon, as Young (1983:101) briefly mentions. By more states
internalising the (hypocritical) normative justification for a regime, the regime
acquires greater legitimacy, with the result that the power relations that underpin a
regime recede from consciousness. Spontaneous international regimes arise with a
tacit understanding of the relational power possessed by other participants. Such a
tacit understanding already restricts the spontaneity of regime development. Similarly,
in the case of negotiated regimes, negotiations are entered into with an informal
understanding of the power hierarchy between states, which biases the eventual
agreement in favour of the hegemon.
A useful addition to Young's analysis is a broadened view of power, closer to a neo-
Gramscian position. A neo-Gramscian VIew of power includes the
ideational/normative constraints that accompany the material bases and interests of
the specific hegemonic order, legitimising such an order:
"The rules and practices and ideologies of a hegemonic order conform to the interests of the
dominant power while having the appearance of a universal natural order of things which
gives at least a certain measure of satisfaction and security to lesser powers.... The
[hegemonic] order does not usually need to be enforced by direct violence or threat of
violence on the part of the founding power" (Cox, 1996:243).
Such a normative order facilitates and assists the internationalisation of the ideas and
values that accompany a regime, lessening the need for sustained coercion, an
untenable situation in the long run (Young, 1983: 101). Organic intellectuals play an
important part in linking and promoting the normative justification of the material
arrangement of the hegemonic order, that is, they assist in "cement[ing] the links
between structure and superstructure" (Gill, 1990: 51).
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One can get a better idea of the power that underpins regimes when one considers the
following problem: Leonard Cohen sardonically sang "I have read the Bill of Human
Rights, and some of it was true". The problem raised here is not so much of why
regimes exist in some areas of international relations and not in others, but why some
regimes are stronger than others. Explaining why regimes develop in some areas and
not in others is problematic given the impossible task of categorising and describing
behaviour that is not significantly patterned. Keeley (1990:15) notes that the issue-
area dealt with in an international regime is "a construct within an issue network, with
the principle of construction being disputable". In other words, an issue-area such as
food aid is contained within the competing, hierarchical but flexible dynamics of
broader issue-networks such as humanitarian assistance, (agricultural) trade, Third
World development, et cetera. Although Cox does not imbue these ontological
constructions with a timeless universality, he does argue that "ontologies are
parameters of our existence ...they are not arbitrary constructions; they are the
specification of the common sense of an epoch" through which people understand,
live and organise their lives (Cox, quoted in Sinclair, 1996:8).
Regime strength can be understood in terms of the extent to which actors forego
defection in search of short-term benefit by heeding regime rules. Regimes, especially
initially, correspond greatly to the (material) interests of the hegemon. Regimes
therefore tend to inflict greater costs/adjustments on states other than the hegemon.
Regimes that closely correspond to the interests of the hegemon, are embedded in the
normatively and materially strong national civil society, but which has been spread
throughout the world, being the closest approximation of a "global culture" that exists.
A regime that strays from merely corresponding to the hegemonic interest (i.e.
becoming more autonomous from the hegemon), needs to be underpinned by an
alternative socio-political base, a new historic bloc as it were. "The national context22
remains the only place where an historic bloc can be founded, although world-
economy and world-political conditions materially influence the prospects for such an
enterprise" (Cox, 1983:174), as the New International Economic Order (NIEO) found
out in the early-1980s23. What has been implied is that regime strength is dependent
22 There is disagreement on this. Drainville (1994: 121-124) argues that an alternative hegemony should
be constructed in the world economy itself, rather than being relegated to the national level.
23 See Augelli and Murphy (1993).
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on either the support of the hegemon, and its ability to ensure that other members
behave according to regime rules, or on the support of a greater proportion of
alternative (counter-hegemonic) socio-political forces in international society. There
are no strong regimes of which the hegemon is not a member, and in the more
successful and influential regimes (e.g. the international free trade regime), the US
plays a prominent role, even if this role involves little more than the perceived threat
of American power (retaliation) if things do not go according to the hegemon's liking.
Note that the hegemon's attitude towards certain regimes is not fixed, its attitude is
normally dependent on its self-interest, as initially articulated by domestic political
groupmgs.
Food aid is an international public good. Without it, the world would be generally
worse off. Snidal (1985:586-590) argues that the leadership provided by the hegemon
in the provision of a public good need not be benevolent. In fact, the hegemonic state
can "tax" weaker states into providing public goods to such an extent that the benefits
received by the lesser states may be less than the benefit derived from the public
good. Weaker states will continue to accept their exploitation by the hegemon as long
as the costs of being exploited are not exceeded by the costs of overthrowing the
hegemonic state (Snidal, 1985:588), a position that admittedly assumes a high degree
of state rationality and perfect information.
In reaction to Puchala and Hopkins's (1983:86) rather open claim that "regimes exist
in all areas of international relations" Nayar (1995: 144) adds the following three
delimiting qualifications to the concept "international regime": Firstly, the influence
of the regime should be detectable, independent of the power that underlies the
international system in which behaviour takes place. Otherwise, a regime would just
be a reflection of the international system. Secondly, regimes must be shown to
constrain self-interested behaviour. Thirdly, regimes must be shown to persist after
shifts in underlying power relations. Nayar's qualifications seem to underestimate the
correspondence of regimes with hegemonic power and interests. Following is an
amendment to Nayar's qualifications, so as also to allow for a dynamic view of
regimes.
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Krasner (1983b:357) argues that powerful states create regimes to augment their
interests. This makes Nayar's (1995:144) first stipulation, that regimes should be seen
as influential independent of underlying power relations, problematic. Regimes,
particularly at creation, largely mirror hegemonic interests, implying a minimum of
adjustment for the hegemon. However, regimes and underpinning power relations are
not likely to change at the same speed (Krasner, 1983b:357), as Nayar (1995:143)
also recognises. The presence of "lags" (the persistence of regimes, despite altered
power relations and interests) suggests that regimes assume some independence. But,
in reaction to Nayar's second qualification, this still does not mean that regimes (are
able to) constrain all states equally. Nayar's third qualification, that regimes must be
shown to persist in spite of shifts in underlying power relations, is less problematic.
Even one of the biggest cynics insofar as regimes are concerned, Susan Strange
(1987:555), notes that
"regimes are more that the international institutions set up to administer or facilitate
multilateral co-operation, though international institutions like the GATT or the IMF often
reflect as well as serve the regime. The word regime embraces the customs and habits of
behaviour that, together with the formal agreements and institutions, provide a measure of
continuity and stability in relations of states and of other transnational actors".
Regime persistence (or "lag") after a change in the underlying power interests is a
reflection of the actual existence of a regime. The assumption is that, at creation,
regimes basically reflect hegemonic interests. Previously we have implied that it is
hard to distinguish patterned behaviour, which points to the existence of a regime,
from the way in which hegemonic power shapes the behaviour of lesser states
irrespective of the presence of a regime. Once the interests of the hegemon change,
and the hegemon subsequently does not try to mold the behaviour of other states in
the same way it used to, but lesser states still behave in compliance with "regime"
regulations, we can say with more certainty that a regime exists. In other words, when
hegemonic power recedes, withdraws, or is exerted to bring about a different
outcome, but the behaviour of other members remains the same, a regime clearly
exists. It should be recognised that a regime does not hold the same disciplinary sway
over the hegemon. Krasner (1983b:360) explains such "lags" as a result of custom,
established practice, uncertainty and/or the inability to perceive of an alternative,
preferable arrangement. One can visually depict "regime" outcomes using two
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variables, plotted on two axes. The first variable estimates congruence with direct24
hegemonic interests. The second variable estimates the extent to which non-
hegemonic states continue (or can be expected to continue) to behave in accordance
with regime rules (see figure 4.1).
What then is the difference between international regimes and international
organisations? An international organisatiorr" explicitly institutionalises at least one
aspect of the broader regime. The WFP, for example, deals with multilateral food aid,
whereas the organisation does not have much influence over bilateral food aid
allocations, although there are attempts at co-ordinating bilateral and multilateral food
aid. Various international organisations may be concerned with one regime, as for
example with the food aid regime, where institutions such as the WFP, FAO, CSD,
IGC, GATT/WTO, are all at least tangential to the food aid regime. By
institutional ising convergent expactations in a given area, a yardstick for judging
divergent behaviour is set. Institutionalising international behaviour'" seems like a
step in the right direction, as it reduces uncertainty, and the concomitant co-operation
ostensibly leads to a positive-sum gain.
Incisive criticism against such a sanguine view of international organisation has been
levelled by neo-Gramscian scholars. Young's (1983: 108) analysis of regime
development has already pointed to the bias inherent to patterned international
behaviour, whereby powerful states are favoured. Within such a biased regime, the
hegemon normally initiates the creation of an institution to regulate an aspect of the
global political economy (Cox, 1983: 171). The creation of an international
organisation is " a means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions
24 The specific mention of direct hegemonic interest in reference to short-term and narrow self-interest,
in contrast to more indirect hegemonic interest whereby the system benefits, and therefore the hegemon
too, but there is little direct gain.
25 When I speak of international organisation, I am referring to intergovernmental organisations
(IGOs). Where necessary, I will indicate other forms of international organisation, as identified by
Keohane and Murphy (1992:871). IGOs are more pertinent for the overall research problem, namely
that of explaining the decline of food aid. Much of the food aid distributed by NGOs originally comes
from states. IGOs are the chief stockists and distributors of food aid on an international level, whereas
NGOs generally take care of domestic distribution, i.e. once food aid has been delivered to recipient
countries.
26 Caporaso (1992:603) identifies multilateralism as more than the formal organisation of the world, but
as a normative project as well, "a belief that activities ought to be organised on a universal basis for a
"relevant" (author's disclaimer) group".
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reflect the power relations at the point of origin and tend, at least initially, to
encourage collective images consistent with these power relations" (Cox, 1981: 136).
"International institutions embody rules which facilitate the expansion of the
dominant economic and social forces but which at the same time permit adjustments
to be made by subordinated interests with a minimum of pain" after first securing the
compliance of other powerful states (Cox, 1983: 172).
International organisations are dynamic creations. Though international organisations
reflect "the power relations at the point of origin", they do also "take on their own
life" (Cox, 1981: 136). Little oversight of the day-to-day functioning of international
organisations exists, especially as long as these institutions do not significantly
deviate from major power interests (Keohane and Murphy, 1992:883). At a minimum
then, some independence is possible. Over the longer term, and beyond mere
conveyed bureaucratic autonomy, international organisations perform their hegemonic
function by reflecting and legitimising the hegemonic order, facilitating its expansion,
and assimilating potentially counter-hegemonic elites and ideas (Cox, 1983: 172).
But, are we to accept the international organisations as mere legitimisers of the
hegemonic order, or can these institutions become the breeding ground for a counter-
hegemonic project, as suggested by Gareau (1996) and Nel (1999a)? Can
organisations such as the General Assembly, the OAD, UNCTAD, and so forth, be
the vanguard institutions in the counter-hegemonic assault on the growing inequality
and injustice that characterises the current world order?27 I think that at best, these
organisations are doomed to securing incremental change (war of position"), leaving
27 I am silent on much of what Schechter (1997:22) calls emerging multilateral ism which is "comprised
of a number intergovernmental institutions whose structures and organisational ideologies diverge from
those establised in the immediate post-WW II era and during the height of the cold war; international
non-governmental organisations numbering in the tens of thousands, working independently or in
concert with other non-governmental actors, states and intergovernmental organisations; and so-called
new social movements". The popular conception ofNGOs is that they are generally more concerned
with the plight of the poorest 80% of the world than are most politicians, but it should be borne in mind
that these organisations do not have any official mandate from those with whom their concern lies. The
lack of democratic accountability and a political mandate undermine the seriousness with which non-
governmental contributions are treated. Where NGOs can be useful is in the strengthening of civil
society in the Third World, thereby assisting in the development of an alternative socio-political basis
from which to effectively oppose the current hegemonic order.
28 See Cox (1983: 164-5) and Femia (1981 :50-55) for more on wars of position and movement.
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the origins of global inequality and injustice in tact29. What are the reasons for such
pessimism, apart from the already mentioned hegemonic roles performed by
international organisations in maintaining the hegemonic order?
Firstly, the extremely strong civil society supportive of the hegemonic order'", and the
weakness of civil society in the South, will prevent South-dominated international
organisations from actually governing internationally, presuming (the very generous
presumption) that South-oriented international organisations suddenly assumed great
centrality in issues of global governance (an approximation of the war of movement).
The prospects for a war of position seem just as dim. A war of position requires a
strong, but alternative basis of support in international civil society, which is in tum
dependent on the development of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc on a national
level somewhere in the world. The growth of an alternative strong civil society is
undermined by the increasing global inequality, which is resulting in the destruction
of civil society in the South through war, disease, hunger, poverty and illiteracy. An
alternative international civil society has an almost definitional lack of access to
material and ideological resources vis-a-vis those possessed by the hegemonic
transnational elite.
Secondly, the lack of a clear VISIOnof the organising principles of a counter-
hegemonic world order (Cox, 1981: 150), apart from saying it should be more just and
equitable, renders the South much like a Hollywood character who answered, upon
being asked what he was rebelling against, "Whadda ya got?". Waltz (1986:340) also
points to this weakness, when, in reference to Cox's notion of critical theory, Waltz
says "I read in ...Cox only what such a theory might do rather than what the theory is".
The counter-hegemonic project runs the risk of merely becoming the rubric under
which divergent emancipatory endeavours are grouped, defining itself in terms of the
hegemonic discourse. The counter-hegemonic lack of an alternative vision contrasts
strongly with the clear fundamentals of the current hegemonic order, namely neo-
29 See Augelli and Murphy (1993) for an example of how the potentially counter-hegemonic NIEO was
thwarted in procuring greater global influence for the South.
30 One should not overemphasise the social rootedness of trans nationalist capitalist institutions and
elites in the (civil) societies whose interests they supposedly advance (Drainville, 1994:124). Societies
in the core states of the world economy are developing their "own internal South" (periphery) (Cox,
1994:107), which are negatively affected by hegemonic arrangements, practices and policies.
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liberal economics, liberal democracy (polyarchy), conspicuous consumption, popular
Western culture and "possessive individualism,,3!. Such a lack of "critical" Utopian
vision dooms potentially counter-hegemonic international organisations to a
"problem-solving" role given their concern with the short term, assuming that it is
possible to fully escape the immediacy and reality of the problems of the present.
Thirdly, the "iron law of oligarchy" dictates against those elites representing Southern
interests being fully democratic in their decisions, resisting the generally more
extreme demands for change from the rank and file. The personal material interests of
the elites representing the South in multilateral forums (including organic intellectuals
of the counter-hegemonic variety), might impede reform, as these elites are expected
to negotiate themselves "out of' (material) power, a highly improbable prospect (Nel,
1999: 14). This is not inconceivable, as it happened on a smaller scale (and only in
terms of political power) during South Africa's recent democratisation. It is however
instructive to note that South Africa's transition is widely regarded as a "miracle"!
2.2.3. Hegemony and the position of the United States in the world order
The dominance ("power over") of one state over another is not enough to create
hegemony. The ways of doing and thinking of the prevailing social groups in lesser
states need to conform to the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social
groups in the dominant (hegemonic) state(s) (Gill, 1993:42). A neo-Gramscian
interpretation of the concept of hegemony expands the more orthodox foundations
and measurements of hegemony, namely one state's military and economic
preponderance to include the normative underpinnings of global hegemony (dominant
values, ideas and ideologies) (Gill, 1986:323). The centrality of production, and the
social relations and structures spawned by the relations of production in neo-Marxist
analyses, results in relatively more explanatory weight being given to the economic
aspect of hegemony, than one would find in realist writings. A neo-Gramscian
conception of hegemony involves a large consensual component, and revolves less
around the ability to exert "power over", as is the case with neo-realist understandings
31 To use Gill's (1990:86) phrase.
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of hegemony. As a rule of thumb, the greater the consent, and the less the need for
coercion, the more hegemonic the order. Cox (1983: 171) views
"hegemony at the international level...not merely [as] an order among states. It is an order
within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all
countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of
international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries.
World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political
structure; and it cannot simply be one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony,
furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down
general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across
national boundaries - rules which support the dominant mode of production".
In his often-cited 1983 article, Cox states that a hegemonic order founded and
maintained by the US has been in decline ever since the mid-1960s. In a transfigured
world order one of the possible outcomes he foresees is "a reconstruction of
hegemony with a broadening of political management as envisaged by the Trilateral
Commission" (Cox, 1983: 171). In a 1992 article, assuming that US hegemony has
indeed declined, the outcome he foresees as most likely is "a revival of declining
hegemony underpinned not by one state but by an oligarchy of powerful states that
have to concert their powers" (Cox, 1996:518). Gill (1990) is more insistent that this
is indeed the way in which hegemony has been reconstituted. But, it has become less
the political leaders of this "oligarchy of powerful states", and more the economic
elites based in these states, that affect our daily lives (Robinson, 1996a: 18-20)
This reconfiguration of hegemony is encapsulated by a shift from an international
economic order (characterised by economically sovereign states and national political
economies) to a transnational liberal economic order in which (global) economic
concerns increasingly dominate public agendas to the detriment of (national) socio-
political concerns which have become increasingly marginalised (Gill, 1990:88, 97;
1991 :62-65). ,"National" capital has also been put on the defensive vis-á-vis the
growing importance and influence of transnational capital. The features of the
transnational liberal economic order include the diminished accountability/control of
leaders over the material well-being of its state's citizens; the internationalisation of
the state and of production; the increasing structural power and mobility of capital;
the efficient and global reach of the media, telecommunications and transportation;
and the dominance of neo-liberal views and policies (Cox, 1981: 144-149; 1994; Gill,
1990:88-100; Gill and Law, 1989; Robinson, 1996a). These developments have been
accompanied and facilitated by the growth of a transnational managerial class. This
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transnational elite has been the implementers and apologists of the relocated
hegemonic order. Although hegemony's roots are strongest in the US, this
transnational class has attained a "clearly distinctive class consciousness" (Cox,
1987:359).
The leaders of this transnational liberal economic order is a transnational managerial
class32 gaining prominence at the expense of more nationally focused elites (Cox,
1981:147; 1987:360-362). The transnational managerial class is the leaders of a
broader group benefiting from the current hegemonic order. The original centre of this
broader social group is the American upper and middle classes (the political economic
aspect of their lives was depicted in J.K. Galbraith's incisively titled book The
Culture of Contentment), but has expanded to include much of the societies of other
Trilateral states, as well as the smaller upper strata in the Third World which have
similar material qualities of life. The values, tastes and culture of the US middle and
upper classes have spread to other parts of the world, thanks to American influence in
foreign markets, but also in broader emulation of the hegemon's successful ways
(Gill, 1990:47,86; 1991:63).
The relocation of the hegemonic vanguard, from a national base in the US (during say
the 1950s and 1960s), to a class that stretches across state boundaries33 offers a fresh
perspective on the debate about declining US hegemony. Hegemony, although
corresponding more closely to US interests than to that of any other state, is not
synonymous with US interests (as it pretty much used to be). The aforementioned
shift from a nationally based hegemony to a less state-based hegemony explains the
context of Cafruny's (1990) analysis of declining US hegemony from a neo-
Gramscian perspective. Bear in mind a previous postulate that, for neo-Gramscian
32 I prefer Cox's notion of transnational managerial class to the somewhat overly economistic tone of
Gill's (1990) transnational capitalist class. Cox's term appears more inclusive of the politicians,
intellectuals and high-level bureaucrats that are also essential to the current hegemonic order. Apart
from those in managerial positions in multinational corporations and their families, the transnational
managerial class also includes "public officials in the national and international agencies involved with
economic management and a whole range of experts and specialists who in some way are connected
wth the maintenance of the world economy in which multinationals thrive" (Cox, 1987:359).
33 Albeit that the national identification of the various members of the transnational managerial class
has weakened in some respects (mostly economically), the world has not suddenly become boundary-
less for them. As such, states still play an important role, even for transnational managerial elites
(Murphy, 1998:423).
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authors, the less consensual the order, the less hegemonic it is. Cafruny focuses on
American hegemony (1990:103-114) and divides US post-WW II hegemony into
three successive phases: integral hegemony (1944-60), declining hegemony (1960-71)
and minimal hegemony (1971-present). The phase of integral hegemony, corresponds
with Gill's international economic order; the phase of declining hegemony
corresponds with the start of the transnationalistion of the world economy, and the
phase of minimal hegemony agrees with Gill's transnational liberal economic order.
During the integral hegemonic phase, hegemony is strongest and at its most
consolidated and stable. Integral hegemony is characterised by "a well-developed
sense of common purpose and lack of overt antagonism among various groups. In this
type of regime the ruling group is capable of simultaneously satisfying its own
economic aspirations and those of the system as a whole" (Cafruny, 1990: 105).
Integral hegemony "can persist only in those historical periods when well organised,
widespread opposition is absent or discredited and when the ruling class performs a
progressive function in the productive process" (Femia, 1981 :46).
Minimal hegemony, as currently exerted by the US, is primarily due to the
transnational managerial class no longer as strongly identifying with, being as
restricted by, and being held as accountable by states, as during the time of Gill's
international economic order. This has often placed politicians and economic elites at
odds (think for example of the arguments spawned by the relocation of American-
owned production plants to Mexico and Southeast Asia). Political and economic
leaders no longer have the same objectives, as they tended to have during the
international economic order/integral hegemony phase. Even though these economic
leaders are obviously not omnipotent in their ability to politically "control" and shape
the world order, their hand is strengthened vis-a-vis nationally based (and focused)
politicians by the "behavioural and structural power of capital" (Gill and Law,
1989: 182-4), with transnational capital resisting any attempts at "state or interstate
control or intervention" (Cox, 1994:99). The power of capital reinforces, and is
reinforced by, the orthodoxy attained by hyper-liberal ideas (particularly its
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antagonistic stand towards government in general''") and influential non-populist and
undemocratic international forums (such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, Trilateral
Commission, World Economic Forum, etc.). One should not exaggerate the tension
between American political elites, as linkages, overlap and sympathies do exist
between these groups ". Overlapping interests and "membership" between political
and transnational economic elites make it very difficult to discern when one should
view American political elite behaviour as on behalf of US interests, and when it is
(transnational) class motivated. Subscription to liberal economic ideology is,
however, one way of distinguishing between transnational and nationally focused
elites (Gill and Law, 1988:67).
Minimal hegemony is characterised by the inability/unwillingness of American rulers
to "devise policies capable of serving common interests, but the subordinate groups
[being] too weak to consolidate a counter-hegemonic bloc" (Augelli and Murphy,
1988: 125), their leaders co-opted through a process of trasformismo'" (Femia,
1981:47). In such conditions, dominant classes no longer "accord their interests and
aspirations with the interests and aspirations of other classes" (Femia, 1981:47),
acting unilaterally on behalf of specific interests (Cox, 1996:245). Such a weakened
"hegemony loses its ethical nature and becomes a fraud at the expense of the subaltern
classes, a deceit by which they are victimised" (Augelli and Murphy, 1988:125).
Although only minimally hegemonic, the US remains the most powerful state in the
world, and as such is (still) able to force other states to incur certain costs or shoulder
a burden to the benefit of the US. The point of declining US hegemony is that self-
interested American behaviour can no longer masquerade behind grand and quite
34 The state, although generally maligned by neo-liberals, remains integral to the hegemonic project, as
noted in the increased importance of those arms of the state most connected to the global economy,
such as treasuries, central banks and finance ministries. All the while, state agencies with a more
national focus have declined in importance (Baker, 1999:81; Cox, 1994:49; 1996:516).
35 Gill's (1990) study of the Trilateral Commission, a forum global elite consensus forming and co-
operation, is instructive for those groups excluded, as he himself indicates. Gill's study helps us to gain
a better understanding of the political subgroups that have more sympathy with the hegemonic project
than others. The assumption is that those American subgroups that are excluded from the Trilateral
Commission, are more Americanist in their motives for action (though this is obviously not a very
accurate assumption to make). Members of the Trilateral Commission are typical of the transnational
managerial class. Members are internationalist in vision, and as such the Commission excludes smalI-
scale and "national" capital, as well as communists, left-wing socialists, ultra-nationalists, populists
and radical right-wingers (Gill, 1990: 156, 158).
36 Trasformismo is the assimilation and co-optation of leaders from threatening subordinate groups,
whereby the organising of class-based opposition is undermined (Cox, 1983: 166).
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universally accepted moral principles as was once the case, nor does it benefit the
system as widely as it did during the phase of integral hegemony. A slight inversion
of Nos sal's (1999) argument serves the neo-Gramscian argument quite nicely. Nossal
argues that the US has not experienced a decline of its power. Nossal (1999:7-10)
mentions numerous examples of American unilateralism and explicit assertions of
power. The "loose talk, rudeness and arrogance ... carry few costs for the United States
(Nossal, 1999:15). However, unlike with realist notions of hegemony, American
"domination" indicates a decline of hegemony, not the assertion thereof (Neunfeld,
1995:15).
Germain and Kenny (1998: 17) are correct in saying that the measurement of
hegemony is problematic, especially at the level of world order. How does one
measure and compare the absence/presence of opposition, or the extent of the
legitimacy enjoyed by a hegemonic order? The answer to this difficult question, I
would venture, is that the immense and increasing poverty and inequality
characteristic of the world at present (Robinson, 1996a:21-23) are the major indicators
of the illegitimacy (compared to thirty years ago, for example) of the current order.
This view is admittedly an explicitly normative one, implying a preference for a world
where everyone's basic needs are satisfied, even if it happens to result in lower
absolute gains in overall welfare, which seem to be the liberal economist's
yardstick.".
Hegemony should not be understood as an absolute, an either or state of being, since
total omnipotence is impossible (Strange, 1987:557). Instead, hegemony should rather
be visualised along a continuum where the amount of fraud and coercion used is .
inversely proportional to hegemonic pervasiveness. This understanding of deep-
rooted and inconspicuous power does not preclude the use of relational power by, or
conflict and competition between, the hegemon and other states, even its allies
(Cafruny, 1990: 104), but stresses that the challenge and the outcome is very much
constrained by the "limits of the possible" (Gill, 1991 :55). However, such conflict and
competition hardly threaten the survival of the world system or allow for the rise of a
37 For a philosophical support of my normative stance, see the highly authoritative work by John Rawls
(1973), A Theory of Justice.
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counter-hegemonic bloc. This fluid view of hegemony can be detected in the writings
of major neo-Gramscian theorists. Cox (1996:517) insists that the "structure of values
and understandings about the nature of order that permeates ... world society ... [i]n a
hegemonic society are relatively unquestioned" (my emphasis). Augelli and Murphy
(1988: 122) state that non-dominant social groups "acknowledge the hegemonic group
as having a leading role in society and a relatively wide political consensus supports
the hegemon's policy goals" (my emphasis). Hegemony is not a definite,
unopposable, infinite, boundless and conclusive reality, even though the domination
aspect of hegemonic powerlknowledge often makes it seems as such. Cracks in the
seeming omniscience of hegemony can be found in the antithesis of hegemony,
namely the counter-hegemonic potentialities of certain oppositional social
movements, institutions and ideas.
Hollis and Smith (1990:7, 197-202) raise the following problem: If state behaviour
has any influence on the system in which it exists, one must explain state behaviour.
Similarly, if bureaucratic behaviour has any influence on state behaviour, we must
account for bureaucratic behaviour. In the case of the US, due to its hegemonic
position, it affects the international system more than does any other state and the
system has less influence on it than it has on other states. The influence of the
American state and the relative freedom it enjoys from systemic constraints accord
American bureaucracies more influence, due to the influence of the state in which
they are situated. Let us now tum to the neo-Gramscian treatment of the agent-
structure problem in International Relations.
2.2.4. The neo-Gramscian treatment of the agent-structure problem
Two important implications arise from Marx's succinct remark that "people make
history, but not in conditions of their own choosing". Firstly, the power of agents
must be recognised as being behind behaviour, but secondly, structural limitations on
agents should not be disregarded (Cox, 1996:50; Dessler, 1989:443). The agent-
structure problem is at least implicitly resolved in most theories in social science, by
pitting agents and structures in certain relations against each other (Wendt, 1987:337).
I will not attempt to defend the neo-Gramscian approach to the agent-structure
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problem"; as it would simply require an exegesis beyond the scope of this study.
Instead I will only state my understanding of the neo-Gramscian position.
Cox and others view structure as influential in delimiting the behavioural scope of
actors in a structure. Instead of lapsing into appropriating structure exclusive,
primordial, independent and mechanistic influence, neo-Gramscians non-
deterministically and dynamically view structure as largely the result of historically
specific "collective human activity,,39 (Gill, 1991:55, 60; see also Germain and
Kenny, 1998:5), although claiming that they view structure as an intentional creation
is inaccurate. For neo-Gramscian theorists, structures are intimately connected to the
politics ofthe transnational elites, and do not enjoy much autonomy to become locales
of conflict and contestation (Drainville, 1994: 114). When not influencing or changing
structural conditions, social, economic and political behaviour further takes place
within the mutable and vague boundaries of a certain social structure (Gill,
1991 :55)40. It is important to note that the behaviour of agents in a structure is
differentially constrained, making some states more equal than others, the practice of
the powerful being particularly meaningful (Drainville, 1994: 108; Gill, 1991 :62).
However, despite the fact that structure constrains, it also enables. No intentional
social activity is possible without the existence of some prior form of social structure
(Dessler, 1989:452). It should be borne in mind that not all units are equally enabled
by social structures. For example, the eloquent and the illiterate are not equally
empowered by language, nor are those who do not speak the "official" language.
The problem with an approach where agency and structure are both dependent and
independent variables is that it becomes nigh impossible to be certain of how strongly
38 For what has become the defmitive introduction to the agent-structure problem in the field of
International Relations, see Wendt (1987).
391t is useful to contrast the neo-Gramscian position with that of realism, such as Kenneth Waltz's
(1979, 1986). Waltz understands structure as existing separately from the agents in that structure,
despite structure being the by-product of original unit behaviour (Dessier, 1989:448-451). Except at
creation, agency plays no rule in shaping the structure, as the essential organising principle of the
international (state) structure is anarchy, anarchy being a permanent condition. States (agency) have
different attributes and strengths, and can even counter structural constraints (Waltz, 1986:344), but the
anarchic nature of the structure renders states to behave similarly. See also Ashley (1986:255-256) for
a brief attack on the inadequacies of "scientific" structural Marxism, as associated with Althusser.
40 A social structure is constituted by "the intersubjective aspect of ideas, ideologies and theories, social
institutions and a prevailing socio-economic system and a set of power relations" (Gill, 1991 :55). See
Germain and Kenny (1998: 10) for problems with such an understanding.
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a unit is constrained by structure or to what extent it is agency driven. The nearest
solution to this problem is to view units in relation to one another, by creating an
implicit hierarchy as it were. For example, one could argue that in the international
system, the hegemon is least constrained and also the most able to successfully satisfy
its national interests. In terms of structural constraints, the hegemon is least
constrained, other major powers (e.g. UK, France, Japan) being significantly more
constrained, but not as much as middle powers. The most vulnerable to, and
dependent on structural forces are Third World states, with a further hierarchy within
this broad group. The extension of the claim that not all states are equally restricted by
structure is that some states are more able to shape the structural conditions in which
all agents exist, often leading to a reciprocal reinforcement of the one by the other. In
sum, behaviour is the result of structure and agency, but for some units structure is
less of a determining factor than for other.
It is in this respect that Hollis and Smith's (1990:7; 197-202) approach to the level of
analysis problem should be viewed. If the units of a system had no influence on the
system", then one need not take unit behaviour into account when trying to
understand the system. But, if we accept the not so contentious claim that the world
system (structure) is influenced by state (unit) behaviour, then we need to examine
unit/state behaviour as well. Similarly, it can be argued that we must account for
bureaucratic influence on state behaviour (Hollis and Smith, 1990:7-8). Accordingly,
a system-state dyad, or a state-bureaucracy'f dyad becomes the unit and level of
analysis (Buzan, 1995:204). In the case of the US, given that it is the most powerful
state in the world, it subsequently affects the system more than does any other state
and the system has less influence on it than on other states. The influence of the
American state and the relative freedom it enjoys from systemic constraints therefore
accord American bureaucracies more influence, due to the influence of the state in
which they are located. The relatively great freedom and power enjoyed by the US,
also makes it more able to actively pursue its interests, as its objectives are less likely
to be thwarted by systemic influences, as would be the case with lesser powers
41 Waltz (1979:79) understands system as "composed ofa structure and of interacting units".
42 I prefer the use of sectoral instead of bureaucratic to describe the various food aid programmes and
their connections with "US food aid".
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Hollis and Smith's (1990:7-9) approach prevents us from reifying the state into a
unitary, rational and coherent entity. Understanding state behaviour in dyadic terms
(i.e. state-sector, allows us to account for the contradictions one often finds between,
for example, US food aid and US agricultural policy, or between US agricultural
policy and US aid policy. A dyadic view of US food aid also allows us to better
understand the inconsistencies of the ontological creation, "US food aid". By breaking
"US food aid" into, for example, state-Title I or state-Food for Progress dyads, the
contradictory effects of lumping together what does not necessarily belong together
are moderated':'.
43 United States food aid is the theme of chapter 5.
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Chapter 3 - Food aid, surplus and agriculture: Some conceptual and
methodological issues
3.1. Introduction
This chapter deals with two themes. The first theme pertains to the conceptualisation
and operationalisation of food aid. The second involves demonstrating that
international food aid is still largely a form of agricultural surplus disposal, but it also
indicates where and how to identify food aid less driven by surplus disposal concerns.
Food aid seems easy to classify as the donation of food to one state by another. In this
study, food aid refers only to international food aid. Such an understanding excludes
governments or other local agencies that run their own internal food aid programmes
(Singer, Wood and Jennings, 1987:14). Problems arise when we define aid in terms of
the purpose it fulfils in the recipient country, that is, is it aid or dumped surplus? We
have virtually no way of telling. That is why this study focuses on the purpose aid
fulfils for the donor). But, for donors, food aid is often a guise for subsidised exports,
so how does one determine the balance of aid/trade in food aid? The valuation of food
aid is complicated by the difficulty of exactly determining international agricultural
market prices, and thereby the various values/costs of food aid to the different donors.
These problems will all be discussed in this chapter.
It is by no means an accepted fact that food aid is a form of surplus disposal, as
agricultural surplus plays virtually no role in the food aid donations of many smaller
donors (Uvin, 1992:304). Food aid is often alluded to as being related to agricultural
surplus in donor countries, but little substantiation and elaboration of this claim can be
found in the literature. The connection between food aid and surplus disposal is either
assumed, or simply not demonstrated in studies which have this view of food aid2.
1 This is consistent, firstly, with the view propounded here that food aid is largely a donor driven
process, as well as, secondly, with the concomitant investigation into the overall decline of food aid
whereby recipient needs are not understood to be of such great importance vis-a-vis those of domestic
stakeholders in major donor countries.
2 Examples of such references to food aid as surplus disposal can be found in Bezuneh and Deaton
(1997:672); Clay and Stokke (1991 :9,27); FAO (1995c:3); Hathaway and Ingco (1995:22-3); Islam
(1996:6); Raffer (1997:1902); Taylor (1992:143); Valdés and McCalla (1996:421) and UNCTAD
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Before the link between food aid and agricultural surplus is shown, the relationship
between international agricultural prices, stock levels and agricultural surplus will be
examined. This will be done so as to enable us to make inferences about food aid
levels based on the level of agricultural prices, stock levels and agricultural surplus.
Once the relationship between the three factors mentioned have been considered, their
relationship with international food aid levels will be investigated. It will be
demonstrated that food aid levels oscillate in reaction to changes in the international
prices of the main cereals (wheat, maize and rice), stock levels and surplus. However,
the relationship is not perfectly proportional.
Before proceeding, it will be useful to distinguish between the three main types of
food aid (programme, project and emergency), as some types are more driven by
agricultural surplus disposal than others. Programme food aid is a form of
government-to-government food aid. It is provided to recipients as a grant or on easy
credit terms. Programme food aid is a form of balance of payments support, as it
enables foreign exchange-strapped countries to save the money it would in any case
have spent on commercial food imports (Shaw and Clay, 1993:2). Recipient
governments typically distribute programme food aid through normal market
channels. When the amount of programme food aid received equals the food imports
that would have taken occurred in any case, it has no direct production disincentive
effects. This does not deny that the ease with which programme food aid is often
given undermines government incentives to promote domestic agricultural
production. Taylor (1992:143) casts a lot of suspicion on programme food aid as this
form of food aid is often seen as a surplus outlet and a way of circumventing export
subsidy restrictions. Programme food aid also demonstrates the greatest counter-
cyclicality with cereal prices of all the types of food aid.
It is often stated that food aid has become more "developmental" and thus not just an
instrument of surplus disposal (Charlton, 1997:440-444; Islam, 1996:7 and Uvin,
1992). Project food aid does not go directly to governments, as does programme food
aid. Instead, project food aid directly targets the poor and malnourished, typically for
(1996:63). Saran and Konandreas (1991) offers the most extensive explication of the relationship
between food aid and surplus disposal to the author's knowledge.
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specific development projects. Unlike programme food aid, project food aid raises the
nutritional level in a country, being additional to normal commercial imports. Project
food aid is distributed through non-market channels, so as to minimise its effect on
the functioning of food markets. Emergency food aid is given in reaction to man-made
or natural disasters. Project and emergency food aid levels have remained fairly
constant in the last decade and constitute "developmental" food aid, that is, food aid
less driven by agricultural surplus disposal motives. There appears to be some
substitution between project and emergency food aid, but the combined level of the
two types of food aid has stayed fairly constant (see figure 3.1). The relative stability
of the aggregate of project and emergency food aid can largely be accounted for by
the contributions of middle powers, but also from the contributions made by the US
under Titles II and III of the Public Law 480 (PL480) programme. Though
agricultural price levels influence project and emergency food aid levels, surplus
disposal is less of a consideration with these two types of food aid, than it is with
programme food aid.
Figure 3.1. Food aid deliveries by category, 1988-97 (in 1 000 tonnes)
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Source: (WFP, 1999b)
3.2. Conceptualising food aid
Internationally, food aid is generally understood to be a transfer of food to a state
from outside its borders as a grant, or with a concessional element of at least 25%.
This yardstick is somewhat arbitrary and obscures some of the problems in
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determining exact levels of food aid. Furthermore, conceptual problems relating to
food aid, whether in terms of the actual classification of food aid as food aid, or the
problems of valuating food aid, also require consideration'. By first looking at some
conceptual problems with food aid, some of the measurement problems (which are
discussed in the latter part of this section) will become more obvious.
This study uses the food aid statistics provided by the WFP, FAO, IGC, USAID,
USDA and other official agencies in this study. These agencies indicate food aid
donations by tonnage (and generally not in terms of value). The reason for their
choice of measurement will become apparent in the following discussion when the
difficulty of measuring food aid in any other way will be demonstrated. The food aid
statistics provided by the aforementioned agencies often portray food aid as a clear-
cut category of foreign aid.
Much food aid provides budgetary relief to recipient countries, incurring savings in
foreign exchange in the current account of the recipient, as poor states no longer have
to pay (as much) for food they probably would have imported in any case, since these
states now receive food on concessional or grant terms. Such food aid therefore fulfils
the same role as financial aid, namely acting as balance of payments support in the
recipient state. But, such food aid is reckoned as food aid, and not as financial aid.
Conversely, much financial aid is in effect food aid. A financial transfer to a recipient
country frees up foreign exchange to be spent on additional imports, some portion of
which may be on the importing of food. Furthermore, how should one count monetary
contributions made by donors under the Food Aid Convention (FAC)? Is it financial
aid, or is it food aid? The same question can be asked of triangular food aid4.
The FAC of 1967 set a binding minimum commitment of 4,5m tonnes, less than half
the quantity the United States originally wanted. The FAC 1967 spread the burden
from three to seventeen industrialised states, excluding Argentina (lGC, 1998a). Only
in 1980 was the FAC minimum increased to 7,6m tonnes. The first downward
3 This section is based largely on similar arguments expressed in Singer (1987), Raffer and Singer
(1996:73-79) and Shaw and Singer (1996:452-456).
4 Triangular food aid involves, for example, Sweden purchasing maize from Kenya to be used as food
aid in nearby Ethiopia. Below, triangular food aid is discussed at somewhat greater length.
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adjustment in the FAC minimum occurred in 1995 when the minimum commitment
was reduced to 5,4m tonnes (USAID, 1998). If one uses the FAC minimum as a
yardstick for measuring the overall obedience of regime members in contributing their
pound of flesh, one is struck by the ostensible altruism of regime members, since their
contributions have always exceeded the predetermined minimum levels. Are we
correct in our assumption of altruism? The answer seems to be negative, and can be
usefully demonstrated by contrasting the minimum contribution of food aid with the
international willingness to provide financial aid. International financial aid targets,
such as the 0,7% of GDP target, have never simultaneously met by all OECD donors,
with total financial aid hovering around the 0,35% of GDP level (Raffer and Singer,
1996:85), having fallen to 0,22% of GDP in 1997 (OECD, 2000). The large donors of
financial aid, the US and Japan, are particularly far from reaching the 0,7% of GDP
milestone. By contrast, many smaller (European) states regularly exceed the 0,7%
level, noticeably Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.
Why have aggregate international targets for financial aid never been met? Domestic
political opposition to financial aid seems to provide the answer, potentially, but this
opposition is rather a manifestation of two rudimentary differences between financial
aid and food aid. The one difference pertains to donor benefit, and the other to the
actual cost of the two forms of aid. The national benefit to a donor giving financial aid
is vague, dispersed, not guaranteed in terms of foreign policy objectives, and domestic
support for it is not as intense as for food aid, even though foreign policy goals are
equally difficult to reach through food aid. By contrast, the strength, access and focus
of certain farm and other lobbies in support of food aid suggest a more immediate and
expressible benefit to the donating state. (Bezuneh and Deaton, 1993:464; Clay and
Stokke, 1991:6; Holdar, 1993:464; Saran and Konandreas, 1991:38; Singer,
1987:324,328). The cost financial aid incurs in the budget of the donor is direct and
measurable. Furthermore, whereas $1m in financial aid is a straight deduction of $1m
from the national budget, the actual cost of food aid is exaggerated in the national
books. As food aid is predominantly surplus produce, the "$lm worth of food aid"
could never have been sold for $lm in a competitive market, as the lack of demand
dictates either a lower price or unsold stock.
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In general terms, the fact that the FAC minimum has always been exceeded, and the
safe assumption that altruism is not a prevailing norm in the global political economy,
suggest that there must be some benefit to the major donors, most of which are net
exporters of food. The benefit to the major donors lies in the surplus disposing nature
of food aid. To use the financial aid contrast once more, money can never be in
surplus, but food can, which explains food aid's surpassing of international targets.
The problem mentioned before remains: how does one distinguish between financial
aid and food aid. The solution proposed here is to consider the way the particular form
of aid is calculated by the donor, because in the valuation of aid, $lm worth of food
aid often costs the donor less than $lm of financial aid (especially for major
agricultural producers). States have various self-interested reasons for donating $lm
worth of food aid rather than $1m worth of financial aid, without the effect on the
recipient even entering into the equation. Calculating food aid in such a way is in line
with the focus on the donating aspect of food aid (food aid as supply driven)
propounded in this study.
While moves are afoot in many donor states to bring food aid into more direct
contrast with financial aid (i.e. increase the substitution between the two forms of
aid), for example the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in the US, an element of
additionality remains. Where food aid comes out of the same budget as does financial
aid, little or no additionality exists, as in the United Kingdoms. Still, the two forms of
aid often come out of different budgets. US Title I food aid offers a shining example,
as it comes out of the budget of the USDA, whereas USAID carries the cost of
financial aid as well as Titles II and III of the Public Law 480 food aid programme".
In terms of aggregate world food aid, it has been found that during years in which
food aid increased, a corresponding decrease in financial aid did not occur, which
confirms the surplus disposal status of food aid, as well as the additionality of it to
financial aid (Saran and Konandreas, 1991 :42).
5 Even when substitution between food aid and fmancial aid occurs, food aid does provide the national
benefit of stimulating national agriculture in the donor state by increasing demand in the cases where
food commodities are acquired within the borders of the donating state.
6 In 1998, food aid accounted for 16% of total US foreign aid (USAID, 199ge). This figure will be
much lower for states for which agricultural surplus disposal motives do not figure in their donation of
food aid.
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Food aid has been in decline vis-á-vis foreign aid as a whole (ODA) (see figure 3.2),
but this is largely due to the increase in aggregate foreign aid over the last few
decades, rather than a decline of food aid per se. However, the increasing substitution
between food aid and financial aid mentioned above, and the gradual disconnection of
food aid from surplus availabitity (the "developmentalisation of food aid) have
contributed to the widening gap between food aid and foreign aid in general. After
decades of steady growth, foreign aid has been decline ever since the peak it reached
in 1992, albeit that this decline has not been as extreme has the decline of food aid
after 1993 had been.
Figure 3.2. Net ODA flows and cereal food aid, 1972-97
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The next conceptual and operational problem concerns the quantification of the
concessional element in food aid, in other words, finding out what part of food aid is
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actually "aid" and what part is "trade"? Part of the problem lies in determining the
exact international prices of agricultural products.
Despite international agricultural prices indicating "trends" in international supply
and demand, the effective prices for wheat, coarse grains and rice have been estimated
to be 30-40% lower than the official Chicago price (Raffer and Singer, 1996:74). This
is due to discounts given to food importers through a maze of bilateral agreements
which include elements of export enhancement programmes, export credits, linkages
with other trade concessions or financial aid, and so forth. Domestic support
programmes to farmers in industrialised states are surplus generating, further
depressing world prices. The importance of all this is that food aid is calculated
according to the depressed world prices. In an international agricultural trading
system free from the distortions mentioned above, prices would be higher, in effect
allowing much more of food trade to be classified as food aid, if the 25% concessional
standard is maintained and food aid is calculated according to the market-determined
higher prices, not the "depressed" prices which one currently finds.
A further conceptual problem pertaining to food aid is determining the value of food
aid. The value of food aid is determined either at cost to the donor and/or according to
market prices or worth to donors. (The latter calculation - worth - cannot be found in
official valuations, but it seems to be the rationale behind some food aid.) Calculating
the value of food aid according to international market prices overestimates the value
of food aid, because de facto market prices are lower than the official prices, as has
been explained. On the other hand, food aid valued according to the cost to donors is
usually undervalued as it does not consider the costs of subsidies, supports and
guaranteed domestic prices, all of which inflate the cost to donors. Costs recovered
through concessional sales also lower donor expenditure in both of the two
aforementioned measures. Singer and Raffer (1996:77) see the true value of food aid
as "somewhere between the international price and the budget cost price". This
understanding is somewhat unmindful of the surplus disposal aspect of much food
7 A half-hearted attempt at solving this problem is made in the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture. It is stipulated in Art 10(4) that "[m]embers donors ofintemational food aid shall ensure
that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less
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aid. In wealthy countries, food, especially the basic products manufactured from
cereals, have low elasticity of demand and price. With the production inducing
agricultural policies found in many industrialised states, it is conceivable that the
market price of certain agricultural products drop below the actual cost of production.
Perverse stories about mountains of grain, lakes of wine and "subsidised" milk
gratuitously fed back to the very same cows that produced it testify to the
valuelessness of certain food stocks in some First World states. These useless stocks
(to consumers in donor countries) often find its way to the Third World as food aid.
Saran and Konandreas (1991 :49) argue that the cheapest way of dealing with such
surplus is through food aid, rather than hoarding stock or crop reduction programmes.
Raffer and Singer's (1996:77) lower level of food aid value could therefore be lower
than the "cost to donors" (which in itself is an undervaluation), depending on the
demand-price-surplus relationship. It is thus more accurate to describe the value of
food aid as having an upper limit lower than the international price, and a lower limit
set at the worth of food aid to donors (not the "cost"). The cost of food aid for major
agricultural producers/exporters is closer to the lower limit than it is for states that are
not major agricultural producers/exporters, such as Japan and the UK, which have to
buy their food aid on the international market. This understanding of the costs of food
aid remains open to fluctuations in agricultural markets, with costs increasing for
everyone during tighter market situations, and vice versa.
The problematic nature of food aid statistics in terms of the type of aid it actually is,
price and value should be clear. Recourse to denoting food aid levels in tonnage is not
unproblematic, though. The problem whether it is food aid or financial aid in terms of
the role it fulfils remains. Determining what qualifies as food aid and what does not
according to price and concessionallevels is a problem that also endures. The varying
cost of food aid to donors has already been mentioned as influenced by the surplus
disposal aspect of the food aid they donate. Food aid tonnage levels, considered in
conjunction with international agricultural prices, indicate surplus levels in the
international agricultural trading system. Comparing tonnage levels allow for greater
comparison between donors as they calculate the costs of their food aid donations
concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986". The USA is the
only donor that does not provide all its food aid in fully grant form.
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differently. Such a form of comparison allows one to see the extent to which different
states resist the counter-cyclical logic of food aid with agricultural prices in their
respective pursuits of the professed altruism of their donations. It should always be
borne in mind that states give food aid (rather than financial aid) for a variety of
reasons which are often not motivated by charitable impulses.
What we have arrived at is that aid should be classified in terms of its first form, in
other words, that which the donor classifies it as. Food aid will be measured in terms
of tonnage, as this offers the simplest means of comparison between donors against
the background of general price trends. No real solutions have been offered in this
section, but hopefully it has aroused a greater sensitivity of the complexities of a
seemingly straightforward commodity such as food aid. The following section will
argue the point that, in general, food aid is intimately connected with agricultural
surplus.
3.3. Food aid and agricultural surplus
3.3.1. Stock levels, surplus and price
What is the difference between agricultural stock and agricultural surplus? While
these two concepts may refer to the same physical body, there is a conceptual
difference". Thus defined, food stocks denote food that has not been sold. Similarly,
agricultural surplus is also agricultural produce that has not been sold. Are the two the
same then? The answer lies in whether that food that is considered to be
"stock/surplus" was ever intended for sale. The question is then, how does one
distinguish between agricultural produce that has been deliberately accumulated/not
sold (i.e. stock) and that which the food producing states have been unable to sell (i.e.
8 The FAO considers food stocks of 17-18% oftotal cereal consumption as the minimum required to
safeguard world food security (FAO, 1998a).
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Figure 3.3. The relationship between the wheat price and ending stocks in
the 1990s
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surplus)? My contention is that this distinction is nigh impossible to draw, especially
on the international level of analysis.
A solution to this conundrum presents itself in the form of international agricultural
prices. Price indicates the relationship between supply and demand9. Price thus
enables us to create a fluid distinction between surplus and stock, indicating a trend,
not a clear cut-off point. Thus, the lower the cereal price, the greater the surplus
element in cereal stocks, ceteris paribus, and vice versa. Whilst I cannot offer a
mathematical formula that captures the relationship between price on the one hand,
and agricultural surplus/stock on the other, a general correlation is undeniable (see
figures 3.2 and 3.3 plotting the relationship between wheat ending stocks and price,
and between maize ending stocks and price). The fact that the troughs of price
coincide with the peaks of stocks, and vice versa, for both commodities'", indicates
the inverse relationship between the two variables, although this inverse relationship
is not perfect.
9 The relationship is obviously not perfect, as demand for the produce of traditional food exporters is
influenced by exogenous factors such as the economic well-being of importing countries, agricultural
production in net food-importing countries, exchange rates, et cetera.
10 In 1997, 89% of food aid was in the form of cereals. Of that 89%, wheat, wheat flour and coarse
grains (of which maize makes up the largest share) represented 81% (WFP, 1999a).
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Figure 3.4. The relationship between the maize price and ending stocks in the 1990s
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Figure 3.4. indicates the inverse relationship between the wheat price (the same trend
is found for maize) and international food aid, and figure 3.5 demonstrates the direct
relationship between food aid and wheat stock levels (the same trend is discernible for
maize). Gilbert (1996: 152) agrees on a correlation between food aid and wheat stocks,
but does not see maize stocks as having any influence on food aid donating
propensity. Gilbert (1996: 146) does point to a study by Shapouri and Missiaen (1990)
which found that in the US, EU and Canada, food aid flows were principally
determined by commodity stocks and the wheat price (due to the large share of wheat
in total food aid), while the budget deficit is a determinant of food aid levels in the US
and Canada. Clay and Stokke (1991:27) concur that the food aid donations of some
donors "are sensitive to prices and the level of national stocks available for export".
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Figure 3.5. Cereal food aid and the wheat price, 1992-97
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Figure 3.6. Cereal food aid and wheat ending stocks, 1992-97
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Could the relationship between food aid and international agricultural prices not be
explained by the fact that many aid budgets are set in nominal terms, so that a price
rise would result in a donor being able to donate less in terms of tonnage, even though
the amount spent remains the same? Although not all food aid programmes are
capped in nominal terms, food aid budgets denoted in monetary value, not in tonnage,
to my mind, do partly explain the aforementioned correlation. In order to argue
around this problem, should one not rather ask questions regarding the reasons for
capping food aid in nominal terms? If food aid were driven by genuine humanitarian
concern, then it stands to reason that the greatest need for food aid is during times of
high international agricultural prices, which indicate a more serious shortage in the
food supply, which puts the most materially vulnerable section of international society
(the poor in Third World countries) at even greater risk. In a truly altruistic world,
such times would witness greater donations of food aid, rather than food aid
increasing when prices are lower and food thus easier to acquire. It therefore seems as
though the capping of food aid in monetary terms prevents food from being given
away (donated) when the "effective" demand for it exists and such food can thus be
sold. Since total world food aid first fell below the (non-binding) minimum target of
10m tonnes per year set at the 1974 World Food Conference in 1995, and has in fact
always exceeded the legally binding minimum levels set by the various Food Aid
Conventions, the implication is that food aid is a form of aid that is often given away
quite painlessly, especially when contrasted with financial aid which has never
reached the international targets set for it (Singer, Wood and Jennings, 1987:39).
If one accepts the link between agricultural stocks/prices and food aid levels, probing
deeper to find the cause of agricultural price increases after 1993 will assist in
understanding the acrimonious environment in which food aid found itself. The
Agreement on Agriculture was signed in 1993, and the Uruguay Round of GATT a
year later. Did the Uruguay Round lead to an increase in food prices upon its
conclusion? There is much dissent surrounding the Uruguay Round and agriculture,
even though there is relative agreement that the Uruguay Round has lain the
foundation for greater liberalisation during future rounds of trade negotiations.
Experts cannot agree, firstly, whether the Uruguay Round actually induced
liberalisation in the agricultural sectors of major food producers (particularly the US
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and the EU) II; secondly, on how significant the liberalising reforms were; and thirdly,
on the link between the Uruguay Round and agricultural price increases after 1993.
What concerns us are the last two disagreements. On the one hand it is argued that the
Uruguay Round induced very little agricultural liberalisation and thus would not have
much of an impact on subsidies and supply, therefore not affecting prices greatly'f.
The opposing view is that the Uruguay Round would/did result in higher international
agricultural prices, especially for cereals, due to the greater significance attributed to
the reforms induced by the Uruguay Round':', As we know, agricultural prices did rise
in the period following the Uruguay Round, with cereal prices reaching its highest
level since the food crises of the mid-1970s 14. One cannot be certain if the reason for
these drastic increases can be attributed to the supply limiting implications of the
Uruguay Round'", or perhaps to increased demand due to "a recovery in world
economic activities" (UNCTAD, 1996: 13).
Be the above disagreement over the cause of agricultural price increases as it may, an
increase in world agricultural prices was anticipated during the negotiation of the
Uruguay Round. Subsequently, the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible
Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least Developed and Net Food-
Importing Countries was included in the Final Act to mitigate some of the problems
the poor net food importers might experience during the years of liberalisation. To
date the Decision has been toothless, and the World Trade Organisation has been
reluctant to commit itself by calling for assistance to poor net-food importing
II There is relative consensus that untenably increasing budget costs prompted the inclusion of
agriculture in the Uruguay Round. Paarlberg (1997:416) argues that the Uruguay Round did not impose
any reforms on the US, and that American reforms were all voluntary. In fact, he argues, the Uruguay
Round might even have prevented more significant reforms in US agriculture. The Uruguay Round did
have some influence on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, but reforms are more
attributable to bilateral pressure from the US. For a similar argument also see UNCTAD (1996:70 note
Il).
12 Hathaway and Ingco (1995:8,23); Valdés and Zietz (1995:923) and UNCTAD (1996:70 note 11).
IJ This view is found in FAO (1995c:13, 22); Goldin and Van der Mensbrugge (1995:36); Greenfield,
de Nigris and Konandreas (1996:367); Hamilton and Whalley (1995:34); Raffer (1997: 1903);
UNCTAD (1996:62) and Yigletu (1997:112).
14 The drastic increases in agricultural prices were mainly found among temperate products, which are
mostly exported by industrialised states. The prices of many tropical products did not increase, such as
for bananas, despite demand for bananas having grown positively in recent times (FAO, 1995c:5;
Raffer, 1997: 1903), while the price of another tropical product, coffee, actually fell by 30% (1994-
1996). Tropical products account for two-thirds of Third World agricultural exports (Greenfield, de
Nigris and Konandreas, 1996:372; Hamilton and Whalley, 1995:42; Valdés and Zietz, 1995:923).
15 A FAO report (1995c:5) argued that the Uruguay Round would have a "negligible effect" on world
agricultural production.
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countries. Thus, while negative effects of the Uruguay Round have accrued
automatically, benefits have not (Raffer, 1997:1903). The inability of GATT, or any
other piece of international legislation to ensure a sustained high level of food aid
points to the weakness of the food aid regime, the topic of investigation in chapter 4.
3.3.2. Food aid less driven by agricultural surplus disposal
It has been acknowledged that not all food aid is equally driven by disposal motives.
It is such food aid that has gradually increased to ensure steady annual levels of food
aid, albeit that these levels are relatively low. It is such food aid that constitutes the
so-called "growth" of food aid identified in the title of this study. This section
investigates the type of food aid more typically considered to be less driven by
agricultural surplus, the channels through which such food aid flows, as well as the
more likely sources of such food aid. Throughout, the connections between the types,
channels and sources of more "developmental" food aid will be indicated. Keep in
mind that surplus disposal still does play a role in the food aid dealt with in this
section, albeit to a lesser extent.
Types: Figure 3.1 tells us that project and emergency food aid donations are fairly
constant, their sum representing a fairly even aggregate, fluctuating between
approximately 4,5m and 7,5m tonnes per year over the last decade. In contrast,
programme food aid shows great variances'". The counter-cyclicality of programme
food aid with agricultural prices (e.g. Title I) strongly suggests its surplus disposal
motivation. Project and emergency food aid, on the other hand, are usually considered
to be motivated by genuine humanitarian concern. Taylor (1992:143) confirms the
general suspicion of programme food aid, as the type of food aid most likely to be
used for the dumping of surplus/circumventing export subsidy restrictions, although it
is not to deny that programme food aid often has positive effects. Our concern,
however, is with project and emergency food aid.
16 Refer to the first two pages of this chapter for a somewhat broader discussion of the differences
between the three main types of food aid.
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According to figure 3.1, project food aid has been in steady decline, with emergency
food aid ever increasing vis-a-vis project food aid. Charlton (1997:445; 451) notices a
similar trend, namely an increasing shift towards emergency food aid, with a
concomitant tendency to replace project food aid with emergency food aid. This is
often due to shifts from developmental food aid to emergency food aid within
predetermined, nominally capped aid budgets. The decline of the more development
orientated project food aid is further attributed to factors such as the greater ease with
which emergency funds can be obtained (vis-a-vis development aid); and the strict
conditions some donors place on their giving of aid, often linking their aid to
structural adjustment programmes, good governance and other objectives, thus
disqualifying many states from receiving aid (Charlton, 1997:452,457).
"Triangular" food aid and so-called "local purchases" are types of food aid, inspired
not by agricultural surplus, but rather by the lack thereof, and has increased in
importance in recent years. It is a special type of food aid that fulfils the same
function as project or emergency food aid (never as programme food aid). But,
triangular food aid transactions have an added benefit in that it involves a donor
purchasing food from a developing country for distribution as food aid in a nearby
third country, thereby stimulating regional agricultural production in the South.
Triangular food aid differs from normal food aid practice in the sense that food does
not originate in developed food exporting countries or in international markets.
Similarly, local purchases involve a donor using cash from its food aid budget to
purchase food for use as food aid within that same country. These two types of food
aid are typically used by net-food importing countries (that is, without surplus to
dump) (Clay and Benson, 1991:144, 165-166). In table 3.1. below, triangular food aid
transactions and local purchases (cereals) are indicated as a percentage of total cereals
donated per donor (1992/93). The huge variation in the utilisation of triangular
transactions/local purchases is striking. Major agricultural producers (e.g. USA,
Canada, Australia and France) donate around 1% (if that) of their total food aid in the
form of triangular food aid/local purcbases'". Conversely, net-food importing
17 An exception to this group seems to be Denmark, which is not a major agricultural producer, even
though it does export cereals on occasion. Danish food aid has shown huge variations, which could
partly explain this seeming discrepancy.
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countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Norway,
Sweden, etc.) donate at least 45% of their food aid in this form (FAO, 1994:48).
Table 3.1. Donor use of triangular food aid and local purchases (as a percentage of total food aid
donated by donor in 1992/93.
Donor Triangular food aid and local purchases
(%)
Australia 1.3%
Canada 0.85%
Denmark 0.03%
France 1.07%
Germany 46.3%
Japan 56.6%
The Netherlands 64.3%
Norway 60.8%
Sweden 75.1%
United Kingdom 51.7%
United States 0.16%
Source: Adapted from FAO (1994:48).
Channels: The multilateralisation of food aid has ensured some consistency in
minimum annual food aid levels, constituting another dimension of what has been
termed the developmentalisation'i of food aid (for want of a better term). However,
states differ in the extent to which they support the multilateralisation of food aid, as
revealed by the size of their contributions under the Food Aid Convention (FAC)19
and the proportion of food aid channeled multilaterally. Middle powers such as
Australia, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands donate more than half of their food
aid multilaterally, as opposed to the US and the EU which are predominantly bilateral
donors (Shaw and Clay, 1993:2). Support for the multilateralisation of food aid can be
gauged, firstly, by the degree to which states behave as "middle powers". The second
indicator is a donor's status as an agricultural producer, that is, whether it is a major
agricultural exporter or not.
18 The multilateralisation of food aid involves two types of food aid, project and emergency food aid.
Project food aid is the purest form of development assistance through food aid, even though
programme and emergency food aid may also have developmental consequences. Hence the
"developmentalisation" of food aid.
19 See table 4.1.
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Why is it argued that the multilateralisation of food aid represents a move away from
the surplus disposal logic that is more characteristic of bilateral food aid? Suppose a
state has consistently donated 50 000 tonnes of food aid (under some form of
multilateral agreement, or at a minimum, through some multilateral organisation). It
would be more difficult for such a state to deviate from its patterned behaviour, as it is
expected to share in the burden. Further, in a multilateral institution a state invites
verbal censure, at least, should it renege on previous commitments. With regard to the
"disciplining" of changes in the bilateral behaviour of states, other states do not have
recourse to the same institutionalised "code" (even though this varies depending on
the issue-area/regime). It is not denied that consistent bilateral state behaviour can
also be difficult to deviate from, but just that it is harder to deviate from patterned
behaviour under multilateral auspices. Multilateral "patterned behaviour accompanied
by shared expectations" becomes more "infused with normative significance"
(Krasner, 1983a: 18) than does patterned bilateral behaviour in the same issue area.
Thus, the multilateralisation of food aid makes it harder for states not to provide food
aid when they do not have agricultural surpluses. This is why the multilateralisation of
food aid represents a move away from surplus driven food aid.
A caveat should be offered with regard to the multilateralisation of food aid, as the
significance of the multilateralisation should not be exaggerated. The growing
proportion of multilateral food aid is taken as an indication that food aid has moved
away from its surplus disposal function, summoning as evidence the proportion of
food aid delivered through the WFP, as opposed to bilateral or NGO deliveries.
Proportionally, multilateral food aid has increased in relation to other channels since
1993, from 22% (1993) to 41 % in 1997. However, this proportional increase
obfuscates the fact that the WFP has not delivered more than 4m tonnes of food aid
since 1993, fluctuating between two and four million tonnes of food aid. In 1993 total
world food aid donations amounted to almost 17m tonnes, but dropped to 6,6m tonnes
in 1997. What these statistics tell us is that the proportion (and not so much the
quantity) of world food given multilaterally has increased, but that great variation
exists in food aid not channeled through the WFP. The great variation of non-WFP
food aid is due to the vicissitudes of international agricultural prices/surpluses. The
multilateralisation of food aid did also not prevent annual donations from falling
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below the target of 10m tonnes per year set at the 1974 World Food Conference. This
caveat with regard to the multilateralisation of food aid should also not lead us to
overestimate the growth in the developmental focus of food aid, as this growth is
much more proportional than it is absolute. Multilateral food aid remains significant,
and thus warrants a consideration of why states support the multilateral channel as
they do.
Sources: Many traditional middle powers'" are not major agricultural producers/
exporters, yet they remain dependable donors of food aid. In chapter 2, three reasons
for such middle power altruism was identified. Firstly, generous food aid donations
are expressions of strong national values regarding justice and equality, articulated
through the foreign policy of the social-democratic middle power state. Secondly, on
a systems level, middle powers seek to manage international conflict in order to
counteract tensions that might pose a threat to the status quo, particularly through
middle power support for international organisation. The donation of food aid is one
way in which to assuage such tensions. Thirdly, middle power foreign policy elites
are influential as the interface between international (top-down) pressures and
domestic (bottom-up) pressures. Under duress from particularly the hegemon, middle
power elites often buckle under international pressure, articulating their position in
accordance with hegemonic wishes, but presenting the adopted position as their own
in order to hide the violation of national sovereignty suffered under their leadership
(Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:58). The first two reasons for middle power altruism
were fleshed out adequately enough in chapter 2 for them to simply be applied to food
aid in particular. The third reason offered above, is an argument made less often, but
is uncannily accurate as to how middle powers were drawn into the food aid regime.
The accession of middle powers into the FAC/food aid regime should not entirely be
seen as behaviour fully motivated by altruism. Before the FAC of 1967, international
food aid was virtually synonymous with US food aid (Shaw and Clay, 1993:5), as, in
1966, the US was providing 98% of total world food aid (Hopkins, 1992:234).
Originally, the PL480 food aid programme of 1954 was first and foremost an explicit
mechanism for agricultural surplus disposal. The US rhetorically attached
20 See chapter 2 for the distinction between traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers.
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humanitarian principles to its behaviour (the disposing of surpluses) and kept quiet
about the selfish rationale for its food aid programme during the early years, even
though it was still fairly obvious. Despite food aid initially being a selfish action, it
did have positive effects in many instances. The point is just that the raison d'être of
food aid (originally, at least) was hardly based on humanitarian concerns. When
international grain markets tightened in the latter half of the 1960s, the US sought to
induce "the acquiescence of other states" (Cox, 1983: 172) to share the food aid
burden'' (which it is during tight market conditions) (IGC, 1998a). (Bureaucratic
permanence, as well as numerous groups with vested interests in sustaining a US food
aid programme, for example, some farmers, the shipping industry, foreign
governments, and so forth, prevented the unilateral termination of the American
programme in the years before the multilateralisation of food aid during this period of
tight grain markets). Despite initial European reluctance to include food aid as part of
the International Grains Agreemenrf, the prospect of a stabilised international grains
market and a sweetener of concessions on industrial products in the Kennedy Round
offered by the US assured European compliance (Cathie, 1997:19). These states also
ran the risk of being branded "free-riders". The result was the first Food Aid
Convention in 1967. Seventeen industrialised states, many of which were not major
food exporters, like donors had traditionally been, and the industrialising Argentina,
signed the agreement (Shaw and Clay, 1993:8; IGC, 1998a).
The humanitarian principles advocated by the US, on which food aid was supposedly
based and which American advocacy gave "the appearance of a universal natural
order of things" (Cox, 1996:243), left initial non-food aid donors without a normative
recourse, courtesy of the power/knowledge foundations of the norms espoused by the
US. The self-interest of the United States, in inducing other states to share the food
aid during a period when the original motivation for food aid (surplus disposal) lost
much of its appeal, must have been fairly apparent to states that were asked to join the
21 The gist of a Gramscian analysis by Cafruny (1990) suggests that the American inducement of others
to share the food aid burden in the late 1960s is a sign of the hegemonic decline of the US. The US
became unable/unwilling to provide leadership and manage the system single-handedly, as hegemons
normally do. Instead, inducing burden-sharing reflected "a tendency of the United States to use power
in ways that reflected national objectives and interests, often at the expense of its allies" (Cafruny,
1990:112).
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FAC (which mostly did not have much agricultural surplus to dispose ot). Yet, the
cost (food aid) that the US was imposing on these states could hardly be resisted,
especially after the promise of concessions in the Kennedy Round of GATT.
Although middle powers did not necessarily buy into the apparent normative
justifications for food aid (e.g. feeding the poor), they gradually began to support and
espouse the moral case for food aid, for the reasons indicated by Ikenberry and
Kupchan (1990:58), and which were dealt with in chapter 2.
These days, middle powers have come to view the donation of food aid as a legitimate
exercise, even priding themselves on their contributions. Moreover, they are more
consistent food aid donors than the USA. As will be made clearer at the end of
chapter 5, the US has retreated from the food aid regime, repositioning itself to
unleash its competitive agricultural exports on the world, while other states carry a
larger share of the food aid burden.
Traditional middle powers are strong supporters of international organisation (Cox,
1996:243) as was indicated in the previous chapter. They are thus more inclined to
channel their food aid through the WFP, as opposed to states that demonstrate less
middle power tendencies, such as the US, which demonstrate more disregard for the
WFP than do most other donors='. By channeling food aid multilaterally, much of the
(short-term) self-interest is dissipated, with these middle power donors acting in the
belief that they are pulling their weight in the provision of an international public
good. However, middle powers do not all donate similar quantities of food aid. It is
important to discern whether a middle power is a major exporter of food (especially
cereals) or not. Major food exporting middle powers generally donate much larger
amounts of food aid than do net-food importing middle powers.
22 Formerly the International Wheat Agreement. The institutionally linked Grains Trade Convention
and the Food Aid Convention, both of 1995, comprise the International Grains Agreement of 1995
(IGC, 1998a).
23 If the diminished use of programme food aid is a further indicator of the developmentalisation of
food aid (declining surplus disposal motivations), then, even in the case of major cereal exporting
middle powers does one detect that these states use programme food aid to a lesser extent than does the
US, particularly its Title I food aid line.
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3.3.3. Agricultural production and middle power predisposition toward donating
food aid
Official international agricultural prices are overstated, as they are in effect lowered
by various bilateral agreements and export subsidies that are virtually impossible to
document (Shaw and Singer, 1996:454). Surplus food has a price that is even lower
than the market price, as surplus by definition denotes that which cannot be sold at the
market price, only at a price lower than that set by the market mechanism, if at all.
This simple economic truth is the reason why net-agricultural exporters generally give
more food aid in relation to its capabilities than do net-agricultural importers.
Consider the similar commitments to the FAC of 1995 by Australia and Japan.
Despite Japan's much larger GDP per capita income and ODA contributions to Third
World states, both countries have committed to a minimum pledge of 0,3m tonnes.
This seems to suggest that 0,3m tonnes of food aid have different costs for the two
donors. Food aid is more expensive for the non-net agricultural exporting state than it
is for Australia, even though Australia's agricultural sector is highly liberalised, no
food stocks are maintained and food aid is paid for out of the aid budget (Shaw and
Clay, 1993:143). Similarly, in 1994, Canada gave only slightly more ODA (in
absolute dollar terms) to developing states, than did Norway. Yet Norway's
commitment under the FAC of 1995 is only 20 000 tonnes, as opposed to the large
agricultural exporting state's (Canada) commitment of twenty times more (400 OOOm
tonnes).
Therefore, agricultural exporters are likely to donate more food aid than states with
similar economic profiles, but which are not net-agricultural exporters. This trend can
be viewed in conjunction with the positive tendency of states that approximate the
role of middle powers to donate aid. States which are not major agricultural exporters,
along with those that are, but pay for food aid out of its aid budget'", are more reliable
guarantors of a steady level of food aid, whereas net-agricultural exporters with an
24 The presence of food aid in the aid budget, and not in the agricultural budget, suggests different
motives for, and behind, giving food aid. In the case of the former, food aid is driven more of a concern
for the recipients than in the latter, whereas surplus disposal plays a stronger role when paid for out of
an agricultural budget.
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element of surplus disposal in their programmes are not reliable for a steady flow of
food aid, especially when agricultural prices are high. Let us briefly consider some of
the food aid donors to demonstrate the interaction of the middle power role and status
as agricultural exporter/importer in determining these states' respective food aid
contributions.
Australia is a major exporter of cereals. It also aspires to a middle power role, and has
a strong social welfare system, even though one will not find such entrenched social-
democratic values as one would in the Scandinavian welfare states. The level of
Australia's commitment under the FAC of 1995 has already been noted and compared
to Japan. Australia's relatively large commitment under the FAC (0,3m tonnes),
considering its limited capabilities, suggests, at a minimum, some gain for Australia.
This gain might not necessarily accrue to the government, which pays for the aid
budget, out of which food aid commodities are purchased from domestic producers.
Australian food aid is not a case of the government trying to get rid surplus stock
since it does not maintain stocks (Shaw and Clay, 1993:143), even though its
purchasing of local stock does stimulate demand for agricultural products somewhat.
However, in 1983, after a bad harvest, Australia purchased food on the world market
to honour its FAC commitment (Shaw and Clay, 1993:144; Uvin, 1992:305). Paying
for food aid out of the aid budget does create problems, as it usurps funds devoted to
other forms of aid during periods of high agricultural prices, which forced Australia to
curb its future commitment, following the price peaks of 1996 (Warr and Ahammad,
1997: 170). Australia is not one of the top donors in terms of ODA per capita, but it
does seem to aspire to play its part as good international citizen, especially with
regard to food aid, if one considers that it channels about half of its food aid through
multilateral organisations. Its contribution would be less were it not a major exporter
of cereals.
Canada is an interesting case as food aid donor. It is a major exporter of cereals, and
is in many ways a typical middle power, given its mid-range capabilities. It is
however a member of the "inner-circle", the Group of Seven (G-7), and is constrained
as such. Thérien and Noël (1994:536) note that "[i]n general, Canada's aid
performance appears generous by comparison with other G-7 countries. The picture
changes, however, when Canadian policies are compared with those of the small
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countries of Northern Europe" with which it is often compared. Given the correlation
between domestic social spending and the willingness to give foreign aid, Thérien and
Noël (1994:545-547) draw a distinction between different types of welfare states,
among others the (Anglo-Saxon) liberal welfare state and the social democratic
welfare state. Canada falls under the first category, which involves a social safety net
but relies on market-based private insurance. The values on which the liberal welfare
state is founded seem particularly vulnerable to the social spending discipline (and
rollback) induced by the "Washington consensus'<'. Another category, social
democratic welfare states, as found in Scandinavia, are built around "universal
programmes embodying social rights" and are less negative about the idea of social
welfare being in the hands of the state. Thus, social democratic welfare states are
hypothetically more resistant against assaults on this virtually fundamental aspect of
Scandinavian life.
Canadian food aid is very similar to that of Australia. Canada's agricultural
prominence enables it to be the largest per capita food aid donor in the world (Shaw
and Clay, 1993:156). Canada has increased the proportion of food aid it channels
through the WFP to about 50%. As with Australia, programme food aid accounts for
about 20% of its total food aid. Programme food aid is dubious, as it is often believed
to be a form of surplus disposal. However, unlike the US, Canadian (and Australian)
programme food aid is entirely on a grant basis. Drainage of Canada's ODA budget is
prevented by the capping food aid levels in dollar terms. For Canada, surplus disposal
nevertheless remains a possibility when required (Saran and Konandreas, 1991 :41).
European food aid consists of fourteen national food aid programmes and one run by
the European Commission. Together, these programmes are making Europe a donor
of increasing importance, having provided 32% of total world food aid in 1997 (WFP,
1998a). The Commission programme provides between a half and two-thirds of total
European food aid (Singer, Wood and Jennings, 1987:25) and has sought to establish
its own identity as a donor, to not just be a reflection and extension of dominant
national donors, even though complete independence is impossible and inherently
25 For a discussion of the structural constraints on Canadian aid policies, see Black, Thérien and Clark
(1996).
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restricted by member states (Cathie, 1997:29). Talbot (1993:155) notices how the
European Commission has aggressively sought to strengthen its authority vis-a-vis
that of the member states (sometimes referred to as "Community dialogue"), with
food aid becoming yet another aspect of European policy-making, instead of it being
done by national governments. The EU programme has a strong multilateral focus
with regard to food aid, as this provides a solution to the inevitable conflict that would
arise if a reconciliation of the fourteen national food aid programmes was to be
attempted (Cathie, 1997:75). The EU distributes about a third of its food aid through
the UN system (mainly the WFP) (Shaw and Clay, 1993:169 and Cathie, 1997:89). lts
bilateral food aid programme is used to build a European food aid donor identity, as
distinct and independent as possible from national European programmes.
Contributions to the EU programme vary from donor to donor, as no enforced
minimum contribution exists.
The number of people employed in the European agricultural sector has dropped from
21% in 1961 to 7% in 1990. Agriculture's share as a percentage of the output of the
EU's GDP had been halved from 1973 to 1990, and the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) is now commanding an even bigger share ofthe European budget relative to its
contribution to total EU GDP (Keeler, 1996:127). Despite agriculture's shrinking
economic contribution and the great expense of agricultural support, the CAP has
withstood major reform. One therefore wonders if the surplus production that has
characterised the CAP in recent times will decrease, especially as the Agreement on
Agriculture decreed a reduction of the export subsidies which the EU used to employ
to get rid of some of its surplus. Some exceptions and loopholes in the 36% reduction
in export subsidies ordained under the Uruguay Round do exist, providing an outlet
for European production. In light of a relatively unchanged CAP, which would have
little disruption on production levels, one can expect the need for a surplus outlet to
remain. Food aid, to some extent, has served to justify the excesses of the CAP, but
food aid remains a by-product of the CAP, rather than primary motivating factor
(Singer, 1987:334).
Despite the fact that European food aid used to be strongly motivated by surplus
disposal needs, the consensus seems to be that European food aid has become more
"developmental". Cathie (1997:47-60) sees European food aid as having been
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delinked from surplus availability and world agricultural price, although Saran and
Konandreas (1991 :40) disagree. The EU has been able to increase its food aid, as
evidenced by the "additionality" of the (food) it provided to the former Eastern bloc
countries and Soviet republics. Furthermore, European food aid is not as self-
interested as that of the US, as all food aid is given as a grant (as opposed to the US
that sells much of its food aid on concessional terms). The Commission has also
delinked trade interests from food aid considerations. The decline of European dairy
food aid indicates a greater concern with the needs of food aid recipients, as dairy
food aid, which is not cost-effective and rather expensive, accounted for more than
half of EU food aid costs during the late 1970s and 1980s (Clay and Stokke, 1991: 11).
Even though European food aid might not be surplus driven in any strict sense, Cathie
(1997: 51) overstates his case when he claims that European food aid is unrelated to
world prices (see figure 3.6). European cereal food aid peaked in 1993 with 4,lm
tonnes, at around the time world agricultural prices started rising. By the time prices
peaked in 1996, European cereal food aid had fallen to 2,4m tonnes, a decline of
about 35%26 (USAID, 1998). This decline indicates a clear relationship between
European food aid and agricultural prices. One should however be careful of the
general claim that European food aid declined because of a lessened need for surplus
disposal. Such a statement might hold true for a major agricultural exporter such as
France, but many European states are net-food importers with little need for
agricultural surplus disposal. Food aid increases in opportunity cost vis-a-vis other
parts of the aid budgets as agricultural prices rise, explaining decreased food aid. The
UK, for example, views food aid as an inferior form of aid (Cathie, 1997:41) and
would therefore have had little tolerance for rising food aid costs that displace other
aid programmes.
26 Over the same period US cereal food aid decreased from 8,5m tonnes in 1993 to 2,8m tonnes in
1996, a drop of about 70% (USAID, 1998).
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Figure 3.7. European food aid and the wheat price, 1991-98
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Some variation can be found among the national food aid programmes of the
European member states. Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have the strongest
multilateral orientation, consistent with their middle power roles. Germany has the
largest national programme, and shows great altruism in its food aid, as it makes
frequent use triangular transactions, does not make use of programme food aid, and
has severed the link with surplus disposal objectives. France is the most self-
interested food aid donor in the EU, with surplus disposal being a prevalent objective
of its food aid programme. French food aid is not paid for out of the national aid
budget, indicating a weaker position of altruistic interests vis-á-vis national
agricultural interests than found in other European states. French food aid further
corresponds with national foreign policy and commercial interests. Furthermore,
France does not make use of triangular transactions, nor does it buy commodities for
donation outside its national borders. Of all the European food aid programmes,
Cathie (1997:39) regards French food aid as being closest to the US PL480
programme, in which economic and political self-interest is often explicit. Italian food
aid shows more similarities with the French programme than with the German
(Cathie, 1997:40).
This chapter has shown that world food aid on aggregate is driven by agricultural
surplus disposal, and to be intimately connected with world cereal prices. The size of
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the American contribution to world food aid creates the impression that all food aid is
driven by the existence of agricultural surplus. However, surplus disposal is less of a
factor for states that approximate the middle power role in the hegemonic order (e.g.
through the provision of food aid). But, even within this group of states performing
the middle power role, does agricultural surplus availability influence the size and
consistency of food aid donations.
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Chapter 4 - The food aid regime
4.1. Introduction
Before 1967, food aid was provided by only three donors, namely the US, Canada and
Australia, albeit that international food aid was synonymous with the American food
aid programme, which provided more than 95% of world cereal food aid during the
mid-1960s (Hopkins, 1992:234; Shaw and Clay, 1991:5). During a period of
tightening grain markets, the US goaded many other industrialised states into sharing
the food aid burden. Despite initial European reluctance to include food aid as part of
the International Grains Agreement', the prospect of a stabilised international grains
market and a sweetener of concessions on industrial products in the Kennedy Round
offered by the US assured European compliance (Cathie, 1997:19). The result was the
first Food Aid Convention (FAC) in 1967. Seventeen industrialised states, many of
which were not major food exporters, like donors had traditionally been, and the
industrialising Argentina signed the agreement (Shaw and Clay, 1993:8; IGC, 1998a).
The FAC of 1967 set a binding minimum annual commitment of 4,5m tonnes of food
aid, less than half the quantity the US originally sought to procure.
Under the FACs of 1980 and 1986, the minimum annual total commitment was
increased to 7,6m tonnes. This increase reflected an effort by the international
community to reach the (non-binding) target of 10m tonnes annually set at the 1974
World Food Conference (IGC, 1998a), and which had been reached in most years. In
1995, the FAC total minimum obligation was reduced to 5,4m tonnes.
The self-interested behaviour of certain donor states has already been implied. Before
the first FAC (1967), the US happily supplied food aid that was, at that stage, solely a
self-interested action, as the US needed a vent for its agricultural surpluses. With the
tightening grains market situation in the mid-1960s, the need for agricultural surplus
disposal abated, thereby raising the cost of food aid, yet the demand for and
expectation of food aid that had been created, remained. The demand and expectation
I Formerly the International Wheat Agreement. The institutionally linked Grains Trade Convention and
the Food Aid Convention, both of 1995, comprise the International Grains Agreement of 1995 (IGC,
1998).
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that had been created prevented, along with typical bureaucratic permanency, the
outright termination of the US food aid programme. As a result, when the
(opportunity) cost of food aid increased, the US sought to share the food aid burden,
no doubt appealing to various humanitarian principles, despite the final material
considerations (for both the US and the EU) which facilitated the agreement.
Table 4.1. Minimum annual commitments under the 1967, 1986 and 1995 Food Aid Conventions
Donor Metric tonnes Metric tonnes Metric tonnes
1967 1986 1995
Argentina N/A. 35000 35000
Australia 225000 300000 300000
Canada 495000 600000 400000
EU 1 034000 1 670000 1 755000
Japan 225000 300000 300000
Norway N/A. 30000 20000
Sweden N/A. 40000 joined EU
Switzerland N/A. 27000 40000
United Kingdom 225000 joined EU joined EU
USA 1 890000 4470000 2500000
Total 4500000 7600000 5350000
Sources: Shaw and Clay (1993:3), International Grains Council (l998a) and Talbot (1993:157).
The chronic food shortages of the 1970s belatedly led to an increase in the minimum
obligation under the FAC of 1980. Agricultural production expanded greatly at the
end of the 1970s to meet the growing demand. The second oil shock, Reagan's
monetarist policies, which were partly in response to the increase in oil prices,
resulted in the debt crises experienced by many Third World states during the 1980s.
Increased inability to pay for imports undermined the demand for agricultural
products that existed during the 1970s. The first half of the 1980s was therefore a
period of huge stock overhangs, an accommodating factor insofar as the donation of
food aid was concerned.
International cereal market conditions were once more reflected in the reduction of
the FAC from 7,6m tonnes to 5,4m tonnes in 1995. Price rises after 1993 and
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shrinking (public) stocks made food aid commodities more costly and harder to
acquire. The dearth of agricultural surplus is thus reflected in the unwillingness of
donors (mainly the US) to commit themselves to the provision of increasingly costly
food aid. The counter-cyclical tendency of food aid with cereal prices, as indicated by
the 1995 FAC reduction, once more demonstrated that in many cases humanitarian
concern is not the prime motivating force behind food aid levels.
In chapter 2 we noted that the behavioural and normative dimensions of regimes are
not that easy to separate, and neither are the direction and magnitude of causality
between these two dimensions. However, we have noted some of the behavioural
changes that have occurred'. Hopkins (1992) traces the evolution of four of the more
important normative principles of the food aid regime. The evolved "consensus"
(Hopkins, 1992) on food aid can be summarised as (expert) agreement that food aid
should be less surplus driven (the most important change/claim for our purposes); that
it should not be a disincentive to recipient agricultural production; that it should be
given with a longer term commitment; and that it should be more development and
less relief oriented. Despite "consensus" on these principles by the epistemie
community on food aid, the extent to which these principles are realised in practice is
debatable.
The principal international agreement pertaining to food aid has been considered
briefly. The principal multilateral organisation that deals with food aid is the World
Food Programme (WFP). The UN General Assembly and the FAO Conference
founded the WFP in 1961 through concomitant resolutions. Initially, the WFP was to
be an experimental organisation with a budget of approximately $100m for its three-
year probation period (1963-65) (Shaw and Clay, 1991 :4). In 1997, the organisation's
annual expenditure had grown to $1,2bn since its modest beginning, making it the
largest development agency after the World Bank (Charlton, 1997:444; WFP, 1998b).
Donors vary in the support they give to the WFP. Middle powers such as Australia,
Canada;: Sweden and the Netherlands donate more than half their food aid
2 I am thinking of declining surplus availability starting in the late 1960s, the "world food crisis" of the
early 1970s, more states participating in the food aid regime, the gradually smaller role performed by
the United States in the food aid regime, etc.
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multilaterally, as opposed to the US and the EU which are predominantly bilateral
donors (Shaw and Clay, 1993:2). Multilateral aid should not always be viewed as
necessarily less politicised than bilateral food aid. The independence of the WFP as a
multilateral organisation is undermined by the fact that up to 70% of the donor
pledges to the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) (which is managed by
the WFP) are "directed" (Shaw and Clay, 1993:25).
Young (1983:98-101) has identified three ways in which international behaviour can
be patterned and thereby lead to the development into a regime. He distinguishes
between spontaneous orders, negotiated orders, and two types of imposed orders
(overt hegemony and de facto imposition). These three patterns of regime
development are not mutually exclusive, nor does the mix of development factors
necessarily remain the same. Most of these growth factors are detectable in ~he
development of the food aid regime. The dynamism of the food aid can be recognised
in the changing mix of reasons for participating.
The food aid regime came about largely as a "negotiated order", with the first FAC of
1967. During the negotiations that preceded the signing of the FAC3, a strong element
of "de facto imposition" was also present, as the US promoted "institutional
arrangements favourable to itself through various forms of leadership and the
manipulation of incentives,,4 (Young, 1983:101). Gradually, the amount of
"imposition" in patterning food aid behaviour abated, and compliance with regime
principles became more consensual, largely due to the increasing role of middle
powers, as explained in chapters 2 and 3. The degree of "spontaneous" compliance
increased in later years, as states started contributing to the food aid regime out of
their own volition, despite many having no agricultural surplus to dispose of.
What is the link between understanding food aid since 1993, particularly its drastic
decline and the food aid regime? The explanation that will be offered here is that the
food aid regime was too weak to prevent the most powerful state and food aid donor,
3 The FAC formed part of the larger International Wheat Agreement, which later became the
International Grains Agreement.
4 The "manipulation of incentives" referred to are the concessions on industrial goods offered by the
US in the Kennedy Round of GATT (Cathie, 1997:19).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89
the US, from unilaterally reducing its share of the international burden. This did not
happen before a food aid regime had been established, from which the US has
gradually been withdrawing. Two questions follow: Firstly, why and how did the US
reduce its commitment? The answer to "why" the US reduced its commitment lies in
the surplus disposal logic of much American food aid, and the disappearing need for it
during a period of high international agricultural prices (chapter 3). The answer to the
"how" lies in the relative independence of action the US enjoys, courtesy of its
hegemonic position (chapter 2). Secondly, why have states other than the US
continued their commitment (reduced it less than the US), even though food aid
became more expensive for them as well, during recent years? The answer lies in the
supporting role middle powers play in maintaining the current world order, as
manifested in the developmentalisation of food aid (chapters 2 and 3). The deviation
of middle powers away from direct self-interest and the absence of continued pressure
from the hegemon indicate the existence of a food aid regime, despite the regime
having little effect on the USA.
The existence of the FAC and the WFP, the GATT/WTO, FAa, International Grains
Agreement, the CSD, and so forth suggests a fairly "formal" international food aid
regime (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983:65,76). Yet, the formality of a regime does not
necessarily result in desired outcomes being attained. The principal outcome the food
aid regime seeks to realise is as high (and consistent) a food aid level as possible.
Food aid levels are seen as a function of direct hegemonic self-interest (though this
depends on agricultural prices) and the acceptance and internalisation of the principles
of the food aid regime by non-hegemonic states (see figure 4.1.).
In chapter 2 the framework for a typology of regimes was sketched. On the one axis
one can adjudge the extent to which regime concurs with direct hegemonic self-
interest. On the other axis the compliance of non-hegemonic states with established
patterns of behaviour after the (actual or theorised) withdrawals of the hegemon from
the regime is indicated (see figure 4.1). The problem, of course, is that typologies do
not allow for a dynamic view of these two dimensions. With regard to the food aid
5 The assumption is that hegemonic withdrawal from the regime occurs when its short-term interests
are not served by contributing to the regime.
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regime, American attitudes toward the regime change basically when cereal prices
change.
As has been mentioned, the principal outcome the food aid regime seeks to procure is
as a high a level of food aid as possible. The highest level of food aid that can be
attained will be when the intersection of two perpendicular lines from the two axes
meet in the top right-hand comer. A point high on the Y-axis, but low on X, will
indicate a relatively high level of food aid, but this level cannot be imputed to be
consistent, as it will drop as soon as cereal prices rise, and the direct hegemonic
interest for giving food aid (disposing of agricultural surplus) dissipates. It is not
inconceivable that the self-interest of other states concurs with that of the US,
especially other major agricultural producers. However, other major agricultural
producers, are more constrained by regime rules than is the hegemon, so one can
expect them to have internalised regime principles to a fair extent. A point high on the
X-axis, but low on Y will yield a more consistent level of food aid, given the large-
scale negation (or absence) of direct and short-term self-interest. A characterisation of
the food aid regime during a period of high international cereal prices will score rather
low on the Y-axis, but reasonably high on the X-axis. During a time of low
agricultural prices, scores on both axes will be quite high, given the lesser amount of
pain involved in "compliance". Let us now characterise other regimes in terms of the
typology (figure 4.1.) that has been developed. The other regimes that will be
considered are the international aviation regime, the free trade regime and the
environmental regime.
In the international aviation regime, states with internationally competitive carriers
prefer "open skies", whereby market forces determine capacity, frequency and points
of entry for carriers. States with less competitive national carriers prefer a more
protectionist aviation regime. The US, as a mercantilist strategy, has advocated
liberalism in international aviation markets, given the competitiveness of its airlines.
The US has used both carrot and stick to secure liberalisation, but this strategy has not
proved entirely successful (Nayar, 1995:163-166). However, the sovereignty principle
is still highly respected in aviation, allowing for an easier and more acceptable retreat
into protectionism. Nayar (1995:169) concludes that "even bilateral agreements have
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Figure 4.1. Regime persistence and direct hegemonic self-interest
y
High
Low
x
Minimal
Axis values:
X-axis: Compliance oflesser states with established
patterns of behaviour
Y-axis: Direct hegemonic self-interest
Maximum
Symbols and regime goal:
A - Aviation regime (open skies)
E - Environmental regime (general
environmental conservation and
protection)
H - Food aid regime during high cereal
prices (max.food aid levels)
L - Food aid regime during low cereal
prices (max.food aid levels)
T - Free trade regime (maximum
openness of trade
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not been characterised by durability ... [N]o single [aviation] regime has developed, let
alone a durable and effective one" (own emphasis).
The free trade regime (epitomised by GATT -WTO) is characterised by a high degree
of compliance by all member states, and as being of great benefit to the state with the
most powerful economy in the world, the US. In the case of aviation, the sovereignty
principle is still an acceptable excuse behind which states with less competitive
airlines can hide. In the case of trade, the opposite seems true. The orthodoxy of
hyperliberal ideas and norms, as well as the shift from an international economic
order to a transnational liberal economic order (Gill, 1990:88), have undermined the
legitimacy and acceptability of invoking national economic sovereignty. At the
moment, the US is still a very prominent promoter of trade liberalisation (and is
indicated as such in figure 4.1.). Should the US unilaterally renege on its commitment
to free trade, the maintaining of the free trade regulations is to be doubted, as this
would leave states open to exploitation, but also because much international trade
liberalisation has been procured through structural American power, making the
acquiescence of lesser states to the regulations of the free trade regime seem more
voluntary than is necessarily the case.
The environmental regime, differs from the other regimes mentioned here in that
states have played much less of role in its development, compared to the other
regimes (Meyer, et al, 1997:627). Meyer, et al (1997) see the formation of the
environmental regime as having been driven by non-state actors and the dissemination
of environmental scientific discourse into international society, resulting in the
growing institutionalisation of environmental protection issues. Following this
argument, one finds a high level of acceptance of the general principles of the
environmental regime in international civil society. States, by contrast, have proved
fairly reluctant to participate in international environmental decision-making,
leadership, discipline and ratification (Meyer et al, 1997 :627). Environmantal
protection is not very high on the American political agenda, as its conspicious
consumption has caused the US to be one of the major polluters in the world.
However, inflicting the costs of environmental protection onto their own voters,
seems like something US politicians want to avoid at all costs. One can therefore infer
that the "withdrawal" of the US from the environmental regime would not affect
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overall regime outcomes" as much, as this is pretty how much how the environmental
regime has always existed.
What can we deduce from the comparison of these four regimes? Direct hegemonic
interest does not guarantee desirable regime outcomes are achieved, or even that a
regime develops, as with the aviation regime, as some agreement on the principles is
necessary. However, direct hegemonic interest definitely helps, as one can see in the
cases of the food aid and free trade regimes. Non-support, or even opposition, from
the hegemon to what a regime seeks to accomplish is a severe restriction to the
international implementation of preferred outcomes (from the regime's perspective).
One finds that environmental lobby groups are influential at local and even national
levels, but their pressure at an international level have not imposed major costs on
states at the core of the world economy.
In chapter 2 it was stated that an international organisation institutionalises at least
part of a broader regime. The World Food Programme (WFP) is the international
organisation most directly concerned with food aid, although it does not distribute all
the food aid in the international system. The WFP distributes virtually all
intergovernmental multilateral food aid (as opposed to non-governmental multilateral
food aid). The WFP is not the only international organisation that is concerned with
food aid, and consequently reference is made to other institutions somehow connected
to food aid, for example, GATT-WTO and the FAO.
International organisations are important in a Coxian framework as they provide
stability to the world order, a status quo from which the dominant powers benefit
greatly and which they do not want to see undermined. Though international
organisations can take on some independence, this independence is circumscribed by
the problem-solving approach of these organisations. Cox (1994:111-12), however, is
optimistic that certain international organisations and agencies could provide the
breeding ground for counter-hegemony, although I do not share his optimism'. The
problem-solving role which international organisations fulfil, and their dependence on
6 The "outcome" that the environmental regime aims for, is a less destructive interaction of man with
nature.
7 Gareau (1996:227), another neo-Gramscian theorist, is even more optimistic about this possibility.
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the West, prevent them, almost a priori, to challenge international inequality or
injustice in any fundamental way that might threaten core interests in the world
economy.
The purpose of the following section is to demonstrate how international organisation
hinder any fundamental critique of the global agricultural system or the (increasing)
inequality one finds in it. This prevents deep-lying changes, the need for which is
often muted by the (low level of) stable food aid guaranteed by the multilateralisation
of food aid. Cox (1983: 172) mentions five characteristics of international organisation
related to its role in preserving the hegemonic order. International organisations:
embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; are
themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; ideologically legitimate the
norms of the world order; co-opt the elites from peripheral countries; and absorb
counter-hegemonic ideas. These five roles can be seen as the structurally supportive
function of international organisations.
4.2. Food aid, international organisations and hegemonic order
4.2.1. International organisations and rules that facilitate hegemonic expansion
Augelli and Murphy (1993:133-8) demonstrate how the Reagan Administration
quashed the political challenge posed by the Third World in the form of the New
International Economic Order (NIEO), by destroying the economic bedrock of the
potentially counter-hegemonic bloc. The world economy was free to be shaped
without influence from the former proponents of the NIEO. Following the demise of
the NIEO, Third World agriculture, an area in which the Third World used to be
highly competitive, was decimated by subsidised Northern agricultural exports, the
Third World without political recourse or influence to defend their agricultural
sectors.
From the majority once having been food exporters, most Sub-Saharan states have
become food importers, the one product that they can produce cost effectively given
the low levels of technological advancement required and the abundance of cheap
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labour. Albeit that Sub-Saharan states are treated differentially under the Uruguay
Round, they had little choice in whether or not to accept the Uruguay Round, which
included the Agreement on Agriculture. Despite some protection from the exigencies
of the world agricultural markets being promised to Low Income Net-Food Importing
Countries, their immediate food needs have been connected to trade. Even at the 1996
World Food Summit was the belief in the beneficence of the "free" market confirmed.
In a joint declaration by participating governments they promised that they will
"strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and overall trade policies are conducive
to food security for all through a fair and market-oriented market system" (my
emphasis) (quoted in Watkins, 1996:244). This means an acceptance of the principle
that food needs have to be satisfied with imports from countries with a comparative
advantage in the specific agricultural product, but with the possibility of food aid
when needed.
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, world agricultural pnces have
skyrocketed, food aid has reached its lowest level in decades, and the aspect of the
Uruguay Round promising food aid has obviously not come to fruition, despite a
Ministerial Decision agreeing "to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the
implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round on trade in agriculture does not
adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to
provide assistance in meeting the food needs of developing countries, especially least
developed and net food-importing developing countries" (GATT Secretariat, 1998).
Food aid is still connected to agricultural surplus, despite promises and analyses to the
contrary.
For the Sub-Saharan states that are signatories of the GATT/WTO, there seems little
escape. Free trade obviously benefits the industrialised exporters of the North, and
even the world on aggregate in terms of income rise. The advantage of the Uruguay
Round for Sub-Saharan Africa remains dubious. By the year 2000, it has been
predicted that Africa's small export surplus in agricultural trade will turn into a small
agricultural trade deficit (FAO, 1995c:67), to not even mention African helplessness
against manufactured products from outside its borders following the implementation
of the Uruguay Round. Sub-Saharan Africa has been connected to the free trading
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world economy, and its food needs have been subjugated to free trade principles and
liberalised market realities.
The trade imperative was to be guaranteed over and above the aid imperative by the
FAO Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSD). The CSD acts according to the FAO
Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations, the basic aim of which is
to prevent food aid from disrupting usual agricultural export channels. The concern
was obviously to prevent unfair (subsidised trade), but an argument could also be
presented that contravention of CSD Principles would undermine Third World
agricultural production, but to argue that concern with the Third World played much
of role for the CSD seems naive. Circumvention of FAO Principles, and thus the
displacement of commercial exports to Sub-Saharan African states, implies the
lowering of the price of related food items, thus becoming a disincentive to local
productions. CSD or not, Third World agriculture was severely damaged by the
agricultural trade wars of the 1980s between the US and the EU, which drove
international agricultural prices down through subsidies. The effectiveness of the CSD
has been described as dubious (Singer, Wood and Jennings, 1987:197) and an agency
which nobody pays much attention to, in any case (Uvin, 1992:305). The CSD is
generally believed to have permitted that which it was supposed to prevent, namely
the displacement of commercial imports by food aid (Saran and Konandreas,
1991:53). Third World governments have further hamstrung their own agricultural
producers by taxing their produce to subsidise food in urban areas for political
reasons, and taxing agricultural exports to earn easy revenue for the government
coffers, making them internationally less competitive.
To conclude, for the food aid regime, the Uruguay Round reiterated the supreme
importance of free trade as a solution to world hunger. Free trade is the axis from
which food aid has become a mere spin-off. Solving world hunger, as a priority, has
had to play second fiddle to the priority of free trade, which has become powerfully
institutionalised and enforced. The inclusion of food aid under the Uruguay Round of
GATT, is an acknowledgement of the problem of food shortages and its connection
8 See Raffer and Singer (1996:83-4) on the problems of thinking in such neo-classical economic terms
and thereby assuming the disincentive effect.
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with agricultural liberalisation. The need for food aid is considered to be a temporary
aberration in a liberalised world economy, which is touted to be the only feasible form
for the world economy to take by those in positions of influence. Blame for hardship
endured by peoples of the Third World has been lain at the door of the domestic
policies, rather than the exigencies of the global economy (Augelli and Murphy,
1993:136).
4.2.2. International organisations as the product of the hegemonic order
International organisations reflect the prevailing power relations at their point of
origin, and is a product of that world order, but international organisations are not just
automatically churned out by the hegemonic world order. Cox is aware of the
intentionality required for the creation of an international organisation when he states
that "[i]nternational institutions and rules are generally initiated by the state which
establishes the hegemony" (my emphasis) (Cox, 1983:172). Deliberate action by the
hegemon is thus normally a prerequisite for the creation of an international
organisation.
During the creation years of international institutions and rules, the "dominant state
takes care to secure the acquiescence of other states according to a hierarchy of
powers within the inter-state structure of hegemony" (Cox, 1983: 172). Much of the
food aid regime developed out of American self-interested behaviour, originally.
Before the FAC 1967, international food aid was virtually synonymous with US food
aid (Shaw and Clay, 1993:5), as, in 1966, the US was providing 98% of total world
food aid (Hopkins, 1992:234). The PL480 food aid programme was primarily an
explicit mechanism for agricultural surplus disposal. When international grain
markets tightened in the latter half of the 1960s, the US sought to induce "the
acquiescence of other states" (Cox, 1983: 172) to share the food aid burden (IGC,
1998). The original signatories to the FAC of 1967 had little choice in whether to
assist or not in the international problem of world hunger by providing an
international public good such as food aid, as they would have been branded as "free-
riders".
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Much deal-making and arm-twisting was involved in procuring the acquiescence of
Japan, the UK and the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) in signing the
first FAC in 1967. Nowadays, states pride themselves on their contributions to
international food aid, as "[p ]atterns of behaviour that persist over extended periods
are infused with normative significance" (Krasner, 1983a:9). New members of the
food aid regime join voluntarily, driven by what one could describe as a bottom-up
imperative for joining. The inclination of these states to continue and to increase their
contributions to the annual food aid minimum set by the FAC was in correspondence
with the "middle power" role performed by many of these countries".
Cooper (1994:3), as well as Pratt (1990:14), note how the issue-areas that to which
middle powers are paying increasing attention in the 1990s are "low (his emphasis)
issues such as poverty and human welfare, ecology and human rights" (Cooper,
1994:3). Food aid would, of course, qualify as a "low" issue, even though the motives
for giving food aid are not always in strict accordance with those that motivate
concern for the "low" issues mentioned above. International organisations offer
middle powers a forum through which to exert their influence, given their lack of
(structural) power on a global scale (Pratt, 1990:15). The commitment of middle
powers toward sustaining the international food aid regime, contrary to the US, was
demonstrated by the reduction of the US of its annual commitment under the FAC
1995 by nearly 50%, leaving an increased proportion of food aid to be provided by
donors other than the US.
What the continued support of the middle powers under the FAC demonstrates is how
a principle has become established that used to be (and still is) in the hegemon's
interest, can now be procured without any effort on the hegemon's behalf. The
hegemon can even decrease its effort in sustaining and ensuring the provision of such
a public good. The food aid regime developed out of the surplus disposing PL480
9 A caveat should be offered with regard to Argentina. Its contribution under the FAC is most probably
not due to its ambition to be seen as a middle power, but can rather be explained in terms of its role as a
major agricultural exporter. Argentina is regarded as a developing country, which normally do not give
substantial aid to others, as these countries are simply too poor. However, Argentina is a major exporter
of agricultural products, and its commitment of 0,3 m tonnes under the 1995 FAC should be viewed as
proof of the need for the disposal of the produce for which there exists no effective demand, rather than
the desire of industrialised states to incur some of the expenses of international development aid on a
developing state.
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programme, it drew other donors into the regime during the tight agricultural market
conditions and since then principles such as feeding the hungry in poor countries have
assumed the appearance of a natural international norm. On this point it is interesting
to note the echo Cox (1996:243) provides: "The rules and practices and ideologies of
a hegemonic order conform to the interests of the dominant power while having the
appearance of a universal natural order of things which gives at least a certain
measure of satisfaction and security to lesser powers ....The [hegemonic] order does
not usually need to be enforced by direct violence or threat of violence on the part of
the founding power. Middle powers may playa supporting role in such a hegemonic
order". What then is the place of norms in the global political economy, particularly
as they pertain to international food aid?
4.2.3. Legitimising the norms of the world order
In lieu of the above, what is the status of norms in the world? Nel (1998:106) draws a
useful distinction between "norms" and "moral beliefs". He views norms "as moral
beliefs that have become so institutionalised in a specific setting that they can be
expected to be a significant contextual constraining and motivating factor", whereas
moral beliefs lack the institutional and behaviour constraining/enabling force of
norms. What causes the institutionalisation and behaviour affecting strengthening of
moral beliefs into norms?
The moral desirability of and the responsibility to assist the hungry can be found in
virtually religious systems. Furthermore, the option of people under the "veil of
ignorance" in John Rawls's "original position" would be one in which they would at
least want their physiological needs to be satisfied. In other words, a moral belief that
the hungry ought to be fed is not without recourse or foundation internationally, even
though one cannot necessarily attribute an ethereal quality to such a moral claim.
What is the relationship between a moral belief, such as an obligation to feed the
hungry, and the global political economy? As Krasner (1993) demonstrates in his
article on the abolition of the slave trade in the nineteenth century, a (moral) principle
is usually adhered to when backed up by a powerful (hegemonic) advocate. In other
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words, for a moral belief to become a norm (in Nel's terms) it needs to be backed up
by some form of power'". Hegemonic power provides the means for a moral belief to
assume the status of an international norm. Moral beliefs do not just immediately
become international norms due to the normative bias of the hegemonic order, as then
all the moral beliefs typical to the hegemon would be converted into norms. Rather, it
requires some intentionality, the will of some actor to institutionalise a moral value.
The origin of the process whereby a moral belief "becomes" a norm, lies in the
national body politic, where some group (e.g. the farming lobby) identifies food aid to
somehow be in the national interest. From a domestic political base states then
attempt to institutionalise certain moral principles internationally, however
hypocritical the reasons for doing so may be. Obviously, some states are more able to
shape the normative world order than others, with the US possessing over most of this
ability. It should be noted that international society would not internalise any moral
belief foreign to it. Cultural or historical precedence facilitates the acceptance of
certain moral beliefs Il.
There are thousands of potentially contradictory moral imperatives in international
society. It follows that a moral principle can expediently be attached to self-interested
behaviour to give it a semblance of respectability, as the US did with the original food
aid programme, after which it assumed its own independent normative influence.
With the signing of the 1967 FAC, seventeen industrialised states gave a legal
foundation to the normative principle of feeding the hungry in other parts of the
world, many signatories recalling their own experiences during and shortly after the
Second World War.
The principle of combating world hunger is given institutional status in the WFP,
ensuring some permanence in the short to medium term with regard to food aid.
Through the WFP, the seeming willingness of the North to assist the needy in the
10 I use power in a structural and relational sense. In Krasner's article power is more relational, as
Britain's structural power was qualitatively not the same in the nineteenth century, as that of the US in
the second half of the twentieth century. The US hegemony is of a different nature, mainly due to the
technological advances in fields such as telecommunications and media (mostly controlled by the US
and its allies), and the military (where American superiority dwarfs whoever is second). International
forums in which to solve international problems also did not exist as they do today.
Il In light of this, it is interesting to note that the right to food was enshrined in 1948 by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Maxwell, 1997:469).
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South is demonstrated. It could be argued that the solution for world hunger lies not
with giving food aid, but rather with the international agricultural trading system.
Northern agriculture is protected and subsidised, making it extremely difficult for
Southern states to export their produce to these lucrative markets. This is a
disincentive for agricultural production in the South, worsened by the erosion of
preferential treatment after the Uruguay Round and its doctrinaire application of free
trade. By subsidising their agricultural exports to the South for domestic reasons, the
incentive to produce locally is further undermined, as food can be imported more
cheaply than it can be produced domestically. The WFP obfuscates this argument,
fulfilling a stopgap role without critically (in the Coxian sense of the word)
addressing the deeper issues 12.
4.2.4. Co-opting elites from peripheral countries
Where would one expect to find experts bureaucrats, ambassadors, academics and
politicians from the South who aim to improve the food situation in the Third World
through food aid? In all likelihood these elites will be found in large numbers around
the focal point of the international food aid regime, namely the WFP. These elites
come to the WFP with great dreams of procuring enough food aid for the South. They
come to the WFP, most likely, with radical (in terms of the orthodoxy) ideas and
demands. Soon they realise that they might have to work from within the WFP to
change the already existing institution to be more amenable to their needs, as nobody
is going to fund the creation of a parallel agency. By working within the organisation,
reform-minded actors soon find themselves in a stalemate as older conservative forces
within the institution resist change. The only changes that result are incremental, not
upsetting any party to any great extent. This is what Gramsci called a "passive
revolution", with a revolutionary outcome remaining impossible without structural
shifts in the world economy (Cox, 1983: 166).
Individuals entering an existing organisation are faced with a routine whereby the
institution deals with its particular issue-area. In Foucauldian terms, this relative
12 This point will be taken further in section 4.2.5.
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defined and coherent sphere of social knowledge is known as a "discourse" (McHoul
and Grace, 1993 :31; Rabinow, 1991 :9), the contextually set "implicit or explicit
principles, norms and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
[within the institution] converge" (with apologies to Krasner, 1983a:2). Our
understanding of reality is tainted by the seeming naturalness of the discourse
subjugating other interpretations through its monopoly on the "truth". Those who
argue from outside the boundaries of the hegemonic discourse seem "unintelligible,
mad, or at least beyond the pale of accepted argument" as other interpretations lack
the legitimacy of the dominant discourse in the WFP (Keeley, 1990:91; also Boyne,
1991 :54). A discourse constrains that which falls outside, and enables actions taking
place within its fuzzy limits.
In terms of the discourse within the WFP, Foucauldian thought provides clues as to
how new reform-minded employees are disciplined and normalised (i.e. turned into
technocrats) through observation, recording and training; processes of comparison,
differentiation, hierarchisation, homogenisation, exclusion and examination (Foucault,
1984:188-205; Johnston, 1991:160-163).
The limits to internal agency-driven change of the discourse of the WFP have been
sketched. The discourse is more likely to be altered structurally "when either the
balance of bargaining power or the perception of national interest (or both together)
change among states who negotiate them" (Strange, 1983:345).
International organisation, as a creation and legitimising agent of the hegemonic order
has already been noted. Apart from being structurally dependent, the WFP is also
dependent on the hegemonic power(s) and its allies in a much more direct sense: With
the exception of Argentina, all the major donors of food aid to the WFP, and under the
FAC, are Northern states. The reliance of the WFP on the North for its lifeblood (food
aid) circumscribes the organisation's policies and actions. "Directed" food aid is an
example of an even more direct subversion of WFP independence. The constraining
influence on the actions of the WFP due to its dependence on the hegemonic power(s)
and its allies for food aid has rendered the WFP to lead the life of a "problem-solving"
agency (Cox, 1981: 128). The WFP is fundamentally unable to sever its ties with the
international donors of food aid, nor can it ignore its interests to any great extent. It is
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within this inevitable problem-solving discourse of the WFP that the normalisation
and technocratisation of elites from peripheral countries take place.
4.2.5. Absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas
Modifications in food aid policy can be construed as having the effect of absorbing
potentially counter-hegemonic ideas. The institution of a minimum level of food aid
at the 1967 FAC, albeit a very low floor, prevented absolute depletion of food aid
during high price periods, given the counter-cyclical character of food aid. The 1974
World Food Conference indicated to the Third World that states from the North were
concerned about their wellbeing. World hunger amidst surpluses and affluence could
have become a counter-hegemonic rallying point, especially under the auspices of the
New International Economic Order (NIEO). Promises to the contrary by the North,
coupled with the availability of easy credit eased the demand for food aid. In the
1980s, the material base of the potentially counter-hegemonic NIEO was destroyed
(Augelli and Murphy, 1993:134) and subsequent demands by the South were made
from a weakened position.
Suggestions that food aid has become more "developmental" in recent years
(Hopkins, 1992; Uvin, 1992) point to an ostensible willingness of the North to assist
the South in growing economically, and so forth. The type of development pursued is
of the hyperliberal variety that leaves dominant social groups the world over in an
even stronger position to act in the global economy than it does others and removes
the state from the economy. In terms of the current conception of "pathways to
development", blame and responsibility for economic failure lie within Third World
countries themselves, with the world order and the major powers exonerated from any
blame (Lee, 1995:154). At the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome, US Secretary of
Agriculture confirmed Lee's observation where he said that "[t]he developing world
must change [their] national policies. The leaders of the developing world must be
furthest out front. They alone (my emphasis) can enact the reforms necessary to pull
their countries out of poverty and dependence. In a time of limited resources, the
United States stands ready to help those nations that demonstrate the political will
necessary to achieve food security (Glickman, 1998).
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The "Washington consensus" narrows the parameters of possible economic solutions
for Third World countries to within one developmental framework. It does not allow
for alternative development strategies, but forces a hegemonic hyperliberal problem-
solving approach onto Third World policy-makers. Hopkins (1992) traces the
development of an epistemie community on food aid. He notes how the episternic
community has been able to ensure "incremental change" (Hopkins, 1992:264), away
from what domestically based politicians might want of various national food aid
policies. Although I would not dare to scorn these experts who form the episternic
community in the way someone like Noam Chomsky scorns "experts", the members
of the epistemie community are all hegemonic organic intellectuals to varying
degrees. They are certainly well-meaning, and altruistically motivated individuals, but
their problem-solving approach assists in legitimising prevailing power relations in
the food aid regime. Their positions are also compromised in that many members of
the epistemie community represent status quo-minded organisations with very
specific interests and views on development, a view associated with structural
adjustment and neo-liberal economics, such as USAID, the World Bank, the OECD
and other international institutions. Hopkins (1992:239) also mentions the gradual
demise of a "more critical, leftist [epistemic] community" which was quite powerful
during the 1970s, and which could have served as the nexus of intellectuals around
which a "critical" international conception of food aid could have been developed.
4.3. International organisational autonomy
We have examined the way in which an international organisation, such as the WFP,
is constrained by the world order within which it is set, and how it serves to legitimate
and support the hegemonic order. The survival of international institutions is
constrained by their foundations in international civil society'<. The more in conflict
u Keeley (1990:96-97), in his application of Foucault's ideas to regimes, asserts that "[s]uccessful
regimes will be linked to significant networks and will suppress, absorb or marginalise their rivals for
control of a set of actors". The basis of power is to be found in the network of societal relations,
demarcating a sphere of interaction and setting the "limits of the possible".
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
105
with the prevailing hegemony an institution is, the more it needs to be underpinned by
counter-hegemonic forces, which must originate in national settings.
"[O]nly a war of position can, in the long run, bring about structural changes, and a war of
position involves building up a the socio-political base for change through the creation of new
historic blocs. The national context remains the only place where an historic bloc can be
founded, although world-economy and world-political conditions materially influence the
prospects for such an enterprise" (Cox, 1983:173).
As has been mentioned briefly, the autonomy of the WFP, as an international
organisation is also constrained in a much more direct manner. At the WFP, food aid
receiving states initiate, formulate and present, sometimes with the assistance of the
WFP, a project for which it requires funding. Funding is then provided by the donor
members of the WFP (Talbot and Moyer, 1997 :278). Thus, the independence of states
that is required to develop a counter-hegemonic movement is constrained by the very
reliance of recipient states on donor states (from the North) for food aid. An
alternative, counter-hegemonic food aid institution is inconceivable, as the very lack
of material resources (as revealed by food shortages in this case) would preclude the
survival of such an institution.
However, international organisations are not puppets of the hegemonic order in which
they are embedded, but assume some autonomy, that is, behaviour inconsistent with
what one would perceive to be the (material) interests of transnational elites. Stated
raisons d'être of international organisation correspond with the material interests of
the transnational elites to a lesser or greater degree.
An area where WFP behaviour varies from major donor interest is in the targeting of
food aid. South and East Asia is a much more economically, politically and militarily
important region to the major powers, than is Sub-Saharan Africa. The major powers
have a history of involvement in both South and East Asia, particularly in building a
bulwark against communism during the Cold War. At present, the interest of core
states in that part of the world is predominantly of an economic nature. The
channeling of food aid during 1997 (before the Asian financial crisis) indicates the
different priorities of donors. The assumption is that multilateral food aid is motivated
more by humanitarian concerns than bilateral food aid, the latter of which being easier
to tie into the foreign policy objectives of the donor state. In 1997, Sub-Saharan
Africa received 40% of all multilateral food aid, as opposed to the 34% that South and
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East Asia received. Although the amounts received are close and not particularly
meaningful as such, the contrast with bilateral food aid hints at motives other than
altruism. During the same year, South and East Asia was the largest receiver of
bilateral food aid (43%), versus the 27% received by Sub-Saharan Africa (WFP,
1998a). This suggests a greater concern with people's wellbeing on the part of the
WFP, than on that of the US and the EU, the world's two largest donors. The stronger
humanism focus of the WFP is consistent with the greater altruism found in the
foreign policies of most middle powers, and their strong propensity to distribute food
aid multilaterally.
The WFP is also the last resort provider of emergency food aid, whereas national aid
agencies have attempted to resist the usurpation of their aid budgets by the demand
for relief aid. While this resistance can be understood as national donors not wanting
their longer term work at making the target population of their development work
more self-sufficient, be undermined, their reluctance can also be understood as self-
interested. "Development" aid plays a market development role, in the sense that it
brings previously excluded people nearer to the world economy. Relief aid, on the
other hand, goes to people who are unlikely to be integrated into the world economy.
In other words, the short-term expense of relief aid offers hardly any hope for a return
on the "investment" that had been made, whereas development aid does offer some
return.
The constrained existence of the food aid regime and the WFP was sketched in this
chapter. The inability of the WFP to gain much autonomy from core states, on more
than one level, explains why the WFP has not been able to provide much leadership
on food aid issues and making a larger dent in world hunger. We now tum to a state
that has the ability to greatly contribute to solving many of the world's problems,
including world hunger, but has chosen not to.
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Chapter 5 - United States Food Aid Policy
5.1. Introduction
Of all the major food aid donors, supply side (surplus disposal) factors play the
strongest role in the determining levels of food aid donated by the United States'.
United States foreign policy has always been notoriously self-interested, devoid of
much of the humanitarian concern one finds in many European states, for example.
Self-interested behaviour, with regards to food aid, is also the most explicit in
American policies. However, the fact that the US has consistently been the largest
food aid donor since World War II, along with its internationally powerful position
have mitigated criticism against its self-interested behaviour. This has allowed the US
considerably more freedom from external constraints, as opposed to those faced by
middle power food aid donors.
In the mid-1960s, the United States provided more than 95% of total food aid,
declining drastically as international grain markets tightened in the few years leading
up to the world food crisis of 1974, when the American share of total cereal food aid
was less than 40% (Hopkins, 1992:235; IGC, 1998a). Since the mid-1970s US food
aid has consistently accounted for about 60% of total cereal food aid. Following the
sharp rise in cereal prices, which started after 1993 and peaked in 1996, US food aid
once more fell to around the 40%-mark in 1997, but steadied to 51% of total cereal
food aid in 1998 (after world prices had dropped significantly) (WFP, 1998a, 1999c).
The decline of the American share of total food aid is partly attributable to the more
prominent role as a food aid donor assumed by the EU and its member states, even
though this prominence has partly been the result of hegemonic pressure. The
persistent large size of US food aid donations has made it hard for other states to
criticise the US for self-interested behaviour and the dumping of agricultural surplus.
Despite only being "minimally hegemonic" (Cafruny, 1990:111-114), the US remains
extremely powerful vis-a-vis other developed states, with these states often incurring
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certain costs or shouldering burdens to the benefit ofthe US. This happens despite US
interests having become more apparent and general system-wide gain less, in these
days of minimal hegemony. While the US enjoys hegemonic power over others, it has
more freedom from structural constraints and pressures from other states than any
other state in the international system. Strange (1988 :23-42) views this power as not
necessarily relational, but structural, a highly fungible form of power. Neo-Gramscian
theorists go even further, endowing American power with a normative
"neutrality/objectivity", in the sense that what the US wants seems only reasonable
and for the benefit of everyone. Subordinated states internalise and unconsciously
assist in the legitimation of the hegemonic order, as well as their own subjugation
within it, much like women who prefer patriarchy to less repressive gender relations.
Such a conception of power is even less reliant on coercion than Strange's structural
power. This understanding of deep-rooted and inconspicuous power does not preclude
conflict or competition between the hegemon and other states, even its allies
(Cafruny, 1990:104), but the challenge and the outcome is very much constrained by
the "limits of the possible" (Gill, 1991:55), requiring very little direct pressure to be
exerted to bring about favourable results for the US (Gill and Law, 1988:75).
The most important supply side factor, in the case of the US food aid, is the
availability of agricultural surplus (as indicated by high commodity stock levels and a
relatively low wheat price) to be donated or exported on concessional terms as food
aid (Gilbert, 1996:146). In chapter 3 the relationship between stock and food aid
levels was discussed, as well as the relationship between prices and food aid levels.
Public Law 480 (PL480) of 1954 gave US food aid the legal basis in the form that has
more or less persisted to this day (Shaw and Clay, 1993: 215). The explicit purpose of
the PL 480 programme during the 1950s and 1960s was to dispose of agricultural
surpluses, accompanied by the secondary concern that poor states/American allies
could benefit from dumped agricultural surplus.
Through the decades, surpluses declined, and food aid was seized upon by various
other groups (other than agricultural interests, that is) to advance American military,
IGilbert (1996: 146) identifies the budget deficit as another important determinant of food aid levels in
the cases of the US and Canada.
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political, commercial and humanitarian interests. Despite the proliferation of groups
with an interest in food aid, the existence of a surplus to donate has always largely
determined the US food aid levels. Food aid still serves as a way to dispose of/sell
produce that cannot be sold at satisfactorily high market prices (surplus). The
Uruguay Round has restricted the ability of the US to use food aid as a guise for
subsidised sales. High international agricultural prices followed the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, negating the need for agricultural surplus disposal, with the result
that US food aid, and its minimum international commitment under the Food Aid
Convention of 1995, declined. Though much of the surplus that used to be sold
through particularly Title I of the PL 480 programme, is now prohibited under the
Uruguay Round, the US is still able to utilise various other agricultural export support
programmes.
Under the Food Aid Convention (FAC) of 1986 the minimum US contribution to
world food aid was to be 4,5 million tonnes. The FAC of 1995 reduced the minimum
US commitment to 2,5m tonnes. Apart from a decreased commitment in absolute
terms, which has always been achieved, the US share of total FAC minimum also
decreased (the EU minimum commitment stayed constant at 1,8m tonnes). Other than
a reduced legal commitment, the US has in recent years also provided a smaller
proportion of actual world food aid. This reduction by the US is an important factor in
explaining the overall decline in world food aid since 1993, even though the US is
still the world's largest donor of food aid. Over the period 1993-96, the decline of US
food aid amounted to two-thirds of the total decline of food aid over the period.
Between 1993 and 1996, US food aid fell by almost 70%, whereas European food aid,
for example, declined by around 40%. Thus, understanding why US food aid has
decreased so drastically since 1993 will go a long way in explaining the general
decline in world food aid levels since 1993.
Understanding the domestic interests and dynamics that propel US food aid is
important because systemic factors place fewer constraints on US domestic policy and
national interest-maximisation than in the case of middle powers'. Hollis and Smith
2 In the case of the US, the state in Hollis and Smith's (1990:8) system-state (system-US) dyad is more
influential and explanatory in terms of system characteristics than in a system-middle power dyad.
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(1990:7) argue that if state behaviour has any influence on the system in which it
exists, one must explain state behaviour. Similarly, if bureaucratic behaviour has any
influence on state behaviour, we must account for bureaucratic behaviour. The US,
due to its hegemonic position, affects the international system more than does any
other state, and the international system has less influence on it than on other states.
The influence of the American state and the relative freedom it enjoys from systemic
constraints accord American bureaucracies more influence, due to the influence of the
state in which they are situated.
Figure 5.1. United States and world cereal food aid (1972-1996)
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One should not reify the state into a unitary, rational and coherent entity. The
existence of various state-sectoral' dyads (e.g. US state-Title I, US state-Food for
Progress, etc.) explain why the ontological creation, "US food aid", is not informed
by a coherent logic and harbours contradictions. For example, of the two most
important PL 480 food aid lines, Title I food aid has decreased drastically in recent
years, whereas Title II has actually increased over the same period. However, both
Title I and Title II are subsumed under the term "US food aid". By treating the
various food aid programmes as units of analysis, US food aid can be explained on a
state level of analysis which is still sensitive to the somewhat divergent food aid
programmes grouped together under the rubric of US food aid.
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US food aid affects, and is affected by, the workings of various domestic agencies.
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) identifies commodities and the
quantities available for donation; the Treasury Department sets the terms of credit at
which food aid sales are to take place; the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
establishes whether funding is available; the Department of State considers the
political implications of food aid donations and the Agency for International
Development puts the programmes to effect in the field. The Food Aid Subcommittee
of the Development Co-ordinating Committee (DCC) rules on whatever interagency
disputes may arise (Ruttan, 1996: 149).
Prior to the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (also known as the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) of 1985, food aid was largely additional to financial
aid. The additionality of food aid to financial aid, though less, is still prevalent. Saran
and Konandreas (1991 :42) argue that on the short-term food aid is still clearly
additional to financial aid, but they are inconclusive about whether substitution has
increased over the longer term. It should also be noted that in states for which surplus
disposal plays a role in food aid (usually the larger agricultural exporters), greater
additionality occurs than when surplus disposal does not play much of a role III
national food aid programmes.
In the US, various agricultural committees and subcommittees of both Houses of
Congress appropriate the respective food aid titles their share, administered by either
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (Title I) or by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) (Titles II and III). The use of at least
two government departments (Agriculture and State) impairs co-ordination and allows
for the additionality of US food aid. Whilst food aid is of less value to a donor than
financial aid, the former type still inflates the general foreign affairs budget (150
account), exaggerated even more so by the over-stated value of food aid as recorded
in the budget", The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act sought to reduce the freedom with
which food aid was given out. The Act introduced a greater trade-off among food aid,
3 I prefer the use of sectoral instead of bureaucratic to describe the various food aid programmes and
their connections with "US food aid".
4 See chapter 3 for a further explanation of the valuation offood aid.
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financial aid and other aspects of the foreign assistance budget (Ruttan, 1996: 178;
Clay and Stokke, 1991 :7).
Figure 5.2. United States Food Asisstance Programmes (1998)
Food for Progress
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Source: USAID (l99ge).
In the rest of the chapter the focus will fall mainly on Titles I and II of the PL480, as
these two programmes accounted for 89% of US food aid in 1998 (USAID, 199ge).
Two smaller programmes, Title III of the PL480 programme and the Food for
Progress programme will also be considered briefly. The various purposes and
benefits to both donor and recipients will be examined in brief, as well as trends
demonstrated by the various Titles in recent years. From the outset it is important to
note the different rationale behind Title I on the one hand, and Titles II (and Title III)
on the other. Title I food aid should be associated with the "decline" of food aid, as it
is funded by the USDA, has a strong surplus disposal function with direct and short-
term material donor interests playing more of a role than in the case of Title II, which
is funded by USAID and is more motivated by humanitarian concerns, and less by
surplus disposal than Title I and should therefore be associated with the "growth" of
food aid. Food for Progress food aid commodities are supplied from the surplus
available to the Commodity Credit Corporation. The last section of this chapter deals
with the relationship between US agriculture and the national food aid programme, as
the US is regarded as the state in which the production of a surplus is a stronger
determinant of food aid levels than any other state.
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5.2. United States food aid programmes
5.2.1. Title I food aid
Title I food aid is a form of bilateral programme food aid, designed to sell surplus
American agricultural commodities to friendly developing countries at below world
market credit terms, without disrupting world (and US) agricultural markets unduly.
Title I food aid accounted for more than 70% of US food aid during the period 1955-
92 (Kodras, 1993 :234), but has drastically shrunk since 1993.
The initial purpose of Title I food aid was to straightforwardly dispose of surplus
agricultural commodities. However, Title I food aid soon came to serve US foreign
policy objectives', despite the fact that aggregate US food aid levels were not
influenced by foreign policy goals, but by the availability of agricultural surplus.
Congress curtailed the (ab)use of Title I credit sales for foreign policy ends in 1975
through the International Development and Food Assistance Act. The
developmental/humanitarian aspect of food aid was enhanced through a regulation
that stipulated that a maximum of 25% of Title I sales were to be allowed to countries
above a certain per capita income level. A further development-minded reform was
the prescription that 15 % of Title I commodities were to be given as a grant, with the
monies generated to be used to the direct benefit of the poor (Shaw and Clay,
1993:216).
The easy credit terms of Title I sales provide balance of payment support to countries
with foreign exchange shortages, as well as to countries that have trouble in meeting
their food needs through commercial imports'' (Shaw and Clay, 1993:218).
Particularly during the 1980s did the benefit of Title I come to the fore, both for the
US and the recipients. The debt problems of many developing states started with the
second oil price hike of 1979 and President Reagan's monetarist policies, after a
5 In 1974, 70% of Title I food aid went to South Vietnam, Cambodia and South Korea, for obvious (to
the US government, that is) military reasons (Ruttan, 1996: 170). See also Cathie (1997:65).
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decade of great financial liquidity. Title I credit sales provided great relief to foreign
exchange strapped poor countries, as it allowed these states to spend their money on
other important items (in theory, at least).
Credit sales under Title I were of great benefit to the US as well, since the US had
rapidly expanded agricultural production to meet the growing demand that prevailed
during the 1970s, a decade of readily available loans and severe chronic food
shortages (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983:79). US agricultural surpluses (and
accompanying political and economic costs) skyrocketed, following the drastic
collapse of effective demand and the emergence of the European Union as a major
agricultural exporter. Since 1993, a relative shortage of supply of agricultural
commodities, as indicated by high international agriculture prices, has lessened the
need for food aid (especially Title I) as a means of surplus disposal. As the size of the
Title I programme for a particular year is denoted in dollar (not tonnage) (Shaw and
Clay, 1993 :221), higher prices automatically reduce the quantity of agricultural
commodities available for sale on credit through Title I. The budget format of Title I
thus provides a built-in mechanism regulating between surplus and food aid levels
Title I credit sales affect normal marketing channels much more than does food aid
delivered through non-market channels, such as emergency aid or food for work
programmes, when the food aid goes straight to the needy. However, Title I food aid
does not raise the food levels of a country, as it merely assists in financing imports
that would have taken place in any case, except when the prices are below that of the
market (Shaw and Clay, 1993:233). Programme food aid does displace commercial
exports to some extent, which makes one wonder how the US escapes/escaped as its
concessional sales are/were often in contravention of the FAO Principles of Surplus
Disposal and Consultative Obligations.
The FAO established the Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSD) to prevent
concessional sales from disrupting normal export patterns in agricultural trade,
requiring food aid to be additional to normal commercial sales. Be that as it may, the
6 A 1989 study found that Title I credit sales do little to improve the overall level of nutrition in
recipient states, as it merely provides balance of payment support in financing imports that would have
taken place in any case (Shaw and Clay, 1993:225), as programme food aid typically does.
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legal status of the FAO Principles is not clear as they are not a "binding instrument"
on member states (Cohn, 1993:23). Singer and Shaw (1996:452) point out that much
food "trade" is not conducted as straightforward market transactions, but rather
through a "labyrinth" of various agreements between governments at various sub-
market prices/credit rates. This opacity makes it "difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify globally the concessional element of such transactions such as export credit,
guarantee and enhancement programmes, and their linkages with other trade
concessions, or with financial aid", with obvious negative implications for the
enforcement of the FAO Principles. This could explain why nobody pays much
attention to the work of the CSD, nor to the rules supposed to ensure that food aid is
additional to commercial exports (Uvin, 1992:305), leaving the CSD to perform a job
of "doubtful effectiveness" (Singer, Wood and Jennings, 1987:197; Cathie, 1997:10).
Title I food aid falls under the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The
mere fact that Title I is funded and administered by the USDA should give one a
strong indication of the interests that underlie Title I food aid, as opposed to Titles U
and UI which are funded by USAID. Currency generated from Title I sales are kept as
counterpart funds 7 and are normally owned by either the US or the recipient
government (Shaw and Clay, 1993:230). The US controls the use of counterpart
funds, which are employed for agricultural and trade purposes, such as the promotion
of business channels in recipient states (through marketing, credit provision and
agribusiness) (Ruttan, 1996:177; Shaw and Clay, 1993:218))8. Under the Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1995/6, Title I is to become an
even more effective market development instrument as private businesses, along with
the governments of developing countries, are now granted soft loans, but their
purchases are tied to American agricultural produce (Cohen, 1998).
7 "Counterpart funds refer to local (domestic) currency obtained from the sale by a government of
commodities or foreign exchange received as aid, from a donor country or international organisation,
and over whose use the donor has (or retains) some control" (Bruton and Hill (1991) in Maxwell and
Owens (1991:4).
8 The influence of the US alone through counterpart funds is quite small, but the accumulation of
counterpart funds from various donors is more consequential. Food aid counterpart funds in
Mozambique amounted to 22% of government expenditure in the late 1980s (Maxwell and Owens,
1991 :5).
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Through the decades, recipients of Title I food aid have strongly reflected the
overseas political and military interests of the US. In 1974, more than 70% of Title I
credit sales went to South Vietnam, Cambodia and South Korea, with the generated
funds being used to support the war effort. During the 1980s, Egypt became the
largest recipient of (mostly US) food aid, in an attempt by Washington to assuage the
Egyptians and their opposition to the "recently-created" Israel, but also because Egypt
was deemed to be a potentially lucrative market to "develop". In the midst of the
African food crisis of the mid-1980s, Egypt was still receiving a disproportionately
large share of world food aid considering that greater need for food aid existed
elsewhere in Africa (Clay and Stokke, 1991:10; Shaw and Clay, 1993:223). Following
the collapse of the Communist regimes of the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, the priority these countries enjoyed in US foreign policy became apparent in
the large amounts of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and food aid they
received". Shifting US priorities can be appreciated by the fact that in the first five
years of these former communist states receiving food aid, starting in 1989, 20% of
world food aid was diverted from the rest of the developing world. This diversion can
be attributed to the shift in countries prioritised by US food aid and foreign policy
(many of the former Communist countries), but also the fact that there is little
additionality to US food aid when new food aid priorities appear on the horizon
(given the nominally fixed budgets of Title I programs). Most of the food aid to the
former communist states was diverted from previous (US) food aid favourites (such as
Egypt, El Salvador and Morocco) (Benson and Clay, 1998:39). In 1994, 30% of US
food aid went to Eastern Europe, and only 23% went to Sub-Saharan Africa
(Charlton, 1997:447).
During the period 1955-1992, Title I made up 70% of total US food aid, but by 1998,
Title I accounted for only 20% of a very low US food aid total (see figure 5.2.)
(Kodras, 1993:234; USAID, 199ge). US programme food aid (Title I) has fallen from
$442,8 (1991) to a budgeted amount of just $112m in 1999. The recent decline in
9 During the period 1990-95, Official Development Assistance (aDA) fell by 15% in real terms.
Without counting aDA to the former Communist states of Eastem Europe and the Soviet Union, aDA
declined by 19% in real terms during the same period. What this means is that aDA to the former
Communist countries increased, or at a minimum, declined less severely than did aDA to the rest of
the developing world. The former Communist countries received 4,8% of aDA in 1995 (Benson and
Clay, 1998:32).
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Title I food aid, should be considered in light of the fact that Title I food aid falls
under the USDA budget. Why has this decline in Title I credit sales taken place?
Taylor (1992:143) identifies programme food aid (which Title I is) as a grey area, in
terms of whether it should be defined as food aid or subsidised sales of agricultural
commodities. The variation of programme food aid agreements (the differing terms
offered in these programme food aid transactions) makes generalisations hard, except
to say that this form of aid is the most suspicious of all forms of food aid.
The Agreement on Agriculture included in the Uruguay Round of the Generalised
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) attempted to limit the misuse of food aid as
a means of circumventing the restrictions on subsidised sales of agricultural
commodities. Article 10(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture states that "Members
donors of international food aid shall ensure that such aid shall be provided to the
extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less concessional than those
provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986,,10. The US is the only
major food aid donor that does not give all its food aid in fully grant form, thereby
enabling the US to recover part of the cost of its food aid programme (Shaw and Clay,
1993 :222) Il. It seems as though the Uruguay Round GATT regulations have
succeeded in preventing US circumvention of international limits on agricultural
export support, and more specifically in the case of Title I, the credit sales of
agricultural commodities.
The Uruguay Round has also made the use of Title I as a market development tool
more difficult. Article 10(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture states that "Members
donors of international food aid shall ensure that the provision of international food
aid is not tied directly to commercial exports of agricultural products to recipient
countries" and "that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid
which is monetised, shall be carried out in accordance with the FAD Principles of
10 According to Article IV of the 1986 FAC, credit sales would require payment in reasonable
instalments over a period of at least 20 years at interest rates below world commercial rates. A
maximum of 15% of the principal cost is payable on delivery (Shaw and Singer, 1996:448).
The FAIR Act of 1995/6 eliminates the minimum repayment period of 10 years set by the 1990 farm
bill, the Agricultural Development and Trade Act and also shortens the maximum grace period from 7
(as set by the 1990 farm bill) to 5 years (Shaw and Clay, 1993:218; USAID, 1999c). The Development
Assistance Committee of the OECD dermes food aid as having a concessional element of at least 25%.
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Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations". Previously, food aid might not have
been explicitly tied with commercial exports, but it was a form of market
development, however vague, indirect or fallible such a market development strategy
may bel2. Market development refers to the improvement of infrastructure and
distributional networks, altered consumer tastes, and so forth. It is hard to directly link
such changes and "development" to food aid, but I would argue that, even though
food aid, at a minimum, might have none of the aforementioned market development
effects, food aid will not do any harm to a recipient country as a future target for
exports during an absence of food aid. The Uruguay Round explicitly forbids the use
of food aid as a market development tool, unless the terms of credit are concessional
enough (have 25% concessionality in its terms of sale).
What then is the effect of the Uruguay Round on US food aid, and in particular Title I
food aid? Forbidding the tying of food aid to commercial sales makes Title I food aid
a less effective market development tool, with money being shifted within the USDA
budget to other market development programmes. Positive market development
results for the US is not guaranteed because, even though Title I food aid might
develop foreign markets, the inability to tie food aid to commercial agricultural
exports from the US leaves the door open for other exporters to take advantage of the
market that has been developed by the US. US agricultural exporters are very
competitive inmost cereals, and thus the US will probably be able to capture much of
the markets they have developed through outright competition, without food aid being
tied to agricultural exports. Furthermore, it has been noted that the CSD has been
II For a while, during the early 1980s, Japan was the only other donor not to donate all its food aid in
fully grant form.
12 The usefulness of food aid as a tool for the development of agricultural markets is a rhetorical device
often employed by the pro-food aid camp. These proponents of food aid point out that most recipients
of food aid later become importers of agricultural exports from the food aid donating countries. Barrett
(1998:569) views the market-development argument as empty. He points out that since 1955, 153
countries (out of an approximately 200) have received food aid through the PL480 programme. Many
ofthese countries are now importers of US agricultural products. The claim made by the pro-food aid
camp is hard to justify on the vague nature of the evidence, as well as the virtual absence of
counterfactual examples. Increased per capita income of a population is probably a greater stimulant
for demand for US agricultural exports (Uvin, 1992:298), as food aid often goes to those countries that
can by definition not afford US agricultural exports. At best, food aid lobbies, invoking the national
interest, can claim that food aid influences consumer tastes in recipient countries, for example, the
growing consumption of wheat and bread in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades. The link between
food aid and changing tastes are not very clear, as one can probably attribute some causal influence to
factors such as advertising, colonial interference and urbanisation.
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unable to implement FAO Principles perfectly. The implication of this is that food aid
does displace agricultural imports from other countries, the Uruguay Round in spite.
The aforementioned restrictions placed on Title I go a fair way in explaining the
downward trend in Title I budget allocations. The US is seemingly not alone in
dealing with the restrictions that have been placed on its programme food aid, as
programme food aid has declined globally from more than 70% of all food aid in the
late 1970s, at least 80% of the total in the early 1980s, to below 40% of all forms of
food aid in 1996 (Charlton, 1997:445; Barrett, 1998:570). The downward trend in
programme food aid can also be discerned in the decline of bilateral food aid from
63% of all channels in 1991, 50% on 1995, and 39% in 1998 (Charlton, 1997:448;
WFP, 1999c). Trends revealed by Title I food aid concur with the assessment of food
aid as generally surplus driven.
5.2.2. Title II food aid
Title II food aid was, according to the PL480 of 1954, to be a programme through
which no more than $300m worth of food aid was to be donated to meet urgent
humanitarian needs in developing countries. Title II was originally a programme of
minor importance in the PL480, judging by the small budget appropriated to it. The
importance of Title II food aid grew in significance vis-á-vis other US food aid lines
in response to the food crises of the 1970s and 1980s. Judging by budgetary trends,
Title II has, in recent years, become the largest programme under the rubric of
American food aid, reaching more than 50 of the poorest states the world over.
Notwithstanding that Title II food aid has increased, both in terms of tonnage and
dollar value, Title II's proportional increase should be viewed against the drastic
decline of Title I food aid, which used to dominate US food aid. The shift in
importance between Title I and Title II is quite apparent if one considers that between
1955 and 1992 70% of US food aid went through Title I (Kodras, 1993:234).
However, in 1998, Title II accounted for 69% of total US food aid and the amount
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budgeted for Title II for the 1999 financial year is more than 7 times larger than the
budget allocation for Title I for the same period 13(USAID, 199ge).
The initial focus of Title II has shifted from providing food aid commodities as
emergency grants, toward becoming a form of project aid that views development by
means of food aid grants as its raison d'être. However, this shift has not precluded
Title II from providing emergency food aid. The shift toward a more development
oriented form of food aid was initiated by the 1975 food aid reforms, under the
authority of Section 206, so that in the 1990s, approximately 25% of Title II grants
have been for emergency purposes (Shaw and Clay, 1993:217-8). The Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 allows for the transfer of
up to 50% of Title Ill's resources to Title II. This has been done to prevent the
development objectives of Title II being hampered should the demand for emergency
food aid deplete its resources (Cohen, 1998)14.
The 1975 food aid reforms permitted the sale of Title II grants for local currency
(monetisation). The funds generated from these sales were to be ploughed back into
the recipient country for agricultural and development purposes (Shaw and Clay,
1993 :217). The FAIR Act of 1996 raised the minimum required monetisation from
10% to 15%. The funds generated from these sales may now, along with the
aforementioned uses, also be used to finance the activities of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGO) and development projects. The FAIR Act also allows, for the
first time, that monetised proceeds be used in another country, as long as it is in the
same region (Cohen, 1998). Title IV, subtitled General Authorities and Requirements,
prohibits these grants from restricting production or marketing in recipient countries,
by using food aid in such a way as to cause injury to US producers in a competitive
world market (the Bellmon amendment) (Ruttan, 1996: 183). Monetisation of Title II
food aid grants and the development it directly enables stand in contrast with the
13 The budget amount allocated for Title I for 1999 was $112m (a decrease of more than 50% from the
previous year when the allocation for Title I was $245m). The amount allocated for Title II for 1999
was $837m, the same amount as the year before, and a slightly up from 1997 (USAID, 199ge).
14 The Food Security Act of 1985 reintroduced Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949 through
which grain, oilseed and dairy products are to be donated under Title II. Although controlled by Title
II, the costs of Section 416 are borne by the Commodity Credit Corporation, not the PL480
programme, and are therefore not seen as part of the International Affairs budget (150 account).
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mildly depressive effects on local economies that Title I credit sales have. The
proceeds from Title I sales are kept in counterpart funds, which are seldom used,
which means that counterpart funds consist largely of money that has been withdrawn
from the recipient economy, hence the mildly depressive effect.
Title II food aid, as a form of project food aid, is regarded as a particularly effective
food aid programme. It is also the only PL480 food aid line that has survived the
recent budget cuts. Title II disrupts commercial markets much less than does Title I,
as Title II is given through non-commercial channels, going directly to those involved
in specific projects, like food for work projects and targeting the poor directly. This
stands in contrast to Title I which is a government-to-government transfer and serves
as balance of payment support in the recipient state. As recipient states do not have to
pay for the food aid (unlike Title I), Title II is largely additional to imported and
locally produced food, and thus raises the domestic food supply, even though some
substitution does occur, the CSD despite.
The benefits of Title II to the US are not as apparent as are those of Title I. Title II
food aid is given as a grant, whereas Title I commodities are sold on easy terms of
credit. Selling something is more self-interested than giving it away. Furthermore, the
channels through which Title II food aid is given also tempers accusations of self-
interested behaviour by the donor. Though some Title II food aid is granted on a
government-to-government basis (which mostly only occurs in cases of emergency),
most of Title II food aid is channeled through NGOs, co-operatives and the WFP. The
1985 farm bill, for example, ruled that around three quarters of Title II must go
through multilateral channels (Ruttan, 1996: 177)15.Food aid through multilateral and
non-state channels diminishes the politicisation of food aid donations'", even though it
does not leave the donor without influence. For example, the US undermines the
(political) independence of the WFP, as the US must approve the provision of food
aid commodities to WFP-assisted emergencies (through the International Emergency
Section 416 food aid donations are made directly from the surpluses available to the CCC. In 1988,
more than 40 countries were receiving food aid through Section 416. (Ruttan, 1996: 177).
15 During the period 1986-90 an average of 59% of Title II food aid went through NGOs, 24% through
the WFP and 17% bilaterally (Shaw and Clay, 1993:223). In 1996, $324m worth of Title II food aid out
ofa total of$821m went through US NGOs (USAID, 1999a).
16 See for example Cathie (1982:2) and Kindleberger (1970: 141).
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Food Reserve - IEFR) on a case-by-case basis (Shaw and Clay, 1993:224). Donors
can prevent certain countries from receiving food aid, or delaying the delivery thereof
in two important ways. Itmight refuse the IEFR requests to draw from the resources it
has donated, by insisting that its pledge be used for other specified emergencies.
Another way of hampering the delivery of timely food aid to certain countries is by
merely not heeding IEFR requests for emergency pledges. The US has been the
biggest culprit in this politicisation of multilateral emergency food aid. This practice
has impacted on the usual opponents of the US, namely Cuba, Libya, Syria and North
Korea (Charlton, 1997:454-7; Shaw and Clay, 1993:224)17. USAID has sometimes
sought to overcome the restrictions placed on it by the State Department (of which it
forms part) by channeling aid through NGOs which are able to provide relief under
less duress from the US government. This happened in Iraq in 1991, where
humanitarian agencies were utilised by USAID to assist vulnerable groups, the same
groups that were under threat from US economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in an
attempt to effect a change in the domestic political order (Natsios, 1997:50)18. Self-
interested behaviour by the US is also demonstrated in the 1985 farm bill which
requires 75% of all US food aid to be shipped in US vessels, even though this leads to
costs five times higher than if competition were allowed (Bovard, 1993 :96; Saran and
Konandreas, 1991:51). Project food aid does have some market development
outcomes, and even though this is not necessarily the primary objective of such food
aid, it does attempt to integrate excluded people into the world economy, an economy
in which the USA is well positioned so as to exploit those more peripheral to it.
Since food aid is often utilised as a means of disposing of agricultural surpluses, food
aid availability declines during times of greatest need. Shortage of supply (as reflected
in higher world agricultural prices) negates the raison d'être of food aid, namely the
surplus disposing incentive, which results in lower food aid levels. During the 1972-
74 food crisis, as agricultural prices soared, the (opportunity) cost of donating food
aid escalated in accordance. This resulted in drastic cuts to the Title II programme
(Rothschild, 1993:91). To prevent the quantity of food aid being diminished as a
17 Sierra Leone and Liberia have also been affected by the unwillingness of donors to volunteer
resources (Charlton, 1997:454-7; Shaw and Clay, 1993:224).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
123
result of higher prices, as had happened in during the 1972-74 food crisis, minimum
tonnage levels for Title II were introduced in 1975 (Shaw and Clay, 1993:217). The
minimum tonnage for 1995 was set at 2,025m tonnes, with the 1999 level slightly
higher at 2,2m tonnes. The government owned Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC), which manages most of the US agricultural surplus, and is administered by
the USDA, provides the Title II programme with most of its food aid requirements,
which is paid for by the USAID (Shaw and Clay, 1993: 221,218). Title II has to
compete other smaller food aid programmes run by the US, such as Section 416 and
Food for Progress, which also draw their resources from Commodity Credit
Corporation surplus. Yet, Title II food aid has survived the decline of food aid the
world over since 1993, though quantities purchased with the same amount of dollars
have differed somewhat after 1993. In 1991, Title II allocations of $803,2m bought
more than 3m tonnes of food aid, but in 1999, $837m is expected to buy 2,2m tonnes.
Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the US Administration and Congress are
both committed to reducing the US budget deficit. Food aid offers an attractive target
for budget cuts, because of the immediate positive effect that appears in the budget, as
food aid is a short-term expense spent during the year of allocation. High international
agricultural prices have also reduced the incentive for food aid as a means of
disposing of agricultural surplus, and have raised the opportunity cost of giving away
a relatively scarce resource (at the moment). Notwithstanding the prevailing climate,
Congress has prevented the Clinton Administration, which has been eyeing the PL480
as a tempting target for budget cuts (Cohen, 1998), from reducing the Title II budget.
However, Titles I and III have borne most of the cuts in recent years. The survival of
the Title II programme is largely due to the flattering view of it as an effective
programme. Title II is also GATT legal, seemingly unlike much of Title I. Article
10(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture prefers the form in which Title II food aid is
given: "Members donors of international food aid shall ensure that such aid shall be
provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms no less concessional
than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention 1986".
18 The booklet opens with a foreword from former US President George Bush, which casts some doubt
on the proclaimed benevolence of the American government, brings the author's independence into
question and makes one more likely to view the information provided as disinformation instead.
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Maintaining the Title II line, even though it has been a costly programme during the
1990s due to high agricultural prices, could be seen as an attempt by the US to
prevent an even greater depletion of its PL480 food aid programme, especially after
the massive reductions in Title I food aid. After all, by maintaining Title II, total US
aid expenditure is not increased, since Title II has to compete with other aid
programmes within the USAID budget. The overall reduction of US food aid reflects
poorly in international food aid statistics, as often little or no differentiation is made
between the various US food aid lines. Be that as it may, the increase of Title II food
aid is an increase in overall less surplus driven food aid, and should therefore be
understood as part of the developmentalisation of food aid.
5.2.3. Title III food aid and Food for Progress
The Title III food aid line is a programme in decline and of decreasing importance. In
1991, food aid assistance to the value of $276,7m (l,4m tonnes) was given through
Title III (Clay and Shaw, 1993:218)19. As the decade progressed, budget allocations to
Title III plummeted, so that in 1998, only $30m (O,lm tonnes) was allocated to the
Title III budget.
Title III food aid is a government-to-government grant programme. It is directed at
the least developed countries of the world", of which four received Title III food aid
in 1998 (USAID, 1999c). Title III commodities are obtained privately or from the
CCC, and is administered and funded by the USAID (Ruttan, 1996:183). Funds
generated from the sale of Title III commodities are used to improve food security in
recipient countries. A greater integration of Title III food aid with other foreign
assistance programmes is being worked towards. This greater integration is due to the
influence of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Clay and Stokke, 1991:7). Apart from
the influence of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, greater integration of Title III
food aid also makes economic sense, especially during a time of high international
agricultural prices, and by implication, limited surpluses do draw upon. The increased
19 The total tonnage donated in 1993 was 1,3m tonnes.
20 To qualify for Title III food aid, a country must have a per capita income of less than $610 per year
(1991), or a significant proportion of the population must be malnourished (Shaw and Clay, 1993:218).
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substitution of Title III food aid with other food aid programmes has lightened the
burden on the USAID budget, especially since a degree of duplication exists between
Titles II and III.
The creation of a free-standing (unrelated to the PL480) Food for Progress Act in
1985 provided the US with a food aid channel to support agricultural liberalisation
and democratisation in countries with slightly higher per capita incomes than the
usually poverty-stricken recipients of food aid (Shaw and Clay, 1993 :217; Ruttan,
1996: 182). Although some element of market development is probably present in all
food aid, it is seldom as explicit as with Food for Progress. The US is aware of its
comparative advantage in many agricultural export products, and uses the Food for
Progress to export "agricultural commodities on credit terms, or on a grant basis, to
support developing countries and countries that are emerging democracies and have
made commitments to introduce or expand free enterprise elements into their
agricultural economies" (my emphasis) (USDA, 1999a). In 1998, South Africa and
the former "bread-basket" of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, were two of the largest
recipients of Food for Progress food aid (USAID, 1999d). South Africa and the
former breadbasket to the Soviet Union, Ukraine, are hardly two priority countries in
terms of food aid needs. Yet, there is more disposable income and "effective" demand
in South Africa and the Ukraine, than there is in a poorer country, which makes the
two aforementioned countries attractive export markets for the US.
The support of democratisation in developing countries through the Food for Progress
programme seems, at first glance, like yet another benevolent act from the centre of
the "Free World" to assist in pushing "history to its end". But, things are not always
what they seem. After decades of supporting authoritarian governrnents in the Third
World, in the mid-1980s the US switched to the promotion of democracy all over the
world (except China, of course). The type of democracy promoted by the US is
polyarchical democracy, whereby mass participation is confined to a choice between
competing elites". Polyarchy is the form of democracy that has attained discursive
hegemony (Robinson, 1996b:624), but offering a more palatable political arrangement
21 Cox (1996:303) echoes Robinson's views on the inequities that are sustained by liberal democracy,
though he does not refer to the phenomenon whereby popular pressure for economic change is moved
off the agenda as polyarchy specifically.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
126
than authoritarianism, transfixing social inequalities and leaving elite material
dominance in tact (Taylor, 1999:14). Polyarchy amounts to a form of consensual
domination whereby social tensions are diffused through the procedural incorporation
of counter-hegemonic forces. Polyarchy focuses intensively on the procedural charade
of democracy, but hardly on the actual social and economic consequences of
government, so that "[t]he notion that there may be a contradiction in terms between
elite and class rule, in which wealth and power is monopolised by minorities, and
democracy, a contradiction that would flow from the original Greek definition of
power of the people, does not enter - by theoretical-definitional fiat - into the
polyarchie definition" (Robinson, 1996b:626).
Food for Progress and the promotion of polyarchy have not become all pervasive in
overall US food aid. In 1998, Food for Progress food aid accounted for only 9% of US
food aid in value terms, and is capped through legislation at 0,5m tonnes (USDA,
1999a). It does however still offer a strong example of the sinister side of
development, economic liberalisation and democratisation.
5.3. Trends in US agriculture
There are two important dimensions to the relationship between agriculture and food
aid. The first involves the "sale"/disposal of agricultural produce through food aid, as
regulated by the Uruguay Round of GATT. The second involves a somewhat deeper
dynamic, namely the actual production of a surplus to be available for donation
(dumping) as food aid. The first has already been considered. We now tum to the
latter.
The relationships between agricultural surplus, price and food aid levels were noted in
chapter 3. The purpose of this section is an examination of US agricultural production
in the 1990s, with special reference to cereals, and how this capacity has evolved. The
importance of grasping this better is to improve our understanding of the availability
of food aid (which, in the case of the US depends greatly on the availability of an
agricultural surplus). US food aid policy should be understood with reference to the
evolution of US agricultural performance and policies over the last few decades.
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US agricultural exports were in great demand during the 1970s. Relatively high prices
due to a perceived shortage of supply (remember the "world food crisis" of 1972-4 ?),
a weak dollar, weak international competition, free trade transgressions that were
easily forgiven in the context of the Cold War, and vast and easily available credit for
food importing developing countries all stimulated US agricultural production, and
made domestic support somewhat redundant (Mahler, 1991 :37).
Things changed in the 1980s. In response to the production stimulating conditions of
the 1970s, US farmers expanded production, but their exports were met with stem
competition from the highly subsidised exports from the EU, which became a net
exporter of agricultural commodities in the early 1980s. Demand for US exports was
further stunted by a strong dollar and the unfolding world debt crisis, both factors
partly the result of the high US interest rates that followed President Reagan's
reaction to the second oil shock of 1979. Furthermore, agricultural exports to Japan
stabilised=. The US was stuck with huge agricultural surpluses. The demand for
assistance from US farmers made agriculture the fastest increasing budget item in the
US, despite "significant" unilateral cuts to domestic support courtesy of the 1985 farm
bill (Paarlberg, 1997:419; Mahler, 1991:143)23. In an attempt to offset EU subsidies to
third country markets, the US introduced their own export assistance programmes, for
example, the Export Enhancement Programme (EEP). Combined action of the US and
EU resulted in huge quantities of agricultural commodities being dumped on world
markets during the 1980s (McMichael, 1996:641), negatively affecting developing
country agricultural production and export earnings. The increased competitiveness
brought to bear by the EEPs was easily and more cheaply countered by the EU,
resulting in the US failing to take market share away from the EU (Paarlberg,
1997:424; Cohn, 1993:31).
For the US, more so than the EU, the rising costs of agricultural assistance was
becoming untenable. Reagan initially proposed a simultaneous liberalisation of all
22 Once a the population reaches a certain level of income, as happened in Japan, the population's
demand for food does not increase greatly, due to the low price elasticity of demand for basic
commodities such as food (Mohr and Fourie, 1996:262-3).
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national agricultural sectors, but the EU resisted (Yigletu, 1997: 109). The EU and the
US accused each other of forcing the other to use export subsidies. Itwould therefore
have required a great deal of good faith/naiveté for one of the two parties to
unilaterally liberalise its agricultural sector. The problem was to ensure simultaneous
liberalisation. The Uruguay Round of the GATT offered the ideal forum in which to
solve this problem (Gardner, 1996:95). The intolerable expense of agricultural support
programmes, and the belief that it would enjoy a comparative advantage in a
liberalised agricultural trading order (McMichael, 1993: 199), prompted the US to
include Agriculture in the Uruguay Round and induce the acceptance of its inclusion
on others (Gill and Law, 1988:346).
The initial proposal of the US to the Uruguay Round was the "zero option" through
which the US wanted to put an end to all agricultural support, protection and export
subsidisation the world over within ten years. The call fell on deaf European ears
(Gardner, 1996:95). The American plea for free trade should, despite the rhetoric, not
be seen as the final acceptance by the US of the logic of the free market (even in
agriculture), even though the prevailing "neoliberal consensus" accommodates the
expediency and "legitimacy" of such rhetoric. The American position should rather be
viewed as a neo-mercantilist strategy by which the US sought to take advantage of the
comparative advantage it believed it enjoyed in international agriculture, an advantage
that will be enhanced under a system of free trade (Mahler, 1991:45). The mercantilist
expediency of the US position is evident in the fact that the USDA favoured free trade
in sectors where the US had a comparative advantage/", but sought protection for
those sectors that were not deemed international competitive (such as tobacco,
livestock, sugar, dairy and vegetables) (Grant, 1993:254; Palmeter, 1989:47).
23 The annual cost of farm programmes rose by more or less five times in real terms in the period 1980-
86 (Paarlberg, 1997:419).
24 A Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (1995c:65) study predicted that North American
countries would see a net increase in exports of around 50% as a result of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, gaining through the export of products such as cereals, fats and oils, meat
and milk. According to 1991/2-1995/6 averages, the US is the largest exporter of wheat (34,2m
tonnes), followed by Canada (20,7m tonnes and the EU (19,7). The US is also the largest exporter of
coarse grains, with 52,2m tonnes, followed by the EU (8,3m tons). Maize/com, of which the US has a
72% world share (USDA, 1999b), makes up more than 60 % of the international coarse grains trade
(IGC, 1998b).
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During the negotiation of the Uruguay Round, the US unilaterally reformed its
agricultural sector, not so much in anticipation of GATT discipline, but due to budget
pressure (Paarlberg, 1997:429; Moyer and Josling, 1990:163). The US was, at the
time, licking its lips at increased export opportunities, following a decrease in EU
export subsidies according to GATT regulations (Ingersent, Rayner and Hine,
1995:1724; Gardner, 1996:99; McMichael, 1993:206).
The US stance during the agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round exhibited
self-confidence in its ability to be highly competitive in a liberalised agricultural trade
system. The US attitude explains the umbrage with which it accepted the limited
liberalisation stipulated by the Agreement on Agriculture in 199325.
The first farm bill after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1995/6, continues to evince an attitude and
vision of US pre-eminence in global agricultural trade. The 1995/6 FAIR Act
"decoupled't" support from agricultural price levels and ended acreage reduction
programmes'" in order to encourage full production (Paarlberg and Orden, 1996: 1306;
Ingco, Mitchell and McCalla, 1996: 19). The lifting of restrictions on full production
reveals two assumptions underlying the US attitude to international agricultural trade:
Firstly, the US expects agricultural prices to remain high until the end of the decade
(Stuart and Runge, 1997:130), and secondly, that it will be (one of) the dominant
exporters in a free agricultural trading system.
25 Although not significant in a quantitative sense (except perhaps with regard to restrictions on export
subsidies), in a qualitative sense the Uruguay Round did lay a foundation for easier agricultural
liberalisation in future trade rounds. The most significant outcome of the Agreement on Agriculture
was the 36% reduction on export subsidies, which would allow for more open competition in the third
country markets. Judging by the recent sanctions threatened and imposed by the US against the EU,
following the trade dispute that ignited over bananas, an unremitting US position on freer agricultural
trade can be expected in the next round of world trade negotiations, as it will seek to further benefit
from its competitive agricultural exports.
26 "Coupled" payments to farmers make up the difference between the target price, set by the
government, and the actual market price, which used to be the lower of the two prices during times of
excess supply, such as during the 1980s and early 1990s (Paarlberg and Orden, 1996:1306).
27 During the period 1985-95 the US idled 18,2 % of its grain cropland (Ingco, Mitchell and McCalla,
1996:5)
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5.4. Conclusion
What is the implication of all the above for food aid? Generally, to speak of food aid
as surplus disposal is a travesty during favourable market conditions for exporters,
along with the dominant international position the US has to take advantage of the
opportunities presented by these favourable market conditions. If one accepts the
argument that food aid is largely a means of surplus disposal, then the decline of US
Title I food aid is understandable, given the wonderful export opportunities for
agricultural commodities that have presented themselves since 1993.
The future of food aid as a means of surplus disposal looks bleak. US posturing
during the banana trade conflict with the EU looks like the introduction, insistence
and assertion of much freer trade in agriculture and US dominance, based on its
comparative advantage, within such a trade regime, regardless of the needs of poor
countries'". The US would not assume such an extreme position if it did not expect
high prices and its market dominance to continue. For wheat, the US committed itself
to a 36% decrease in protection following the Uruguay Round, even though wheat had
fairly little protection prior to the Uruguay Round, in any case (Ingco, 1995 :50).
Market share does not change as rapidly as do prices, so therefore one would expect
the first variable to affect US food aid levels to be a drop in prices (not decreased
market share). However, the "destruction" of competitors have made agricultural
markets more oligopolistic, and thus less perfecr'", giving the US tremendous
influence on world cereal prices (George, 1982:40; Watkins, 1996:245). Cargill, a
large North American agricultural multinational company, supplies in excess of 60%
of the world cereal market (Kronick, 1996:291). World agricultural markets are
therefore more amenable to US influence, giving the US more control over the market
aspects such as supply and price.
28 The needs of poor countries are, ostensibly, what the banana-trade conflict between the US and the
EU is about. The EU wants to give preferential access to certain Caribbean countries (part of the
Africa-Caribbean-Pacific group) as bananas are the only product these island states can grow and
subsequently export, and the US insists that free trade principles embodied by the WTO, be upheld.
The US already controls 75% of the banana market in the EU. See also note 25.
29 The more perfect a market, the less the influence one actor has on the market.
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All is not lost. The decoupling of agricultural support after the FAIR Act and the
encouragement of full production in the US will probably result in a glut in
agricultural markets, a typical "bust" following the "boom" of recent years. At the end
of 1998, world wheat prices had fallen to its lowest level in ten years, despite world
consumption of wheat approaching record highs (World Grain, 1998), already
resulting in a rise in food aid for 1998 (WFP, 1999£).
Although US food aid has declined drastically since 1993, Title II food aid has
remained fairly constant. This seems to be in line with the developmentalisation of
food aid, as Title II is largely driven by more altruistic concerns, as opposed to the
surplus disposal motives of Title 1. This developmentalisation is to be expected
judging by the budget out of which it is funded. As with other states, this
developmentalisation is not huge, in the case of the US one can count on
approximately 2m tonnes of annual food aid being given through Title II. Although
useful, it is nowhere near the 8,5m tonnes of cereal food aid that the US donated in
1993, in the days when Title I was still a major food aid line within the PL480.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion
6.1. Overview
International food aid remains by and large a form of agricultural surplus disposal.
Consequently, food aid declined to its lowest level in more than two decades when
cereal prices reached record heights in 1996. This decline in food aid was all the more
pronounced considering that in 1993 food aid had reached its highest level since the
1960s. However, despite the record heights attained by cereal prices in 1996, food aid
did not disappear entirely. The total disappearance of post-1993 food aid was
prevented by the developmentalisation of food aid, or as the title suggests, the
"growth" of food aid. This thesis attempted to understand food aid after 1993 in terms
of these two paradoxical, but parallel trends, namely the "growth" and "decline" of
food aid, albeit that these trends are not equal in size.
The decline of food aid occurred because agricultural surplus availability remains the
most important factor that determines food aid levels. The need to dump surplus as
food aid (which largely disappeared in the years following 1993) does not play the
same role for all states, but it plays the strongest role of all states for the largest donor
and most powerful state in the world, the United States. In the period 1993-96, US
food aid showed a greater decline, both in absolute and relative terms, than any of the
other major donors.
Regimes have been theorised as developing in accordance with, and as a result of
initial hegemonic self-interest. The food aid regime originated with the United States.
Gradually, the US drew other, weaker states (middle powers) into the food aid regime.
These weaker states soon acquiesced to US power and accepted the hypocritical
normative justification of the food aid regime. However, when cereal prices started
rising after 1993, the usual American reason for donating food aid (i.e. to get rid of
agricultural surplus) started dissipating and the US began to withdraw from the
regime. As prices continued to rise, food aid became intolerably expensive. Donating
large amounts of food aid was no longer in the direct and short-term self-interest of
the hegemon. As a result, US food aid declined by almost 70% (1993-96). The US
also reneged on its commitment under the FAC of 1995, and reduced its commitment
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by almost 50% under the FAC of 1997. The food aid regime was not totally
destroyed, as we will see when we consider the "growth" of food aid below. But first,
why has the food aid regime had so little success in getting the US to negate much of
its short-term self-interest and consequently disconnect its food aid from surplus
availability?
The US's freedom from structural constraints in general, and from the food aid regime
more specifically, has been approached from the neo-Gramscian perspective. Given
that the US is the most powerful state in the world, along with the neo-Gramscian
"solution" to the agent-structure problem, the US is viewed as having more freedom
and enjoying greater benefits from structural conditions than any other state. Such
freedom allows the US to be more able and successful in pursuing and satisfying its
national interests, without much fear of effective opposition/retaliation from external
forces. Of course, the point is not that structural conditions are so overbearing for
middle powers that they are entirely unable to pursue their immediate self-interest (i.e.
reduce food aid donations when agricultural prices rise); but rather that they are less
able to do so compared to the hegemon. But there are also other reasons why, after
1993, middle powers did not reduce their food aid contributions to the same extent
than did the hegemon, to which we will return below.
The tremendous influence of the United States on food aid matters and levels
necessitated a more refined analysis, an analysis that moved beyond viewing the
hegemon in unitary terms, especially if we wanted to more accurately identify the
location of, and the reasons for the post-1993 "decline" of food aid. Subsequently, we
were able to account for the divergent tendencies of the various food aid lines that fall
under the rubric of "US food aid". The two major US food aid lines, Title I and Title
II of the Public Law 480 of 1954, illustrate the divergences within US food aid
distinctly: Title I food aid is administered by the USDA, and is notorious for its
surplus disposing logic. Consider that between 1955 and 1992, Title I accounted for
70% of an already high US food aid aggregate. By 1998, Title I food aid had fallen to
only 20% of an already very low US food aid aggregate. On the other hand, Title II,
administered by USAID, has grown to account for 69% for US food aid in 1998, with
the budget allocation for 1999 being seven times the size of that allocated to Title I
(USAID, 199ge).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
134
The growth of food aid is largely the result of the food aid regime that developed out
of initial American self-interest. When cereal prices started to rise in the late 1960s,
the US drew other states (middle powers) into the food aid regime, so as to share the
food aid burden. To a much greater extent than the hegemon, these middle powers
have accepted, and continued to abide by the norms of the food aid regime, whereby
food aid should be disconnected from agricultural surplus.
Middle powers are supportive of the hegemon (on a fundamental level) and the
hegemonic order as a whole, as this is the arrangement whereby they benefit most,
given their limited capabilities. In order to preserve the status quo in the global
political economy, middle powers attempt to moderate tensions, (food) aid being a
typical way of assuaging such stress. Middle power altruism is not solely the result of
their position in the hegemonic order, but also due to prevalent societal values (which
are often strongly social-democratic) and the constrained existence of middle power
foreign policy leaders. Supporting the process of international organisation is another
important way in which middle powers seek to manage conflict and exert some
influence in the international system.
International organisation, as an institution within a broader regime, serve to
legitimise, support and perpetuate the hegemonic order, whilst not addressing root
causes of injustice, inequality, and so forth. In the food aid regime international
organisations facilitate the rules that support hegemonic expansion (e.g. accepting
liberalised trade as a solution to world hunger) and co-opt counter-hegemonic elites
and ideas.
The behaviour of middle powers and the development of international organisation
and the food aid regime have provided continuity and consistency to food aid
donations, albeit at a low level of around 5m tonnes per year. Although the initial
normative justification (provided by the United States) whereby the middle powers
were drawn into the food aid regime was hypocritical, these norms have become
greatly accepted, with states contributing to the food aid regime out of their own
volition. The power of the US is no longer needed to "enforce" the norms according to
which the food aid regime functions. Gradually, through the role of middle powers
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and multilateralisation, food aid is being disconnected from its dependence on the
availability of agricultural surplus (which has been termed the "developmentalisation"
of food aid). But, as we have seen, the hegemon (and most important food aid donor)
plays according to different rules than do less powerful states.
Before we proceed to assess the prospects of future food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, I
would like to point out some of the weaknesses of this (field of) study, especially for
those interested in further work in the cross-section of food aid and International
Relations.
6.2. Weakness of this study and avenues for further research
Firstly, the (traditional) middle power concept is applied too crudely and basically
signifies any developed state other than the hegemon. This crude contrast was
originally drawn to distinguish the US and the freedom it enjoys from other states that
are much more restricted and influenced by the structures shaped through American
behaviour. The fact of the matter is that there is a huge gap between the United States
and other states, whether it be in terms of relational or structural power, and as a result
a whole different set of rules apply to the US. However, middle powers are not all
equally constrained/influenced by hegemonic pressure. This variation is largely
undeveloped in this study. Future scholars would do well to hierarchise states
according to the hegemonically moulded constraining and enabling factors that affect
their international behaviour. This does not just apply to middle powers with regard to
food aid, but to most aspects of the international life of states.
Secondly, and keeping with the topic of middle powers: A finer distinction between
middle powers that are major agricultural producers and those that are not should be
made. We have established that agricultural surplus disposal plays a role in the food
aid donations of major agricultural exporting middle powers, such as Canada and
Australia. But, more clarity is needed on how much of the their food aid is surplus
disposal and how much is aid.
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Thirdly, the serious shortage of literature on all aspects of food aid from states other
than the United States indicates a fertile area for research. I am specifically referring
to European food aid, as it has increased in importance in recent years, especially
given the gradual withdrawal of the US from the food aid regime.
Fourthly, bureaucratic food aid politics was hardly touched upon in this study, except
for the chapter on US food aid policy. This is understandable given the macro-level of
this study, but even so, in the literature there exists very little on the bureaucratic
decision-making procedures and agency/departmental politics with regard to food
aid'. In the case of the US, more work on the opposing forces of self-interest (surplus-
driven food aid) and altruism (non-surplus driven food aid) is needed, so as to help us
to better understand the contradictory tendencies of US food aid policy.
Finally, in this study, because of the macro-scope of this study, the links between
(non-) surplus driven food aid and the various types, donors and channels were not
always very direct. In a study of more limited range, these connections can be drawn
more directly and indicated more clearly. But let us return, to the final issue dealt with
in this study, namely the future of food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa:
6.3. The future of food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa
In the first chapter we identified three ways whereby the population of a state can
acquire the food it needs to survive, namely by producing it themselves, importing it
or receiving it as a donation (food aid). The dismal prospects for the first two of these
strategies for improving food security in Sub-Saharan Africa were sketched in the
same chapter. What are the prospects of the third strategy (food aid) for acquiring
food, with regard to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa?
IThe partial exception is Ruttan (1996), who traces the institutional history offood aid in the United
States.
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Figure 6.1. Food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, in comparison to the
world aggregate, 1989-1998
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Judging by figure 6.1, food aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has oscillated pretty much in
accordance with the trends in overall world food aid. The share of food aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa has also hovered around the 40%-mark (WFP, 1998d). What this tells
us is that Sub-Saharan Africa is not receiving growing attention by the food aid
donors, and should expect increases in food aid only when total world food aid
Increases.
Financial aid can be utilised to buy food, and thereby serve the same purpose as food
aid (for the recipient). Figure 3.2 indicated the decline of foreign aid (ODA) since
1992. Aid from DAC countries to Least Developed Countries have also as a share of
totalODA, from 28% in 1987 (0,09% of DAC members' GDP) to 23% in 1997
(0,05% of DAC members' GDP) (OECD, 2000a). ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa has
increased since the mid-1980s, but this increase is relatively less than the increases in
ODA to parts of the world like North Africa and the Middle East and Latin America
and the Caribbean (OECD, 2000c). Therefore, these trends do not augur well for the
improved food availability in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, the largest donor of food aid, the United States, is withdrawing from the
food aid regime (except when agricultural prices are low and it needs to get rid of it
surplus). American withdrawal can be attributed to federal budget pressure, the
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inability ofthe food aid regime to prevent its high degree of self-interested behaviour,
and also, as has been argued, to its increasing market share in many cereals and
growing agricultural competitiveness'. Increasing market control allows for easier
price manipulation in these relatively imperfect cereal markets. The same dominance
also suggests a preference for a (more) open agricultural trade regime so as to
capitalise on one's competitiveness. With the Seattle Round having only recently got
underway as this is being written, commentators' have identified agriculture as one
area where the US will be insistent on much greater liberalisation than that which was
achieved during the Uruguay Round. The American preference for a greater
liberalisation of agricultural trade during the Seattle Round of international trade
negotiations can be traced back to more than a decade ago. Think, for example, of the
"zero option'" advocated by the US at the start of the Uruguay Round. Think of the
1995/6 US farm bill's lifting of all production restricting regulations. And think of the
recent spat the US had with the EU, during the so-called "banana war'", during which
the US insisted on the upholding of free trade principles in agriculture.
The signs are ominous for Sub-Saharan Africa. Aid on the whole is declining. It
seems increasingly that whatever food Sub-Saharan Africa will get from the US, as
the breadbasket of the world, will be in the form of imports, not food aid (that is, if
Sub-Saharan Africa has the ability to pay). Luckily, there are uncontrollable factors
(e.g. the weather) that influence agricultural production, and subsequently agricultural
markets are characterised by booms and busts. In 1998, food aid levels increased,
following the sharp decline of cereal prices after the record highs of 1996 which had
spawned demand-driven production increases. Therefore, apart from reliance on the
ebb and flow of cereal prices, the developmentalisation of food aid just does not seem
significant enough to make the huge impact required on the hunger ravaged African
continent
2 See also notes 24 and 25, chapter 5.
3 See, for example, Atkinson (1999) and Watkins (1999)
4 The "zero option" was a position whereby the US wanted all agricultural support to end.
5 See also note 28, chapter 5.
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